Round The World
New Delhi, 26 June 2007
Post Bush-Blair
US-UK TIES SET To
CHANGE?
By Saroj Kumar Rath
School of International Studies, JNU
The international politics of recent years have seen a
resurgence and refashioning of the US-UK 'special relationship'. Widely seen as
likely to expire with the end of the Cold War, the relationship revived
following the 9/11 terror attacks in 2001 on the United States. The longevity,
sustenance and warmthness of the US-UK
'special relationship' has always had a direct bearing on the personal rapport
of the heads of the two countries. The easy and understandable factors of this
special relationship include simple inertia and the subtle effects of shared culture.
With the US
President George Bush about to enter the phase of a lame duck President in the
coming session of the Democrats-dominated
Congress and with Tony Blair having
retired on 27 June last as British Prime Minister, the future of the US-UK special
relationship again comes into the domain of public debate. The anxiety about the future of their inter-personal
relationship has already surfaced. In retrospect, Reagan and Thatcher raised
the level of understanding between the two countries to an undisputable level during
the 1980s. But in the subsequent period the US-UK relations cooled perceptibly
under Prime Minister John Major and President Bill Clinton.
Their personal chemistry was adversely affected when
damaging reports revealed Major's support for Bush's electoral bid for a second
term in the 1992 Presidential election. Further, the Conservative Party's role in
influencing the elections in his favour by disclosing unfavourable details
about Clinton's life when he was a Rhode scholar
at the Oxford University. Relations deteriorated over
the issue of Northern Ireland in what was perceived to be US interference in an internal matter of Britain.
Clinton's decision in 1994 to grant a
48-hour visa to the Sinn Fein leader Garry Adams to visit the United States strained Britain's relations with the US. The American
decision was taken overriding intense efforts by Britain
to persuade Clinton
against it. The visit went ahead and attracted considerable publicity, discomforting
London greatly.
The visa issue once again became a
bone of contention in 1995 when Adams applied for another US visa. Once again,
Britain went through the
painful process of lobbying hard to prevent
Clinton from
granting a visa only to taste defeat yet again
Relations improved only after May 1997 under Prime Minister
Tony Blair and President Bill Clinton. With the passing
of time both the leaders once again reaffirmed the special relationship. Like
Thatcher and Reagan, Blair and Clinton clicked on a personal and political level.
The members of Clinton's campaign team helped
Blair in the run up to the 1997 UK
general election and later the pair collaborated on Northern Ireland, the Balkans and
Kosovo. Blair was also a friend to Clinton
during the Monica Lewinsky scandal.
After the strength of Blair's relationship with Clinton, many thought the
election of George Bush would mark a downturn in Anglo-US relations. But Blair
refused to bad-mouth Bush saying that people should not underestimate his
intelligence. The "special relationship" in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks operated in a radically changed international environment. Both Bush
and Blair endorsed the "special relationship" in no uncertain terms. London
was quick to stand shoulder to shoulder with Washington after the 9/11 attacks
and this stance has continued with Blair throwing his weight fully behind the
US Administration in pursuing the attacks against Libya, the war in Afghanistan
and the Iraq war.
Blair's demitting the office marks the end of an era in
U.S.-British relations. His extraordinarily close alliance with Bush defied all
expectations and has been a major force on the world stage post the 9/11 attack.
Blair's successor, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, is an uncharismatic, somber figure who is unlikely
to set the world alight it seems. The special relationship will continue under
Brown, but it will be a low-key affair with a greater emphasis on
behind-the-scenes negotiations than high profile public displays of unity.
As Bush will be shortly entering another election year, he
may prefer not to undertake any risky international project with Prime Minister
Gordon Brown. While Blair was loved by an adoring American public, Brown will
struggle even for name recognition across
the Atlantic. Blair leaves behind a strong British stamp on the world stage,
with his country playing a major role along with the US in Afghanistan and Iraq
and enjoying the fruits of economic growth domestically.
Blair's steadfast support for the US in the four years since
2001 and his key role in building the international coalition demonstrated
principled leadership as well as vision. He rubbished the argument that growing
terrorism in the West was because of the presence of US-UK troops in Iraq. According
to him the 9/11 attacks predated the deployment of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Under Blair's leadership, over 45,000 British military personnel
participated in the liberation of Iraq, by any measure a huge contribution for
a nation of Britain's size. More than 7,000 British troops are still based in
southern Iraq and 148 soldiers have sacrificed their lives. More than 5,000 British
troops are engaged in military operations against the Taliban in southern
Afghanistan as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and a further 1,500 are due
to be deployed this summer.
That apart, Blair’s Government failed to demonstrate to the public
that the Anglo–American alliance had brought tangible benefits to the country
and operated as a two-way street. He could do little to stem the tide of
anti-Americanism among the public, which became increasingly disillusioned with
his support for U.S. foreign policy. The rise of anti-Americanism is not a
temporary phenomenon but a dangerous long-term trend that will have
far-reaching implications for both the special relationship and America's
ability to project power on the world stage.
Today, Britain is a hornet's nest of Islamic militants, with
400 to 600 al-Qaeda terrorist suspects in the U.K., some of whom have been trained
in camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Blair's misguided belief that Britain could
be both America's closest ally and part of a politically and economically
integrated Europe was a key foreign policy failure. Roughly half of British
laws now originate in Brussels, a
shocking state of affairs that Brown may like to reverse. It will be up to
future British Governments to ensure that UK regains its position as a fully
sovereign nation and the long-term future of the special relationship will
depend upon it.
Nonetheless, Brown
is unlikely to fundamentally transform the nature of the Anglo–American
alliance as they stand on a firm foundation. With a large support base of the
left of the Labour Party for the Democrats in Washington, he may not emulate
the close friendship that Blair has developed with Bush. Nor is he likely to
win the kind of adoration from the American public that Blair gained after
9/11. Clearly, there may be no repeat of the extraordinarily successful Bush-Blair partnership that has defined the
U.S.-U.K. relationship since 9/11.
Brown's approach may be less
sentimental than Blair's, based on a sharper-edged analysis of what he defines
as the British national interest. This policy of Brown may lead to greater
confrontation with Washington over issues
such as international development assistance,
poverty reduction, trade, and global warming. Brown has called for "a modern
Marshall Plan for the developing world—a new deal between the richest countries
and the poorest countries."
Brown is less
likely than Blair to spearhead international efforts in the war on terrorism
and will be under pressure to bring
home British troops fighting in Iraq. His views on some of the biggest issues of the day, such as the Iranian nuclear
programme, are unknown, and it is uncertain whether Brown will back Washington's
hawkish line toward rogue states such as Iran and Syria. If the US were to use military
force against Iran's nuclear facilities, there would be no guarantee that a
Brown-led Government would provide military, strategic, or political support.
---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature
Alliance)
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