Round The World

New Delhi, 15 May 2007

INDO-US Nuclear Deal

DOUBTS CONTINUE TO RISE

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The US Under Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns will shortly be visiting New Delhi to conduct negotiations and finalize the details of the 123 Agreement related to civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and India.

The US State Department Spokesman Sean McCormack issued a statement on the eve of Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon’s visit to Washington earlier this month, that “the discussions were positive and the U.S. is encouraged by the extensive progress that was made on the issues. We look forward to resolving the outstanding issues in the weeks ahead. In that regard, Under Secretary Burns is visiting India to reach a final agreement.”

This highly positive statement by McCormack was in sharp contrast to reports in the Indian media casting doubts over the success of 123 negotiations. From July 18, 2005 until December 18, 2006, Indian and American lawmakers, strategic experts, commentators and scholars were indulged in an endless debate on the proposed civilian nuclear technology cooperation between India and the US.

However, the debate over this issue appears to have almost ended in the United States. The opposition to US cooperation with India in civilian nuclear technology appears to have ended with the passage of the Henry J Hyde US-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act in the US Congress and signing of the Act by President George Bush on 18 December 2006. One does not find any edit-page articles in the American media since then. Nor have important think-tanks like the Brookings Institution and Council of Foreign Relations devoted their attention to this issue.

At one level, opponents of this initiative in the US are perhaps satisfied with the Henry Hyde Act and have full faith in the US Administration to go ahead and conclude the necessary 123 agreement with India along the lines delineated in the Act. At another level, one can argue that the 123 negotiations are quite secretive and nothing much is coming out openly to engage in a serious debate.

The scene is quite different in India. Although the intensity of the debate on the nuclear deal with the US has come down, Indian political leaders and strategic community are wide awake and have not stopped raising questions about the need and justifications of such a deal. While the Bush Administration has succeeded in removing doubts within America over the relevance of this initiative with India, the Manmohan Singh Government in India has certainly not been able to give acceptable answers to questions and doubts raised by the Left Parties, Right Wing BJP or even strategic experts or scientists.  Significantly, the India political left and political right are united in opposing the deal in its current form.

After the successful passage and signing of the Henry Hyde Act, the CPI (M) found serious objectionable provisions in the Act and took the position that that the US legislation on the nuclear deal was "not acceptable," and asked the Government to discontinue talks with the Bush Administration, as the law contradicted most significant assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament.

External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee argued that "India need not worry about the  legislation passed by the US Congress as it is meant for the US lawmakers. India is obliged only to the bilateral agreement (123 Agreement)” and that the US Administration has categorically assured us that this legislation enables the United States to fulfill all of the commitments it made to India in the July 18 and March 2 Joint Statements and that this legislation explicitly authorizes civil nuclear cooperation with India in a manner fully consistent with those two Statements.” The CPI) M) fired back saying, "Obviously, the U.S. administration is bound by the provisions of its Act while negotiating this agreement. This cannot be accepted by India, as it negates the most significant, if not all, assurances given by the Prime Minister to Parliament. Thus, further negotiations on this score must not proceed.''

The Bharatiya Janata Party too demanded that the Government reject the Henry J. Hyde Act, which contained “humiliating conditionalities” and imposed “conditionalities   which are worse than those in the NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty] and the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty].”

The scientists have raised main objection to the Act on its requirement related to conduct of future nuclear tests by India. Once India conducts any future tests, the US would ipso facto cancel the civilian nuclear cooperation with India. Former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman P K Iyengar went on to say that "It is impossible to have a minimum credible deterrent without conducting nuclear tests. But the bill indicates that the cooperation will be terminated if this is done."

The main India concerns are the following: First, the nuclear agreement with the US would force India to team up with the US on certain foreign policy issues. Secondly, it would make it difficult for India to conduct nuclear tests in the future without compromising its foreign, particularly US, collaborative nuclear programmes. Thirdly, the deal does not guarantee equal treatment of India with other nuclear weapon powers, since enrichment and reprocessing technology would continue to be denied to India. Fourthly, the US supply of nuclear fuel will have limited duration rather than perpetual, as expected.

Fifthly, the US is likely to have intrusive inspection over India’s civilian nuclear programmes and close watch on the military programmes. Sixthly, the initiative is hailed by the US as a nonproliferation initiative and ultimately aims at circumscribing India’s nuclear weapon capability. Restriction on enrichment and reprocessing technology, future nuclear tests and limiting or stopping the production of fissile material are actually measures to limit India’s nuclear deterrent.

Seventhly, even the argument on energy security is weak in the sense that nuclear technology by 2020 will constitute only 5% of electricity generation and less than 4% of total energy sources of India. For a small gain, India cannot afford to sacrifice a great deal on its freedom of action in national security front.

All these questions actually require a proper and satisfying response from the Government of India. The negotiations between the Ministry of External Affairs and the US State Department are gong on in a relatively secretive manner. It is granted that such negotiations cannot take place in the public domain. But at the same time, in a democracy people’s concerns and questions need to be addressed in the most proper fashion possible. Perhaps the Prime Minister needs to come out once again with a speech before the Parliament with answers to all those concerns and issues. Such a statement will have more relevance before signing the 123 Agreement rather than after it. Post facto justifications would be more harmful and hence better avoided.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)