Round The World

New Delhi, 21 October 2022

Sino-US Conflict

THE THIRD WAY

By Dr. D.K. Giri

(Prof. International Relations, JIMMC)

With confirmation of Xi Jinping for the third term, in the 20^th Congress of Chinese Communist Party, the battle lines against USA are reconfirmed. Contrary to speculations, Xi Jinping may be re-elected but his powers will be reduced, the military and foreign policies may be shared, Xi Jinping seems to have emerged stronger. Since China opened up half a century ago, no Chinese leader has acquired so much power with no limits to the number of terms in office. What is more, we are witnessing in China the homologation of positions which points to a cult personality, a practice no longer noticed in recent times.

International political analysts like to point that resistance to Jinping’s autocratic style exists in places like Hong Kong, Tibet and Xinxiang, and it will grow. That perspective merits a debate and may be that, dissent can be exacerbated and exploited by China’s adversaries like the West in future. But as of now, Xi’s footprint coincides with those of China. The prevalent political mood represented by Jinping consists of a few ambitions. One, China wants to collect political dividends for its economic successes. It needs to be more assertive internationally. Second, Chinese dream is to become a world power. Beijing seeks to supplant US as the numero uno in the world politics, or share the leadership space.

Xi Jinping has convinced his colleagues that the US is in an irreversible decline as the world power. And Beijing can fill the void. Third, Chinese leadership believes that their system is better for economic growth, political discipline and social security etc, and they should put forth their system as a viable and replicable option for the world. In order to fulfil the aforesaid aspirations, China wants a strong man who controls and reassures citizens. Jinping is the man for the moment. Sensing the mood, Jinping has consolidated his authority with an iron hand and political acuity. He has eliminated most of his opponents by implicating them in corruption scandals. At the same time, he put his men in leadership positions – from army to propaganda, and from security to data management etc.

The implications of the concentration of power in the hands of Xi Jinping are two-fold – national and international. Domestically, China has become, from one-party to a one-leader country. Internationally, Beijing increasingly prefers greater assertion and continued claim to a world power status to an approach of maintaining a low international profile while steadying its economic growth.This trend has been evident in recent times as Beijing has been making stronger claims to territories and mineral rights in places like South China Sea and traditional Japanese Islands. These claims have alienated East Asian countries like Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Japan who are aligned with USA in security terms, while accommodating China on limited trade and investment.

This is the stark and hard choice many countries have to make, between USA and China. In doing so, there are atleast three strategies adopted by different countries. One is hedging, which is no longer viable. As the competition between the two big powers intensifies, countries will have to make a choice between security and trade. They would need USA as an international guardian to defend their territorial integrity and political sovereignty etc, although they realise that China has grown too big to be ignored.

Second variable is how countries like to play their respective world roles. They will be ‘contributor’ to a world order or ‘recipient’ of what is being shaped in other words, shaper or taker. Many middle-power countries like Japan, Germany, Australia will like to be a ‘shaper’ of the world order and hence go with America which claims to be the champion of the free world based on democracy and all the political and human values that go with it. That is why these countries have formal security treaties with USA.

Interestingly, countries like Australia take a hybrid approach as they need both,the security provided by USA and the trade with China. Although Australia has made it clear that security and rule-based world order will take precedence as political sovereignty or territorial integrity is threatened.

The third variable in building concrete partnership is ‘reliability’ of USA as an international guardian. US’s reputation as a trusted ally and of its staying-power as a defender of democracy is not strong. Also, can USA push China back to the position of status quo – a big market with no international political ambitions? Many analysts contend that USA could not deter China without imposing real heavy costs.

Where does India stand between USA and China? New Delhi has been hedging in the name of neutrality. It has been non-aligned between USSR, now Russia and USA. But it is a different ball-game with China, especially when China is a border country occupying and demanding Indian territory. New Delhi likes to hold on to its strategic autonomy and has been hedging in Sino-US conflict, perhaps conscious of the other two variables – the shaper/taker position in which India is perceived to be a hybrid partner. It goes with USA on security arrangements like Quad and with China on economic groupings like BRICS and SCO. And the other variable India is wary of is US’s reputation as a trustworthy ally. Obviously, USA has been going back and forth on partnership with Pakistan, Afghanistan and others, even with India and China.

Admittedly, many countries are wanting to retain their strategic autonomy – South Africa, Brazil, Chile etc for example. Such stances remind us of the non-aligned movement (NAM) created in 1960s by India and others, immediately after the decolonisation process began. I have maintained in my writings, and in this column that it was an unviable strategy in an inter-dependent world which later began globalising. However, this strategy can be recalibrated as an ‘Alliance of the Progressives’, in actual terms, Alliance of the Non-Aligned. Since the latter term is an oxymoron, the former terminology is preferable.

What it means in practical terms is that the alliance of the progressives will be both dispositional and situational corresponding to a country’s political values and to its legitimate national interest. India very well fits into this formation – ‘the third-way’ in international politics. This is certainly not the way of neutrality or abstentions in the United Nations in the name of strategic autonomy. Alliance of Progressives will enjoin upon in open a country to speak up for progressive values irrespective of whichever country is offended by them.

These values are defined in discourses and shared among allies. Such values could include freedom, equality, justice, identity, dignity, pluralism, solidarity etc. and others that may be commonly conceived from time to time and agreed upon. In the alliance of progressives, the national interest of a country will not be downplayed; it would be jointly defined among allies, not by a country alone leading to conflict with other countries. Let India be a leading part of the third way, reformulating the strategy of non-alignment it initiated decades ago. The third way is certainly worth exploring. ----INFA

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)