Defence Notes

Indo-Pak Talks

SIACHEN GLACIER ON BOIL AGAIN

By B.K. Mathur

Nothing of the sort has happened. India wants, and rightly too, Islamabad to authenticate the positions of the Indian troops in the region at present to eliminate any mischief by the Pakistan Army in claiming those strategically advantageous heights which the Indian troops are presently occupying at high costs, notwithstanding clear indications prior to the Rawalpindi talks that Islamabad was, in principle, inclined to arrive at an agreement for the withdrawal of Indian troops.  Islamabad obviously wants New Delhi to be flexible on the distance to which the Indian troops will pull back with actually no commitment about the withdrawal of troops from where to where and why.  Naturally the controversy remains unresolved, notwithstanding the diplomatic and political statements by the top leadership of the two countries.

 Strategically, the Indian troops are based at a height very advantageous to them in the event of a war. This is hurting the military rulers in Pakistan against the backdrop of its defeats at the hands of India’s armed forces in 1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999.  All the time the Pak forces have attacked India from the Kashmir side and had to pay heavily, despite assistance and support from powerful, developed countries. Islamabad now wants the Indians troops to be withdrawn from these heights over the Saltoro ridge, which India should not leave.  Islamabad may have lately accepted in principle the Indian troops’ positions. But there is certainly need to first get confirmation of the “actual ground position line (AGPL) as the defining line or Line of Control.

 In other words, the LoC which was earlier drawn up only up to NJ 9842 should be extended as part of a firm compromise and defined upto the end. Nothing short of which need to be accepted, notwithstanding Islamabad’s diplomatic pressure for world consumption. The Indian side, particularly the Defence side, including the armed forces, should ignore what the Pakistan Defence Secretary’s delegation had reportedly stated after the last week’s unsuccessful round, like in May last year: India has remained adamant on its demand for authentication of the present position of Indian troops, even though we had offered to “record” the positions.  This clearly means that Islamabad remains adamant to its known position that it does not want to legalise the AGPL.

 What the Indian Army insists is to have a “clearly defined operational response mechanism.”  A firm provision needs to be incorporated in the agreement, that in the event of the Pakistani troops intruding into the Indian territory and taking positions belonging to the Indian Army and withdrawn under the agreement\, the Indian troops would be within their right to undertake an operational response and re-capture the positions on the Glacier heights held by them prior to the implementation of the agreement, if any.  But before the “give and take” arrangement which PM Manmohan Singh seems willing to work out with President Musharraf, it is necessary for New Delhi to draw the LoC upto the end.

The defining of the AGPL is at the root of the prolonged Siachen problem.  Remember, following the Shimla Agreement after the 1971 war, the ceasefire line was converted into the Line of Control (LoC) and so delineated on the maps.  This exercise established Point NJ 9842 as the anchor around which the LoC got further defined as “thence north to the glaciers”. This controversy over the “undrawn” LoC beyond NJ 9842 and its continuation towards north or “north-east” has remained unresolved, which consequently led to the operation “Meghdoot” in 1984.  The Indian forces then occupied the strategic heights.  The inviolability of the LoC has to be maintained and made an important national objective, as stressed by former Defence and External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh of the BJP.

This national objective must be kept in mind while working out any agreement with Pakistan.  It should not be treated casually because the LoC in the Siachen sector has been turned into the AGPL. If New Delhi is now considering withdrawal of troops from the heights acquired through great efforts in 1984, then there is need for secure certain commitments and assurances from Islamabad. Any formula to resolve the contentious issue must, therefore, include the confirmation of the AGPL, as the defining line, commitment against the re-occupation of the heights surreptitiously by Pakistan, defining the extent of the withdrawal and, importantly, cleaning of that part of the Glacier which has been under the Pakistani troops for a long time.

 Any withdrawal of Indian troops from the strategic heights for a military operation needs to be negotiated after obtaining adequate assurances, with a clause for immediate military action against the violator, that is, Pakistan. In this context, it must be remembered that the positions on which the Indian troops are deployed are not over Siachen but the Saltoro glacier west of Siachen.  Pakistan has attempted several times since 1984 to dislodge our troops from that height and has, in the process, lost substantial number of troops.  Evidently, therefore, any agreement with Islamabad without confirming the validity of the AGPL would amount to a violation of the sanctity of the LoC – and dilution of India’s stand all these years.

In the past successive Army Chiefs have expressed their concern about an agreement on withdrawal of the troops from these heights in a hush hush manner, at times warning of the consequences. The Chief of the Army Staff, General J.J. Singh had boldly stated: last year prior to the tenth round of the Defence Secretaries meet: “We have conveyed our concern and views to the Government and we expect that the composite dialogue will take care of these concerns and the decision of the Government will be taken in consonance with the views which have been projected.”  The Army’s main plea now, as on two earlier occasions in 1989 and 1990, is that some kind of a mechanism should be incorporated in the agreement that defines the Indian troops’ positions after withdrawal.

 Truly, it will be suicidal for India to agree on anything less than getting Indian troops present position “authenticated” before any withdrawal. This done, another “precautionary measure” must be taken: continued presence of the Indian Air Force, even if the troops are ultimately pulled back. The IAF bases of the Western forward area should remain in full “operational readiness”, because Kashmir and its annexation has always remained close to the hearts of all military rulers. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto has disclosed the other day in her amended autography that Musharraf as Director of Military Operations has “sought” permission to “take” Kashmir and assure control of Srinagar in 1996.  What he wanted was foolishly attempted in Kargil in 1999. Please remember this.---INFA

  (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)