Round The World

New Delhi, 7 August 2007

Indo-US 123 Pact

WILL CHINA SUPPORT IT?

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

Yet another milestone has been covered by the Manmohan Singh Government and the Bush Administration by completing negotiations on the 123 Agreement relating to the bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation and releasing the text of this pact for the consumption of the international community and the general public around the world.

The Indo-US nuclear deal is of interest not only to India and the US but the vast majority of nations for the simple reason that it would cement a new paradigmatic relationship between the most powerful and the largest democracies in the world. Secondly, the ultimate success of this deal will also influence the global balance of power, international civilian nuclear commerce and the texture of India’s relations with friends and adversaries of the US.

In fact, there are many countries in the world who wish this initiative to fail and miserably fail. One of them is certainly Pakistan, which has been trying to prevent such a deal by urging China to do something about it along with negotiating with the American political and strategic elite at various levels and openly demanding an equitable treatment for itself.

A country like Iran is apparently unhappy over closer relations between India and the US in view of the fear that it would lose a valuable strategic ally at a crucial phase of its nuclear standoff with Washington.

China’s strategic thinking aspires for a more troublesome relationship between neighboring India and the US. Already flanked by Japan, the pivotal strategic ally of the US, to its east, Beijing watches with considerable amount of fretfulness improving defence ties between New Delhi and Washington to its west; and perceives that the nuclear deal will buttress the development of  Indo-US security cooperation. 

However, neither Iran nor Pakistan are members of the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG) — a body which needs to give its consent to the Indo-US nuclear deal to move forward. Growing concerns over Pakistan’s connections with terror networks and international nuclear black market will make it difficult for the Musharraf Government to influence decision making in the NSG. Additionally, suspected Iranian nuclear weapon program and alleged violation of the NPT by Tehran make it a faint voice in the group opposed to the Indo-US nuclear deal.

The same cannot be said about China, which is a member of the NSG wielding veto power. Beijing is also an influential member of the international control regimes and a significant player in nuclear politics. Some Indian commentators have raised the possibility of Beijing creating complications for New Delhi and others have been anxiously watching the Chinese leaders’ cautious reticence on this issue. The inscrutable Chinese moves in the world of diplomacy should make India careful and watchful.

The US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns appears more confident of the Chinese position. In a recent interview to television networks, he disagreed that China could be a stumbling block and stated that Washington had begun its dialogues with several governments, including the Chinese soon after the July 2005 Indo-US agreement to convince them that the nuclear cooperation initiative with India was a step forward.

Given the level of influence the US exercises over China in view of the US-China agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation and extensive business and trade ties between the two, one can reasonably believe that China will not use its veto to prevent the Indo-US nuclear deal. Simultaneously, it is unlikely that China will throw its weight to support this deal without asking questions, indulging in various diplomatic posturing or even bargaining for certain advantages for itself or for its strategic partner — Pakistan.

Besides the international aspect of the 123 Agreement, the domestic political sector in the US and India is equally problematic to an extent. Both the Governments have been answerable to their respective people almost at every step in their movement towards finalizing the nuclear cooperation pact.

Soon after the release of the text of the 123 Agreement, the National Democratic Alliance, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party registered its opposition to the agreement. It has gone to the extent of demanding a debate on this issue in Parliament, creation of a Joint Parliamentary Committee to study and examine the various dimensions of the agreement before giving its final green signal. The Left parties stuck to their earlier opposition and promised to respond to the text agreement after a careful examination. The Third Party Alliance, the so-called UNPA, has openly expressed views against the agreement.

Similarly, there are strong voices of opposition to this agreement in the United States. The New York Times, one of the most influential newspapers of that country, in its editorial has urged the US Congress to reject the 123 Agreement, saying it is a sell out to India. The editorial complained: “Washington capitulated to India’s nuclear establishment. The problem is that the US got very little back. No promise to stop bomb-making material. No promise not to expand its arsenal. And no promise not to resume nuclear testing.”

Contrast this observation with the complaint made in India. A.N. Prasad, former Director of BARC, says: “We are now in effect reduced to a mere recipient state mandated by the Henry Hyde Act…to carry out a set of do’s and don’ts and strive to earn a good behaviour report card to become eligible to continue receiving what they can offer.” Placcid Rodrigues, President of the Indian Nuclear Society, does not agree that the 123 Agreement is an example of “full civilian nuclear cooperation” and points out that “enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water technology” are not covered in this agreement.

Similarly, some law makers in India, particularly the BJP considers this agreement an “assault” on Indian sovereignty and demands a vote on this in the coming session of the Parliament. In contrast, 23 US legislators have written a letter to President Bush saying, “Washington may have capitulated to India’s demands on the agreement…. The President cannot rewrite laws during a closed-door negotiation session with a foreign Government.”

Thus, the US critics think that the Bush Administration has capitulated to the Indian demands and the Indian critics argue that New Delhi has agreed to play second fiddle to Washington in international affairs. The American opponents argue that India has promised little to promote non-proliferation and the Indian opponents feel that the Government has failed in asking for reprocessing and enrichment technologies.

Nonetheless, the number of supporters in both the countries appears to have increased with several critics turning silent or giving tacit support to the final 123 Agreement. The opponents have spelled out the extreme demands, but the supporters have been indicating the substantial areas of convergence.

The fact remains that the two Governments have been able to weather critical opposition to the initiative in the past and they are likely to be successful in the future as well. ---- INFA

(Copyright India News and Feature Alliance)