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Round The World
New Delhi, 23 December
2022
Tawang Clashes
A WAKE UP CALL
By Dr. D.K. Giri
(Prof. International Relations,
JIMMC)
On 9 December, the Indian and Chinese troops clashed at
Yangtse in Tawang sector in Arunachal Pradesh. The fight involved hundreds of
Chinese and Indian troops, a few of them sustaining minor or major injuries. Tawang
is quite a sensitive border area. It was in this sector that the 1962
India-China war had first begun. It was also the last spot where the ceasefire
was brought about. The Chinese attempted unsuccessfully to change the status
quo at Yangtse by perhaps wresting the area from India. The debate in India and
speculations across the world has revived on whether India and China will go to
war at some point.
Before engaging in the debate on probability of an
India-China war, a quick dip into the causes of the latest physical conflict is
in order. India and China share the longest border in the world which has been
contested by both sides. There have been recurring conflicts on the border
since 1962. The bones of contention are Aksai Chin a region north of Nepal which
is controlled by China and claimed by India. Likewise, Arunachal Pradesh on the
east of Bhutan, is controlled by India while claimed by China. Such claims and
counter-claims have created 13 hotspots.
At any rate, the Chinese incursions into India are not
random or one-off. They are consistent and coordinated. Some Dutch academics
have studied this process deeply in a commendable work called, “Rising tensions
in the Himalayas: A geo-spatial analyses of Chinese incursions into India”. By
studying several incursions from 2006 to 2020, they have established the
pattern of incursions as a part of expansionist strategy adopted by China.
Elaborating on Chinese military tactics, they infer that China will bite a bit
of territory, than a bit more, forcing India to accept it as part of Chinese occupation.
Some people call it the ‘salami slicing’ tactics.
Another metaphor for Chinese strategy of nibbling away our
territory is to ‘keep the pot boiling, but do not let it boil over’. China will
like to tear into other countries’ territory. It will take a small piece of land;
keep it under the threshold from where the target country, in this case India,
could counter-attack. But over time, it becomes a bigger piece of land as part
of Chinese territory. Yet another Chinese tactic of grabbing land is to enter
into another country’s territory and when confronted militarily or
diplomatically back-off half way and declare that they had done it
inadvertently as the lines of demarcation were not clear and have then
withdrawn.
Such strategies for acquiring territory are well-known. The
Dutch study has also found out that Beijing goes for territorial aggression on
certain periods of its domestic politics and economy. The study said, “We found
an uptick in incursions when China is experiencing economic stress such as low
consumer confidence and in Indian case, when New Delhi gets closer to the
Washington”. If overseas observers and researchers are aware of Chinese ‘deception
diplomacy’ and territorial expansionism, it will be hard to believe that Indian
foreign policy officials and strategists are oblivious to Chinese games at the
borders!
Since the Galwan military confrontation in June 2020 that killed
Indian and Chinese troops, 9thDecember clash with sticks and clubs
even without gunfire is aserious development which should be regarded as a
wake-up call vis-à-vis China by Government of India. The current debate post-9
December is whether China will launch a full-scale war on India. Some observers
contend that the war is not a question of whether but when. Some of us, myself
in this column, have repeatedly alerted the government about the sinister
designs of China on India: trying to encircle India by poaching on her
neighbours, stunting India’s economic growth, making illegitimate claims on
Indian territory and sporadic incursions into Indian land.
So, whether India and China will go to war at some point in
future is not the question. The real position should be that we are at war with
China. Such a position will correctly define or redefine our strategy towards
China. One can credit Narendra Modi regime for breaking some new grounds on
India’s foreign policy. But on China, I have consistently maintained that New
Delhi has fumbled. It does not have a long-term, viable and workable policy
towards China. It is at best reacting to each crisis that emerges, whereas it
should have a comprehensive, wellthought-out strategy.
Admittedly, there is a clear economic asymmetry between New
Delhi and Beijing. This need not translate into military power disparity. If
Ukraine can engage the mighty Russia, Indian army can certainly stand up to
China. At any rate, if a military conflict breaks out, the world powers get involved
directly or indirectly in order to maintain the balance of power and in some
cases,related superiority. So, obviously the dynamics of power configuration will
be dramatically different from what they are now if a full-blown military
confrontation.
The current Indian strategy appears to consist of the
following steps – build border infrastructure, use military power as India did
in Galwan and Tawang in order to rebuff Chinese intrusion, seek military
advantage strategically or even fortuitously. Furthermore, diplomatically
deepen partnership with the democratic world by projecting China as a systemic
threat; participate in countervailing coalitions. Moreover, over a period of
time when Indian economy catches up with that of China, New Delhi could take on
China in any which way Beijing approaches.
Even the Dutch scholars are suggesting that confrontation
or military retaliation is not the way to resolve the border disputes. Early
warning systems have to be used to ward-off incursions and negotiations for
settling disputes. New Delhi needs to build-up its economy to match the might
of Chinese robust economy. The strategy may be appropriate for the time-being. But
nothing stops India from being diplomatically pro-active in countering China.
Why is India in SCO and BRICS when Beijing is moving its
military into Indian territory? New Delhi has taken a position against
Islamabad that it will not hold talks until the latter stops sponsoring
terrorism in Indian territory. Why cannot New Delhi have a similar approach to
China however big it may be? That India will not associate with China in any
forum until it withdraws from Indian territory or ceases to make false claims.
To reiterate, we have been arguing that India’s foreign
policy should revolve around our China policy not Pakistan although the latter
is a vote-catcher. This shift away from Islamabad to Beijing has not happened
yet. The present government seems to be uncertain about this necessary and
unavoidable shift. Galwan and Tawang are the litmus tests on Chinese intention
and attitude towards India. Will the government take this on board and make
this urgent shift forthwith. ---INFA
(Copyright, India News & Feature
Alliance)
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