Round The World

New Delhi, 25 September 2007

AFGHAN PRAGMATISM OR SURRENDER?

 By Seema Sridhar

The Afghan Government’s consent to talk to the Taliban has created ripples in the international community. Questionably, when protracted acts of violence succeed in getting two conflicting parties to the negotiating table, does it imply the victory of brute force and terrorist violence in getting governments to negotiate on their terms?

Is talking to the enemy a symptom of stepping backwards, capitulating? Or is it the accepted mode of showing pragmatism? These have been the raging debates among the Afghan watchers over the last one month, with the death toll in Afghanistan reaching the highest this year, since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001.

In early September, the Afghan Senate passed a Bill distinguishing between the Afghan members of the Taliban, the Pakistani insurgents and the al-Qaeda who they classified as the enemies of Afghanistan.  With the passing of this Bill by the Lower House, the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai made renewed calls for talks with the Taliban.

President Karzai who has survived several assassination attempts by the Taliban has been criticized for finally being intimidated into buckling under the mounting pressure of the recurrent terrorist attacks. It is conceded that without the participation of the warlords, particularly, the powerful Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, it has almost been impossible to tackle the feuding private militias.

Further, the Centre-periphery relations have been at its worst under the post-Taliban Afghan Government as the rule of law beyond Kabul still seems like a far away utopian dream. Securing the Afghan boundaries is of utmost importance considering the spewing volatility in its neighbourhood. But this is easier said than done.

Infiltration from across the Pakistan border continues unabated. The disputed status of the Durrand line along with the controversy over fencing the Pakistan-Afghan border has only exacerbated the situation inside Afghanistan. The regrouped Taliban have struck back with an unforeseen force and are proving too much for the security forces of the international coalition to battle.

Militant attacks in southern and eastern Afghanistan have spiralled over the last one and half years, making this year the bloodiest since the inception of the war. A total of 103 suicide attacks, many of these on schools and such other civilian targets have pushed the Afghan Government into a corner. The ‘Spring Offensive’ launched by the Taliban this year has led to a shocking rise in insurgency, particularly in Kabul, which had remained outside the ambit of large scale insurgent violence due to the heavy troops concentration.

The Pakistani unwillingness to completely clamp down upon the al-Qaida factions in its tribal areas, where they have found a safe haven to regroup coupled with the Afghani perception of America’s soft stance towards Pakistan has left Kabul with few options in responding to the al-Qaida resurgence. The Afghan people are disillusioned with the US and NATO-led troops capability to restore security in the State and are irked by the ‘collateral damage’ occurring due to their retaliatory strikes.

The decision to talk to the Taliban has its bearings in all of these combined factors. So far calls for closer cooperation between the international security forces and the Afghans have not been very fruitful. Similarly, the calls in the policy circles for enhanced collaboration between the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan to tackle the rising Taliban insurgence have also not been bided by in effect.

The withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan was the pre-condition set by the Taliban for being party to negotiations with the Karzai Government.  The Taliban after being overthrown in the US-led ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ has now gained enough force to not only brings the Afghan Government to negotiate with them, but also to set terms for the negotiations. This pre-condition, of course, has been denied by the Afghan Government and the talks have been stalled this far.

But how long will it be before the Government takes a more conciliatory position even towards the demands of the Taliban, however unreasonable they might be. How many more terrorist attacks would determine the tone and tenor of the dialogue in favour of the Taliban? Remember, the more the leeway given to violence in the form of willingness to negotiate, the more the power balance tilts towards the perpetrator of the violence. Any form of dialogue would be meaningful only if the stakes are more or less balanced for both the parties.

It is only when two conflicting sides have reached a stalemate wherein more violence would only place the insurgents at a disadvantaged situation owing to mutual threat perceptions being equalized that a dialogue process could begin on an optimistic note. This means that an effective immediate crackdown on the regrouped Taliban factions, both within and outside Afghanistan is the need of the hour. If not, the Afghan Government would only end up capitulating to the Taliban, which has the advantage as of now, owing to the terror trial it has unleashed.

The United Nations has also stated that it would support peace talks between the Afghan Government and the Taliban and is even prepared to mediate. Commencing a dialogue with insurgents has seen mixed results in the past --- in some cases it has brought about a semblance of peace and in some it has amounted to simply giving in.

In a recent book, “Transnational Terrorism- Motives, Measures and Impacts”, Dr Chintamani Mahapatra, Associate Professor at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University and INFA contributor, contends that India should talk to the ISI if it wants effective cooperation with Pakistan on combating terrorism, keeping in mind spate of recent terrorist attacks on civilian targets in major cities across India.

This has evoked mixed reactions in strategic circles. The opposing views being:  One, talking always helps in addressing issues. Two, it would amount to walking into the hands of the enemy.

The history of talking to the enemy has witnessed many a crisis situation that has called for placating the demands of terrorist outfits. The hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight to Kandahar forced the Indian Government to release three terrorists from prison to secure the release of the passengers. The kidnapping of an Italian journalist in Afghanistan in March this year also led to the Afghan Government entering into a covert deal with the Taliban to secure his release. Thus, negotiating with the insurgents has been conditional upon such unavoidable circumstances, where the Government not only finds its hands tied but also the public outcry mounts to distressingly shrill levels.

The crux of the move behind opening up talks with the Taliban in today’s Afghanistan is that the attacks are not going to recede now. One future heinous incident would be aimed at forcing the Karzai Government to the negotiating table ---- on the insurgent’s own terms. So, the sooner they start the talk process, the lesser would be the death toll.

However, to what extent this logic would actually apply to the current situation wherein the Taliban is stuck to its unreasonable demand of troop withdrawal remains to be seen. Between demonstrable incapability for a complete crackdown by the ISAF and seemingly impossible conditions set by the enemy for negotiations, Afghanistan finds itself caught and bound in a Gordian knot. ---- INFA

(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)