Round The World   

New Delhi, 16 October 2007

The N-Deal Crisis

DELAYED BUT NOT THE END

 By Shailza Singh

Research Scholar, JNU

What is the future of the Indo-US civil nuclear deal? This is the million dollar question. The recent assertion by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress President Sonia Gandhi that the Government would not be put at stake over the deal, as a measure to defuse the political disquiet haunting the UPA, seems to have made the Government sink even deeper into crisis.

In a bizarre turn of events, the Big Two, Sonia and Manmohan have shown their preference of the Government over the Nuclear deal, a pact they were so enthusiastic and committed to and wanted it clinched “in the national interest”.

Pertinently, the extensively debated and politically divisive 123 Agreement, that is supposed to operationalise the Indo-US nuclear deal, landed the UPA Government into a crisis-like situation. The Government lauded the Agreement as the biggest breakthrough in years and a major achievement for four reasons.

End Nuclear Isolation

One, the deal would end more than three decades of India’s nuclear isolation  and enable the country to launch a new large scale industry of its own. Two, it would serve the imperative of India’s future energy security as nuclear power is essential for the country’s energy needs.

Three, it would alter the geo-strategic balance in Asia to the advantage of India. And lastly it would enable access to dual-use technology that would make available to Indian laboratories and industries a range of components and equipments having a variety of applications in other areas like medical research, space technology, defence, bio-technology, nanotechnology and manufacture of sports goods.

Left Objections

However, soon after the completion of the Agreement, serious objections were raised by not only the main Opposition party, the BJP, but also the Left parties that support the Government from outside. The Red Brigade threatened to withdraw support to the UPA if the deal was operationalised. They along with the other parties opposing the deal together constituted a clear Parliamentary majority thus creating political turbulence.

Significantly, the two sides of the political spectrum opposed the deal on divergent grounds. The BJP found the deal unacceptable as it was “an assault on India’s nuclear sovereignty and foreign policy”. Its opposition stemmed from the concern that the country would be coaxed to accept what is essentially a CTBT.

The Left’s opposition to the deal turned out to be quite different from that of the political right. It was rooted in ideological grounds based on resisting the expansion of the US political and economic supremacy. It argued that the deal would lead to aligning India’s interests to that of the US. Hence its opposition was not to the deal per se but to its larger policy implications. Moreover, this strategic alliance would have rippling consequences that would haunt it later.

The Left parties with 62 MPs in the Lok Sabha threatened to withdraw support from the Government over the deal and demanded a six month pause on the operationalization of the deal. Never mind, that it had been debated in both Houses of Parliament several times. Which is unprecedented in regard to international agreements.

Govt Efforts Futile

While the BJP’s opposition was perceived as motivated by factional hostility, the Government took the Left’s opposition seriously because their support is crucial for the Government’s survival. Thus, while it rejected the BJP’s demand for setting up a Joint Parliamentary Committee to look into ‘the legal lacunae’ in the 123 Agreement, the Government set up a 15-member UPA-Left panel in late August.

The panel headed by the External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee was to consider the Left’s objections and resolve the differences. But the Government’s stand was that the 123 Agreement could not be renegotiated and nor could it be negotiated in parts. Hence, there was no scope for further fine-tuning.

The Prime Minister seemed fully committed to the deal, even setting up a tentative timeline to conclude its negotiations with the IAEA in October. The Congress Party came up with a 21-page booklet named “India’s Nuclear Energy Programme and the 123 Agreement with the United States” dismissing the charges that the Agreement would affect India’s ability to conduct an independent foreign policy and strategic programme.

It also projected it as a pro-poor and pro-people programme pact. Besides, any backtracking would lead to significant embarrassment for India globally and for the Government domestically.

The Government presented the 123 Agreement as a diplomatic victory wherein the country managed to strike a better bargain from the US than China. (Beijing does not possess the right to reprocess.) Not only that. A similar deal had been denied to Pakistan and it was a “historic opportunity” which the country could not afford to miss.

Allies Have Second Thoughts

However, the Left did not buy the Government’s arguments. The more the Agreement was discussed the more the Left highlighted the legal lacunae of the pact. With the debate getting more intense the chances of a consensus remained bleak. At the same time there was mounting reluctance from the allies --- RJD, NCP and DMK to stake the Government over the deal.  A “deal-or-Government” situation emerged.

Owing to the electoral calculations and pressure from the coalition partners, Sonia and Manmohan switched gears. That too at a time when it seemed that the Government was all set for the next steps towards operationalising the deal. It decided to slow down the process of going ahead with the deal.

The Government considers it a well thought of and realistic step to take the Left parties on board and then proceed with the negotiations. Given the fact that if the Left withdrew support, a minority Government would not be able to undertake credible negotiations internationally.

Congressmen Upset

Needless to say, this step has been criticized within the Congress. The leadership has been charged of “inglorious surrender to the enemies of the nation,” said former Union Minister Ram Jethmalani. Add to this a blame game has started between the Congress and its allies over who is responsible for this climb down.

On the other hand, the turnaround has increased the credibility of the Left whose opposition to the deal was basically aimed at restoring their core constituency, largely of peasants, blue collar workers and Muslims, who were feeling increasingly alienated because of the Government’s closer ties with the US. Now they are in a “victorious” situation while the Congress is in a state of disappointment.

So, what next? Is the deal dead? Can India further delay the next steps towards operationalising the deal without killing the deal itself? Well, as of now the presumption about the death of the deal would be premature. The panel meeting to be held on October 22 has not been called off and is critical.

However, it is most likely that the deal will be delayed and will be de-linked from the Bush administration’s time-table. The signal of slow down of the process of proceeding with the deal will be sent to the US and the agreement is not a done deal now. ---- INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)