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Round
The World
New
Delhi, 22 July 2022
India’s Foreign
Policy
CAPACITY &
CONSTRAINTS
By Dr. D.K. Giri
(Prof. International
Politics, JIMMC)
All policies of all governments anywhere in
the world require periodic review and evaluation. Foreign policy, in
particular, needs regular review and re-evaluation in the context of
ever-changing, dynamics in the external environment of any country. In this
piece, we attempt to briefly examine the capacities and the constraints of
India’s foreign policy. This has been necessitated by two strategies currently
pursued by the present regime. They could be contradictory and complementary at
the same time. They also draw the lineage from the previous regimes.
The strategies in reference are the strategic
autonomy and multi-alignment. India’s approach to and understanding of the
concept of strategic autonomy is captured in External Affairs Minister S
Jaishankar’s presentation in the Raisina Dialogues (2021). He explained, “We
have to be confident in who we are. It is better to engage with the world as to
who we are rather than pleasing the world by being a pale imitation of what
they are, the idea that we need to get approval from other quarters has to be
put behind”.
As said before, this is not an entirely new
concept. But the government supporters will contend that the country was done
with the Congress style of limiting its strategic moves, for fear of attracting
Western displeasure or disapproval. Today, India is confident enough to secure
her aims and interests without worrying too much about what others thought.
On the second strategy, in this dynamic world
of multiple and changing alliances, India’s strategy of making partnership is
articulated by Jaishankar in his book, the India Way: Strategies for an
Uncertain World (2020). He argues that India should spread its risks and
not place all its eggs in one basket. The essence of S. Jaishankar’s argument
is that with the changing global balance of power and faced with major security
and economic challenges, India would have to advance its national interests by
identifying and exploiting opportunities wherever they exist in the global
community.
Yet, the third strategy, or
rather an aspiration is, India becoming a great power. This is self-consciously
expressed at times by top leadership and is endorsed or encouraged by world
leaders. Citing some statements, Prime Minister Narendra Modi immediately after
taking over the office in 2014 expressed his government’s intention as, “India
taking a leading role” in global affairs. Then Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar,
spoke of India’s aspirations to be a ‘leading power’. Minister of State for
External Affairs V.K. Singh, saw India on track to becoming “a leading world
power”.
Unarguably, India is being
recognised as a rising power. Jim O’ Neill, the former head of Goldman Sachs,
famously coined the term BRICS to refer to four rising powers – Brazil, Russia,
India and China. India could well become a permanent member of the UNSC. Every
major power has endorsed India’s candidature for this position alongside the
current P-5. India’s trajectory towards becoming a big power consists of the
following capacities: India’s GDP in nominal terms is about 2.7 trillion USD,
making it the sixth biggest economy in the world. There are some projections
that suggest in purchasing power parity terms, India could be the second
largest economy after China by 2050. If India achieves the 5 trillion USD
target in the near future, it could jump to third position in economic
capacity.
India’s military consists of
1.5 million active personnel, the third largest after China and the US. India
is a major nuclear power with 130-140 nuclear weapons which can be placed on a
range of delivery systems including IRBMs – Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missiles. In 2009, India launched its first nuclear-power submarine (INS
Arihant) to carry nuclear weapons. In 2018, the Lowy Institute’s Asia Power
Index, which collects various dimensions of power, ranked India fourth, after
USA, China and Japan.
The question to ask is, does
India have the capacity commensurate with its rising power aspirations and to
maintain the two strategies mentioned above. From the economy and military
potential, the aspiration sounds credible. But on a reality check, it is a tall
order especially when India is compared and faced with China. Curiously, the
constraints lie in actualising the capacities.
Let us talk a bit about the
structural capacity of Indian foreign policy in carrying out the strategies and
the big-power objective. A detailed discussion, a ‘grand capacity analysis’ is
beyond the scope of this piece. The limited objective is to briefly and critically
look at the foreign policy capacity from a structural point of view. Former
Foreign Secretary and the National Security Advisor, Shivshankar Menon had
said, “India has serious capacity issues in the implementation of foreign
policy and lacks the institutional depth to see a policy through”. He further
argued that India showed “boldness in policy conception, caution in
implementation”. He cited implementation problems as centralisation of
decision-making, lack of ‘capability’ in the foreign ministry, weak
‘institutionalisation of foreign policy implementation’ and serious ‘capacity
issues’.
Studies have been done to
assess India’s foreign policy capacity which suggest that MEA has strengths in
terms of individual level competences of its officers, but suffers from
organisational and systemic weaknesses. The experts helpfully comment that
these weaknesses can be alleviated by reducing the hierarchal nature of the
leadership in South Block, decreasing the centralisation of decision-making,
enlarging the power of the policy-planning unit by seeking support from outside
MEA. Furthermore, MEA needs to develop stronger and more active ties to other
ministries, especially the Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and
above all, the Defence Ministry.
More important, MEA should
not remain an exclusive and elite club. It needs to improve communication with
the other two sectors, business and civil society – both at home and abroad. Thus,
the increase in such horizontal consultation would diminish the centralised
decision making and hierarchical nature of MEA.
Another pressing reform
suggested by experts is to increase the recruitment to the MEA. Through the IFS,
only about 30 or so are offered the service out of half-a-million candidates
applying for examination. This is far too less. The suggestion is to recruit on
the model of the private sector, like many developed countries do, from the top
under-graduate and graduate programme through a rigorous process of interviews
and group discussion. Another way, like it has been done in the IAS, is to
allow lateral entry for mid-career specialists. This may not increase numbers
but will boost expertise which will make communication and cooperation with
other agencies easier.
Understandably, while many
small or big reforms are needed, what is pressing at any time is the need to
increase policy capacity. This is not necessarily based on numbers. It is about
competencies at least three levels – individual officials, government
organisations and the resources existing in the country. The gap between
conceptualisation of the policy and its implementation can be bridged by
increasing the organisational and systemic capacities in order to absorb and
reflect the individual competences existing in the ministry.
In parenthesis, may we add
that India’s democracy and demography should drive India’s foreign policy in
making strategic alliances, be it multi-alignment or with single power block.
This is the choice India has to make. Taiwan would have been invaded by now if
it was not aligned with the United States. No NATO member has been attacked so
far. This should give some indication, as normalcy has not been restored with
China on border despite 17th round of negotiations. Something to
think about! ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News & Feature Alliance)
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