ROUND THE WORLD

New Delhi, 16 May 2006

Strategic Triangle

India, China and the US

By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra

School of International Studies, JNU

The emerging relations between India, China and the US are going to determine the future of Asian stability. These countries have never been able to establish a durable strategic alliance in the post-Second World War history with one another. Nor any two of them are likely to form such an alliance in the future.

However, the future Asian stability will largely depend upon how these three powers interact with one another. During the early years of the Cold War, both China and India were the newly-independent and fully sovereign states. The United States, on the other hand, had emerged as a global superpower with tremendous stakes in the Asia pacific region.

India was not comfortable with the US policy of maintaining strategic alliances and establishing military bases around the world. New Delhi adopted a non-aligned foreign policy in quite contrast with the US approach. Consequently, Washington came to detest both Indian nationalism and non-alignment. Yet, it was not difficult for the United States to maintain a modicum of working relations with India.

On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China from its very birth was considered a hostile political entity by the US. After failing to bring about a compromise between Mao’s Communist forces and Chian Kai-shek’s Nationalist forces, Washington was unable to live at peace with Communist China. The US Containment Doctrine was as much applicable to China as to the USSR.

India and China nonetheless were able to forge cordial ties with each other, despite different political systems and conviction. Democratic India had extended its hands of friendship to Communist China and the two countries soon pledged to maintain bilateral relationship on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence or Panch Sheel.

The political scenario began to change in curious ways since the early 1960s and crystallized clearly by early 1970s. India and China had turned hostile with a border war in 1962 to their credit. The US and China had begun to share a common enemy with widening rift between the Soviet Union and China. India by the way went closer towards the Soviet Union, which was considered an adversary by both China and the US.

The strategic understanding between the US and China and between India and the Soviet Union became completely irrelevant after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. India, China and the United States began to adopt a policy of constructive engagement towards one another under the new political and security landscape of the post-Cold War era.

As the Chinese economy boomed with a galloping speed and the entire world began to court it, India too improved its economic ties with China. But the extent and degree of the US-China economic cooperation was way ahead of the US-India or India-China economic relations. The trade surplus run by the Chinese vis-a-vis the US was several times higher than the total trade turn-over between India and the US. The US investment in China too was much higher than its investment in India.

There is little doubt that China’s economic performance outstripped India’s partly because India was a latecomer to the field of economic reforms and openness. The authoritarian decision-making process in China compared with the democratic systems in India also to an extent influenced the pace of economic growth in the two countries.

Significantly, the growing economic ties between China and the US did not make them strategic partners but strategic competitors by the turn of the Century. As China’s economy exploded to new heights and so did its capability to invest more in its defence sectors, American worries intensified. The new vigorous and confident China was expected to demand a larger share of its influence in Asian politics that would automatically cut into the American share.

As President George Bush entered the White House with a team of neo-conservatives, the American rhetoric on China changed from “strategic partner” to “strategic competitor.” While the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US compelled the Bush Administration to avoid any competition with China, some Americans clearly saw a challenge in a rapidly growing China and sought to contain this unprecedented growth.

The US had two choices to manage the Chinese challenge. One was to allow Japanese militarization. The other was to help Indian technological and economic growth. The first choice has been a difficult one in view of the prevailing fear in the Asia Pacific region of any resurgence of Japanese militarism. The second choice had little problem, since India itself had begun its engagement of the international community economically.

Consequently, the Bush Administration identified India as a new “strategic partner” and pledged to assist India in its emergence as a global power. The expanding defence cooperation between India and the US, the efforts to implement a new nuclear deal, the pledge to enhance bilateral trade are all geared towards building India’s power profile.

Some Americans and a few Indians possess a desire to establish a network of relationship that would aim at containing the growth of a malign Chinese power. The idea of a new containment strategy is neither beneficial for the region nor for the world. It has the seeds of a new devastating Cold War-type confrontation that would enhance mutual suspicions and stall the growth process.

Communist China is not a closed country, but a heavily engaged nation in the international community. Its economic policies have benefited many countries around the world. India should refrain from joining any US-led network that intends to contain China. On the other hand, the China is a revisionist power. Some Chinese do speak of getting Asia rid of American presence and influence. This is a containment strategy aimed at containing American influence in Asia. India should avoid teaming up with China and possibly Russia in order to limit US activities in Asia.

Simultaneously, India has to guard against its own containment, which may not be openly articulated but quietly undertaken. There was a time when both the US and China sought containment of India in various ways. There was no US-China axis at work against India. But the US was uncomfortable with India’s closeness with the Soviets and the Chinese built up Pakistan as a counterweight to India.

Currently, the US favours a strong, stable and prosperous India. China, on the other hand, appears wary of growing Indo-US ties. India hardly complained or evinced distrust when US-China relations grew to unprecedented heights after the Cold War. China needs little to fear from closer Indo-US relations. But it is significant to pursue a diplomacy of removing fears and apprehensions.

Positive engagements among India, China and the US will be indispensable for Asian economic growth and political stability. Suspicions between any two of this triangle will be harmful for regional growth and global stability. In other words, this emerging strategic triangle has the potential for enormous economic growth and dangerous security consequences. ---INFA

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