Defence Notes
New Delhi,
16 December 2013
Defence
Appointments
MIRED IN
POLITICAL RED TAPISM
By Col (Dr) PK Vasudeva
(Retd)
The Government’s readiness to
appoint a permanent four-star General in principle as India’s first
tri-service military chief will be widely welcomed by all right thinking
strategists, barring the bureaucracy. For decades, the country’s strategic
community has urged the creation of a single-point military advisor, Chief of
Defence Staff (CDS), who would also oversee matters that relate to all three Services.
In October last year, the 14-member
high-powered Naresh Chandra Task Force on National Security had recommended the
appointment of a four-star general as Chairman of Chiefs of Staff Committee
(COSC), who would be dealing with the joint issues of the
three Services on a full-time basis. However, there are still
hiccups for this post, because Defence Minister A K
Antony feels it should be cleared by all political parties, which is an excuse
for delay.
In a National
Security Lecture, 2013 on “Civil Military Relations: Opportunities and
Challenges”, delivered at New Delhi’s United Services Institution, Governor
of Jammu and Kashmir N N Vohra stated
that the frequently voiced dissatisfaction among the defence forces is that the
civilians posted in the Defence Ministry don’t have either the adequate
experience of working in this arena nor long enough tenures to gain
specialisation for effectively dealing with military matters.
Some
commentators allege that the role of political leaders has been hijacked by the
bureaucracy and what ordains in the MoD today is “bureaucratic control and not
civilian political control of the military”. It has further been argued that
the civil services have succeeded in having their own way, essentially because
the political leadership has little or no past experience or expertise in
handling defence matters, has little interest, and lacks the will to support
reforms in the defence management apparatus.
The Task Force has also recommended
the appointment of Director level officers as staff officers from the Armed Forces
in the Defence Ministry for better coordination and procurement of arms and
defence equipment because the civilian staff lacks expertise and experience.
But the Ministry refuses to toe the line. In fact,
the administration has always been questioning the appointment of a permanent
chairman COSC/CDS. Firstly, as the defence service chiefs agree, the three Services
must coordinate closely to generate decisive power on the modern day
battlefield.
Secondly,
tri-Service autonomy causes wasteful expenditure with capabilities,
organisations and equipment being duplicated and even triplicated. Rather than
running redundant facilities, all three Services could combine functions such
as strategic communications, medical services, military policing, legal
services and logistics
Thirdly,
the Government shouldn’t have to discuss military issues with three Service chiefs
separately, often getting contradictory advice. The Chairman COSC would be a
single point-of-contact that offers integrated military solutions after taking
all service viewpoints into consideration.
For these
reasons, the Kargil Review Committee recommended way back in 1999 the creation
of a CDS, which was envisaged as a five-star general, admiral or air marshal,
directly overseeing the four-star Service chiefs of the army, navy and air
force. But the prospect of a powerful new military chief (chairman COSC)
apparently set off alarm bells. The NDA government accepted all the recommendations
of the GoM, under former Deputy Prime Minister L K Advani, barring the
appointment of a CDS. On that, the NDA ruled that it be “considered later,
after the Government is able to consult various political parties.”
Recall,
the Task Force had recommended to the Prime Minister that this four-star post
be created immediately to handle the jurisdiction where two or more Service
interests overlap. The three Service chiefs, who were in full agreement, sent
an appointment proposal to the National Security Council, which in turn referred
it to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which is to rule on the matter,
for bringing reforms in the country’s higher defence management.
In that case, it would be
insufficient to merely appoint Army chief General Bikram Singh as the first
permanent Chairman of COSC, and bump up Lieutenant General Anil Chait as army
chief. If these appointments are not accompanied by structural reforms, these
might seem no more than cynical ploys with an eye on the coming 2014 elections.
Presently, the Service chiefs
function as chiefs of staff and also commanders-in-chief, managing the gamut of
operations, policy planning, human resources, training and equipping. With
operations understandably enjoying precedence, there is little emphasis on long
range force structuring, equipment planning and human resource development.
Creating the structures for this
separation must be a specified task of the new Chairman COSC. One option is the
creation of US-style integrated theatre commands, with regional commanders
allocated army, navy and air force units for their operational tasks. For
example, the currently separate southern commands of the army, navy and air
force could be integrated into a single tri-service command that could
optimally harness the combat power of all three services.
Modern western militaries follow one
of two distinct models. The US, with its global responsibilities, has
independent theatre commands, such as Pacific, Central, etc, each of which are equipped
with land, air and sea units, bureaucrats and political departments needed for
independent campaigns. The theatre commander, a four-star general or admiral,
reports directly to the US
president, through the secretary for defence. In Washington, there is a centralized Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), headed by a five-star chairman.
The smaller British, French,
Canadian and Australian militaries place their army, navy, air force and marine
units directly under their respective four-star service chiefs. These service
chiefs answer to a five-star Chief of Defence Staff, who could be from any
service. The CDS reports to the minister in charge of defence.
Unfortunately,
the appointment of permanent Chairman COSC seems to have been again caught up
in doldrums. The NDA’s failure to act was followed by the UPA that uses the
same threadbare excuses. On Jun 13, 2005, then Defence Minister Pranab
Mukherjee declared that the CDS “would require a broad political consensus
among parties, both in office and in opposition.” Eight years on, incredibly, Antony has deployed the
same excuse to block even a four-star permanent chairman COSC, a post far less
threatening than a five-star CDS.
The
military deeply resents this humiliating lack of trust on the apolitical
defence establishment. Political leadership on the advice of bureaucracy feels
that appointing a CDS might invite a coup. Now the Defence Ministry says that a
permanent chairman COSC would be “a first step towards a CDS.”
Does Antony really believe
that it is acceptable to stall action in 2013 with exactly the same excuses of
2001 and 2005? Will good sense prevail on the CCS keeping in view the national
security interests of the country or will chalta
hai attitude continue, which may cost the nation heavily during any future
war? --- INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
|