Round The World
New Delhi, 26 August 2008
N-Deal Stuck In NSG
INDIA NEEDS TO BE FLEXIBLE
By Sitakanta Mishra
Senior Research
Scholar, South Asian Studies Division,
Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi.
With the unfolding of events since the trust vote on 22 July
2008, the discourse on India's
credential as a sovereign nation has turned a full circle. First, the current
nuclear conundrum is axiomatic of India's culture of democratic nuclearism, identity formation
and national interest which have evolved through many ups and downs.
Second, India's
stand at the recently held 15th NAM
ministerial meeting in Tehran
vindicates its responsibility as a demagogue in its region and its commitment
for unbiased international order. Third, the unanimous endorsement of the
India-specific safeguards by the IAEA Board of Governors at Vienna
marks the beginning of the fruition of India's single-minded challenge to
the lop-sided global nuclear order.
Finally, the hold up of India's waiver application in the
NSG and the consequent diplomatic push and pull vindicate that the deal is not
really straight-jacketed as has been branded by many. All these events
underline the fact that national interest and sovereignty nourished by the democratic
ethos is paramount in India's
recent undertakings, although it has been coloured otherwise.
The domestic debate over the Indo-US nuclear deal leading to
the trust vote seems to have been interpreted out of proportion. Undoubtedly,
it is the first instance when the country’s foreign and nuclear policy issues
were the bone of contention. But there is no denying the fact that nuclear
issues have always been "highly opinionated" perhaps owing to our
argumentative trait and "deeply entrenched" culture of democratic
debate. Resulting in the nuclear policy and planning, except the operational
aspects, being vigourously debated.
While on the one hand, the euphoria over the deal and the
consequent political gimmick is an off-shoot of New Delhi's democratic nuclear discourse. On
the other hand, the episode brings forth the nuances of the political-nuclear
interface and the resultant domestic hubbub.
In relation to the
deal, two inter-connected issues --- our independent foreign policy and the alliance
with US --- have repeatedly been highlighted and claimed by the Left as stains
on India's
sovereign nationhood. While their principled opposition to the deal is
understandable, on the flip side, it was a slap on India's proud claim as a vibrant
democracy when a part of the system was unable to overcome ideological
stereotypes. It is shocking that some leaders and parties failed to understand
the fact that technology misunderstood is
development missed.
The approval of the India-specific safeguards agreement
through "consensus" by the IAEA Board of Governor on 1 August will
permit regular IAEA surveillance of India's 14 declared civilian
nuclear energy plants out of a total 22 facilities. Among the proposed 14, 6
are already under the agency's supervision and if things go right it would
start implementing the new agreements at the facilities in 2009.
According to the IAEA Chief Mohamed EL Baradei the deal
satisfies India's
needs and also meets all legal requirements of the UN atomic watchdog. All eyes
are now on getting a "clean and unconditional" exemption at the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is likely to meet for the second time in early
September.
However, the Congress-led UPA Government's hook or crook
approach to silence the domestic dissent would certainly not work while dealing
with international divergence. Small countries like Austria,
Ireland, Norway, Switzerland
and New Zealand have already
shown their discontent and have emphasised reintroduction of provisions for
full-scope safeguard and India's
membership in the NPT during the NSG meet.
Clearly, the Foreign Ministry needs to introspect why these
small countries have raised apprehension about India's credentials when developed
countries have wholeheartedly supporting the deal? Most of the Scandinavian
countries have never found adequate attention in New Delhi’s international calculation.
One can easily perceive how Canada
and South Africa were
quickly convinced in comparison to other small nations perhaps owing to the
fact that Ottawa and Pretoria
bag greater attention from New Delhi
than the Scandinavians. For that matter, the Left assertion on India’s foreign
policy having a big-power-bias holds some truth.
The lack of consensus in the NSG to okay the India-specific
waivers doesn't mean that the countries have opposed it outright. Instead, they
wanted another round of debate on India's credentials. The hardened
attitude of these countries can also be a consequence of the internal debate in
India.
This has generated a chain reaction in the countries which have dissent on the
deal.
For example, the Indo-US deal is reflected in the local
politics of Austria,
a strongly anti-nuclear country which is preparing for fresh election in
September. Austrian critics lament that their Government is not more vocal and
firm in its opposition to the N-deal. Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer’s coalition Government
has been accused for currying favour with India
in order to win New Delhi's
backing for an Austrian bid for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security
Council.
In the US
too, anxiety on the deal is gathering steam in tandem with the run-up to the Presidential
election. Many hope that the deal would be passed during the current Congress
and the choice of Joseph Biden as the Democratic Vice Presidential candidate
has eased the situation. Moreover, Barack Obama's non-proliferation zeal may
well be tempered by Biden's enthusiasm for India and the deal. Republican McCain
is already committed to the deal. Thus the deal might have a spill-over effect in
the electoral battle.
At this
juncture, while India
can demand a "clean exemption", and oppose any conditionality, for
example signing the NPT and the CTBT, however “it does make sense to be
reasonably flexible". The deal after all does have in-built mechanisms for
any future eventuality.
The US on its part has already dispatched
envoys to New Zealand, Canada, Japan,
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland,
Norway and the Netherlands,
among others to persuade them. The US
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Glen Davies is in Wellington
to persuade New Zealand, the
staunchest hardliner, to support India.
More importantly, New
Delhi needs to understand that there is no such thing
as unconditional waiver. If in its next meet in early September the NSG remains
chary of granting India
carte blanche approval, a measure of flexibility on its part without
compromising the core concerns, should be in place.
Therefore, to drive the deal towards its logical conclusion,
India, in the short run, needs to mobilise all resources at its disposal to
maintain unanimity on the deal while
remaining flexible on substantive issues, if warranted. In the long-run, it
needs to reach out to small nations by spreading its soft power.
Also it is in the interest of the Congress Party to demystify
domestic apprehension by selling the benefits of the deal to the aam aadmi on a war-footing. Besides, the
deal and New Delhi’s relations with the US should not
become an end in itself. The Government must remain alert to anything going
wrong or modification of provisions needed while negotiating with the NSG or
with the US Congress. Therefore, it has rightly been said, "negotiating
for an exception for India …
would be like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire." ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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