New Delhi, 25 July 2007

Indo-US Nuclear Deal

BOTH SIDES WORKING TO MAKE IT HAPPEN

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The civilian nuclear cooperation proposal received a tremendous boost following the recently-concluded meeting of the Indian delegation with its American counterpart in Washington. With both sides expressing “satisfaction” over the negotiations, the prospect of a final 123 agreement looks quite bright.

And, this shall be yet another major milestone before the two nations actually start implementing the deal, which was struck way back in July 2005. In the past, there have been several road-blocks and more lie ahead. The strategic analysis community in both the countries was clearly divided on the relevance and justification of this deal.

In the US, opponents of the deal based their arguments on its negative impact on the international non-proliferation regime, its influence on the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programmes, and its potentiality to assist the Indian nuclear weapons’ programme. On their side, the opponents in India expressed concern over the possible loss of the country’s sovereignty, negative consequences for the nuclear posture based on a nuclear triad and a loss of autonomy in foreign policy decision-making.

The proponents of this bilateral nuclear deal in the US pointed out its positive impact -- on the emerging strategic partnership, on nuclear non-proliferation by bringing 65 per cent of Indian reactors under the IAEA safeguards, its constructive effect on the environment by encouraging India to generate power through harnessing nuclear energy, and its optimistic bearing on the international energy security efforts.

Likewise, the advocates of this deal in India expressed the hope that it would end India’s isolation in the international non-proliferation regime and enable the country to become a significant player in further preventing WMD proliferation. It was also believed that India would be able to generate clean energy at a time when the demand for it was rising given the growing economy. Indian interlocutors, like their American counterparts, also acknowledged the assured advantage of the deal for uplifting Indo-US relations to new heights.

While both the Bush Administration and the Manmohan Singh Government were clear from day one and went ahead with mutual negotiations, they were answerable to their respective supreme legislative bodies. With the US having a presidential system of government, the White House is not directly accountable to the Congress. However, the US Senate has a substantial role to play in foreign policy issues and in matters of international treaties and agreements. The House of Representatives, on the other hand
also enjoys certain powers of oversight. Therefore, but for the US Congress, the Bush Administration would not be able to implement its decision of forging a civilian cooperation with India.

In fact, there were many legislators who raised doubts on the nuclear deal with India, forcing the Bush Administration officials to frequently visit Capitol Hill, interact with Congressional leaders and convince them of the relevance and benefits of the deal. The outcome was the passage of the Henry Hyde Act in the Congress with an impressive majority support.

The Indian Parliamentary system allows the Government to conclude international treaties and take foreign policy initiatives with neither any prior approval of the legislature nor any system of legislative ratification. Yet the Government, under this system is accountable to the legislature for its continuation in office. When several legislators in India raised doubts over the need for such a deal with the US and questioned its importance, Manmohan Singh had to make statements on the floor of the Lok Sabha to clarify the reasons and intentions behind such an initiative.

Thus, the working of democracy in the entire process of negotiations over the Indo-US nuclear deal is a testimony to its importance as well as the commendable political culture of both countries. However, there is a difference in the ways the two cultures work. Once the Henry Hyde Bill, to give effect to this initiative, was passed by the US Congress and signed onto law by the Bush Administration, questions and doubts in the American minds were set at rest. Those who had vehemently argued against the Bill almost ceased to do so. But in India, the Indian public, academia, commentators and political leaders continue to indulge in scrutinizing the negotiation process at every step.

There is nothing wrong with this. But with the civilian nuclear cooperation between the US and India going to be a win-win situation for both, the question as to who is going to win more remains incalculable. The cost and benefits of this cooperation is certainly not going to be equal. Everyone wants a benefit and has little to be reluctant about. But the cost is calculated by all parties carefully. Indian scientists, political leaders and strategic analysts appear to be still busy measuring the cost India has to bear and have thus kept a vigilant eye on the 123 negotiations putting the Government on alert.

Both Indian and American negotiators are content at the outcome of the recent Washington round. Even though some Indian scientists continue to question India about the cost of this agreement, it is increasingly becoming clear that both Washington and New Delhi are swiftly inching towards concluding the 123 agreement. But it will not be the final destination. The US Congress will have to give its final approval. India has to successfully sign an agreement with the IAEA. And the Nuclear suppliers Group will have to give its green signal.--- INFA

 (Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)