Round The World

New Delhi, 8 December 2023

India’s Foreign Policy

FROM NON TO MULTI-ALINGMENT!

By Prof. (Dr.) D.K. Giri

(Secretary General, Assn for Democratic Socialism) 

The erudite and articulate foreign affairs minister S Jaishankar has of late been stressing the multi-polarity in world politics that requires a multi-alignment approach. Probably he means that configuration of world powers has drastically changed causing a few global powers emerging on the scene. So non-alignment between two blocks in a bipolar world as it was, should give way to engaging with various power centres. This certainly merits a deeper evaluation. Interestingly, the foreign policy for the first in recent years, such as the success of G-20 in New Delhi, became a campaign point in the recent State elections.   

Foreign policy of any country is essentially a manifestation of its national imperatives. They are defined by international political observers, commentators, academics and diplomats as determinants, objectives, principles and national interests. India’s foreign policy, likewise, has been shaped by and has evolved as reflection of such priorities, and more important, in response to the prevalent world order. 

The evolution of India’s foreign policy since 1947 till date could be divided into several phases in various ways. Let us take two formats for segmenting India’s foreign policy. One is to divide it into six phases. The first phase (1947-62) could be described as optimistic Non-Alignment. India got independence in 1947, two years after the end of Second World War when international politics got divided into two camps – one led by the US and the other by the former Soviet Union. India was wary of the Western powers which were colonisers and wanted to stay away from them. 

Strategically also, India did not wish to belong to any camp. The independent stance stemmed from its long and gruelling freedom struggle. Thus, India founded the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in 1961, which, in a way, was the zenith of solidarity in the Third World which was getting decolonised. However, the 1962 war with China changed that position as India had to seek military help from US and Britain. 

The unexpected war with China and its consequence led to the second phase of Realism and Reorganising (1962-71). New Delhi had to look beyond Non-Alignment in the interest of national security, concluding a now largely forgotten defence agreement with the US in 1964. Later, India faced pressures from the US and UK on Kashmir. At the same time, Pakistan was becoming an ally of the United States. New Delhi then perforce had to tilt towards the Soviet Union which led to the third phase. 

The third phase (1971-91) consisted of India’s assertion as a regional power based on self-reliance. India showed remarkable strategic autonomy and use of hard power in liberating East Pakistan (Bangladesh) in 1971 war against Pakistan. The emergence of US-China-Pakistan axis posed multiple challenges for India. Recognising the security risks, New Delhi signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty with Soviet Union. Geo-political and domestic upheavals in 1990s necessitated a strategic shift in India’s foreign policy. The Gulf War (1991-91), the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991) and the economic stagnation at home causing a balance of payment crisis led India to rethink its foreign policy. 

The fourth phase, safeguarding the strategic autonomy (1991-98) came into play. The strategic autonomy manifested conspicuously in exercising its nuclear option (Pokhran-II) in 1998. The emergence of the US as a sole super power also prompted India to change its course. India reached out to engage with the US, Israel and Asean countries. 

In the fifth phase (1998-2013), India acquired the attributes of a balancing power and began to be seen as the counterweight to China, a new economic power. This recognition could be reflected in India-US Nuclear Agreement in 2008. At the same time, India maintained its traditional ties with Russia and made ‘common cause’ with China in BRICS and SCO. 

The sixth phase turned India to multi-alignment (2013-till now). This current strategy emanates from India’s self-realisation of its capabilities and geo-political significance in the existing world politics influenced largely by rise and threat of China. To name a few of India’s power-indicators; it is one of the major world economies (fifth largest), a big technology power (software), global player in certain major issues like climate change (Paris Agreement), anti-terrorism (peace-broker) and a regional power – SAGAR, Act East, BIMSTEC, QUAD, and so on. 

The second format phasing India’s foreign policy consists of three strategies. Nehruvian idealism (1947-62); during this period, India regarded ethics and rule-based order as the guiding principles enshrined in the international institutions. That is why perhaps India took the Kashmir dispute to the United Nations, signed the Panchsheel Agreement with China (remember Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai mood sweeping across the country), built NAM which was marked by anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-racism. 

The war with China changed dramatically India’s foreign policy. New Delhi shifted to strategic realism (1962-1991). In this phase, India gave shelter to Dalai Lama to the chagrin of China; India was critical of US action in Vietnam, India liberated Bangladesh in 1971, sent troops to Sri Lanka (IPKF) to quell the Tamil separatist movement, although on hindsight, it was a strategic mistake. 

In the third phase following the foreign currency crisis in 1991, India embraced the policy of economic pragmatism, which primarily meant focussing on India’s growth and development. Following such strategy, India did business with China despite the lingering border disputes, continued arms trade and other imports from Russia despite latter’s decline as a world power and falling out with US, carried on trade even with Pakistan although to a less volume than before. New Delhi negotiated both with Israel and adversarial Arab States. 

From the historical overview of India’s foreign policy, I would like to draw two broad distinct phases in terms of strategy, one non-alignment and the other, multi-alignment. It is to be noted that non-alignment was sought to be worked into “genuine Non-Alignment for a brief period, two-and-half years under Janata Party rule (1977-79)”. It is also worth noting that the Latin American countries seem to be emulating India’s non-aligned strategy re-christening it as “active Non-Alignment” which partly shaped their reactions to the war in Ukraine. 

This policy emerged in 2019 and is still being laid out as a framework of their foreign policy in response to the challenges posed by US-China competition. It means not accepting a priori position of any of great power in conflict. The term ‘active’ refers to a foreign policy in constant search of opportunities, a kind of nimble approach. 

In India’s journey from non-alignment to multi-alignment, is there any room for re-alignment? Recognising the popular aphorism, “people become wiser after the event”, non-alignment was a flawed policy from the word go. If Nehru wanted to stay away from Western powers, why did he stay in the Commonwealth which was created and headed by Britain? In a world, in which countries are inter-dependent as well as antagonistic, it was not feasible to be non-aligned. The non-viability of the strategy was exposed many times in India’s conduct of its foreign policy – 1956 (invasion of Hungary), 1962 (China war), 1968 (attack on Czechoslovakia), 1971 (post-Bangladesh war) and so on. 

Multi-alignment is stating the obvious. No country can function in isolation. Politics is global although strategies in actions are national. Multi-alignment as a strategy seems nebulous; it needs to be clearly defined. Going with everyone conceptually appears to be confusing two potential allies, actual friends and partners. What is therefore needed is re-alignment in India’s foreign policy in keeping with its long-term national interests. ---INFA 

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