Round The World
New Delhi, 5 May 2015
Afghan
Conundrum
INDIA MUST REORIENT POLICY?
By Amrita
Banerjee
Research
Scholar, JNU
Seven months into his presidency,
Ashraf Ghani finally visited New Delhi.
His perceived tilt towards Islamabad and Beijing in an effort to find a
negotiated settlement to the conflict with the Afghan Taliban, including some
unilateral confidence building measures to fundamentally transform
Afghanistan’s traditionally strained ties with Pakistan, has probably been
blown out of proportion.
That it has taken long for the new
Afghan president to put India on his travel itinerary - a country which was the
first to commit itself to a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan,
immediately following the US/NATO decision to drawdown troops, and one which
has been the largest bilateral donor from the region – has led many to
speculate about the possible outcome of Ghani’s three-day visit to New Delhi in
the last week of April this year. Does this delay send out a message about a
reprioritisation in Afghanistan’s
foreign policy calculus about relations with India? And what steps does India need to
take to secure its interests, are some questions raised?
To start with, Ghani’s visit to India after
seven months into office has raised some profound questions. The dominant
perception in the Indian strategic affairs community is that Ghani has not only
under-appreciated but has also ignored India
and instead has given priority to Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, China and Iran. While his reasons for
visiting all these countries may have been tactical, the symbolic snub to India cannot be
discounted. It marks a sharp contrast to the kind of warmth his predecessor,
Hamid Karzai, displayed towards India
and the comfort level that he enjoyed with the Indian leadership, cutting
across party lines.
However, the reality is that the
contemporary security environment in Kabul
is also different. Ghani’s regional diplomacy, thus, has to be seen within the
following context. Firstly, his is a post-International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) government, which no longer has the assured support of 100,000
plus Western troops. Secondly, the US-led ‘war on terror’ may have receded but
not the ‘terror of war’ from Afghanistan as the Taliban have opened up several
fronts including in relatively stable and remote areas in the north and have
just announced the beginning of their annual spring offensive. Also, the
growing appeal of the ISIS among possibly
marginalised elements within various Islamist militant groups active in the
region could further complicate the security environment.
Thus Ghani’s shift of positions is
seen as being guided by one, the calculation of a Pakistan-sponsored
breakthrough with the Taliban, and two, the need to convey the message that Afghanistan no
longer wishes to be a battleground for an India-Pakistan proxy war. Ghani’s
shift also comes amidst disappointment among many Afghans about India’s failure
to grab the opportunity.
Ghani has already rescinded a
request for weapon supplies from New
Delhi, suggesting that he can get arms from anywhere.
Now that Washington
has promised to support 352,000 Afghan personnel until 2017, the Indian help
gets even less relevant. But, to cover it up, India has handed over three
multi-role Cheetah helicopters to the president during his recent visit.
Many in India
suspect that even India’s
economic role in Afghanistan
may become diminished and that Ghani might review the gamut of Indian projects
including the Chabahar
Port linking project,
iron-ore blocks, and steel plant in Hajigak. Even New Delhi
seems to have gone slow with Kabul.
This was evident as there was no major take-away from the Afghan President in
his first State visit to India.
No bilateral agreements were signed nor was there any movement on the
India-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement on cooperation on a wide
variety of areas.
Apparently, the Narendra Modi
government was well aware that Ghani needed the space to work out a peace deal
with the Taliban. So New Delhi did not rush into
any fresh defence deals since Delhi
knows the perils of close military engagement in that volatile nation.
So, is India’s Afghan policy in trouble?
Firstly, it appears that India’s
somewhat impulsive efforts have not cut much ice. Secondly, India’s $2 billion
commitment for Afghanistan seems to have been driven more by woolly ideas of
‘gaining goodwill’ rather than being based on a sound strategic assessment.
Thirdly, has India gained
anything by its go-it-alone approach in Kabul?
India’s
concerns on terrorism today seem to linger on and so does its obsession with
the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s networks in Kunar and Nooristan.
In view of these problems and the
situation in hand, its high time India reorients its policy towards
its Northwest neighbour. The focus now has to be on Afghanistan’s ethnic politics. Kabul too should come clear on its expectations from New Delhi as it struggles
to enter a ‘decade of transformation’.
The option of joining hands with Iran is still on the table and so is the
suggestion to change India’s
Pakistan
policy. This is ideal but not an easily reachable option.Thus, it is unlikely
that the Afghan game will end anytime soon. India should continue to play the
game but no longer by showering financial largesse but by deploying its skills
of political manoeuvring. India
should expand cooperation in Kabul
provided security is
managed. It is important to ensure that there is a political settlement in Afghanistan, and if Pakistan
or China
can help, so be it.
Keeping all this in mind, India should
wait patiently. At the end of the day, as sovereign nation Afghanistan’s
leaders have every right to befriend whichever country they want. The main
driver of Indian policy today should be a desire for constancy in Afghanistan for regional stability of South Asia. And as Modi rightly puts it, “India would walk shoulder to shoulder with the
people of Afghanistan
in a mission of global importance.”
Of course, there are likely to be
many bewildering twists to the Afghan situation. For now, most countries are
adopting a wait and see attitude because none is willing to be played by the
Afghans. It would be
premature, however, to say that India
has lost in Afghanistan, for
Delhi’s deepest asset in Kabul is the goodwill it has earned over the
years. India should continue
with its commitment to Afghan reconstruction and express support for Kabul’s ongoing
diplomatic initiatives, while emphasizing the need to preserve the democratic
spirit of the Afghan Constitution.--- INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)
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