ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 11 December, 2007
Nuclear Proliferation
Bush
Strategy Containing
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
After years of expressing concerns, imposing sanctions and threatening
military intervention to prevent Iran
from developing its nuclear weapons capability, the US
intelligence assessment has revealed that Iran stopped its nuclear weapon
programme way back in 2003.
Why was such information
not shared earlier? What was the need to raise a hue and cry over Iran’s
suspected nuclear weapons programme? What was the motive behind the diplomatic
offensive against Tehran’s
claimed civilian nuclear programme?
If such a revelation
had come earlier, the votes in the IAEA, the debate in the UN Security Council
and the European Union’s (EU) Troika’s painstaking exercises and the Iranian
President’s critical remarks and rhetoric would not have been necessary or at
least would not have acerbic contents.
Did it take four years
for the US intelligence
community to establish that Iran
did not have a nuclear weapon ambition since 2003? Any attempt to answer this
question would not be credible. That simply means that the Bush Administration
has had a highly sophisticated approach to contain the spread of nuclear weapons,
particularly in the Third World.
Significantly, the Iranian
President Ahmedinezad was quick to celebrate this piece of information by
announcing his victory. What was the victory about? Was it that President Bush
was wrong in claiming the existence of an Iranian nuclear weapon programme? Was
it that his claim of the civilian nature of the country’s nuclear activities
was vindicated by the American intelligence officers?
The fact remains that
it was at best a Pyrrhic victory. Tehran did not
refute Washington’s
intelligence claim that it had a nuclear weapon programme prior to 2003. By
implication, President Bush was right in denying an ability to Iran to perfect
the art of enriching uranium, because that could have enabled Iran to restart
its weapon programme any time it chose to do so. And that means all the US effort to prevent Iran from enriching uranium on its
soil was not an exercise in futility. That also means future American effort to
keep the heat on Tehran
on the nuclear issue would aim at preventing further spread of nuclear weapons.
Was it not a smart
move? It was. The Bush Administration perhaps timed the revelation of this
intelligence assessment to prevent the regional concerns over an impending or
imminent American military intervention in Iran. Keeping in mind the
forthcoming Presidential elections and the Democratic Party’s stand on Iraq, the
Republican President did not want to create political problems for the Presidential
nominee of the party.
Simultaneously,
President Bush could claim success in handling the Iranian nuclear ambition
without going in for costly intervention. The reluctance of the European and
Asian allies and the Gulf countries to support any US
plan for military action against Iran could certainly raise the political
cost of intervention.
Moreover, domestic
opposition to any further military adventure abroad against the backdrop of the
worsening situation in Afghanistan
and the rising expenses of holding on Iraq
could have made an intervention in Iran prohibitively costly in terms
of finances.
Further, the Bush Administration
has been able to rule out any intervention in Iran
in time, simultaneously making it difficult for Tehran to indulge in any kind of nuclear
commerce with other countries or even in the nuclear black market.
In fact, exposure of
the Abdul Qadeer Khan international nuclear black market is another achievement
that the US Administration can take credit for. By turning the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme into an
international criminal, Washington has sought
to restrict Islamabad’s
nuclear activities. It would be difficult for Pakistan too to search for nuclear
weapons-related materials and equipment in a clandestine manner at least to an
extent it was able to do earlier.
The next achievement
of the Bush White House in containing nuclear proliferation is encouraging Libya to give
up the nuclear weapon path. This was done by adopting an approach that combined
persuasion and pressure, reward and punishment. To some extent, the US unilateralism demonstrated in the invasion of
Iraq and removal of Saddam
Hussein from power had influenced Libya
and Iran
to change course in their nuclear activities.
Incidentally, the Bush
Administration justified military intervention in Iraq on the ground of destroying
that country’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) arsenals. No WMD was found
later and the Administration had to face severe criticism at home and abroad.
But it claims that the military intervention has at least achieved in creating
an Iraq
that would be rid of any infrastructure of WMD production.
The most spectacular
success of the President Bush in containing nuclear proliferation can be seen
in the Korean Peninsula. By adopting a multi-lateral
approach and a hard-line policy of refusing bilateral negotiations, the Bush
Administration was able to persuade the North Korean regime to roll back its
nuclear weapon programme.
After South Africa, North Korea is the second country
to give up its acquired nuclear weapon capability. The difference is that South Africa
claimed that it had destroyed its nuclear weapons, which no one had seen. But
the world had witnessed the testing of a nuclear device by North Korea.
Last but not the
least, the Bush Administration has devised a novel approach to deal with the
proliferation issue with India.
The US-India nuclear deal aims at making India
a partner in non-proliferation and encouraging New Delhi to turn 65 per cent of its nuclear
reactors into energy producing machines.
Among the nuclear
capable countries outside the recognized P-5, India happens to be the only
country that has the potential to become a major global player. Keeping in mind
this factor, the Bush Administration has attempted to establish a strategic
partnership with a nuclear India.
While Washington’s
policy towards Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Libya and to some extent Pakistan
have shown positive outcomes in varying degrees, Indo-US nuclear deal continues
to be under a dark cloud. It is likely that by the time Americans get ready to
vote for a new Presidential candidate, the Bush Administration would be able to
claim unprecedented success in nuclear non-proliferation. ---- INFA
(Copyright India News
and Feature Alliance)
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