Events & Issues

New Delhi, 17 January 2011

Srikrishna Report

LESSONS OF TELANGANA

By Balraj Puri

The Srikrishna report has received a very hostile reaction in Telengana. There are violent protests against it in Hyderabad. Given that out of the six recommendations made by the Commission, five out-rightly rejected the demand for the creation of a Telengana State. The fifth recommendation concedes Telengana as the second best option “only if unavoidable and if the decision is amicable to all. But it will throw up several problems.”

 Telengana’s reaction should have been anticipated. Recall, on 9 December 2009 midnight, when the condition of the fasting Telengana Praja Samiti (TRS) Chief Chandershakher Rao became critical, the Union Home Minister Chindambaran gave a categorical assurance that Telengana would be formed.

Expectedly, this generated heat in the rest of Andhra. Raylseema and coastal Andhra were shut down for many days and almost half the State Assembly resigned. Also, demands for Statehood revived elsewhere in the country. Today, notwithstanding the Government’s efforts for a consensus on the Srikrishna report this does not seem possible.

Specially against the backdrop that in the 2004 Assembly election, the Congress had supported the demand of Telengana. Again in the 2009 polls, when all major parties, including the Congress, TDP and BJP supported the demand, it was generally believed that the TRS had become irrelevant and marginalized. The Congress, then back-tracked on its promise.

Besides, the demand for Telengana is as old as that for Vishalandhra. Soon after Independence, Telengana, which was a part of Hyderabad, had started a powerful movement under the Communist Party leadership against the Nizam for Statehood. At that time, Communist all over India were fighting for separate identities of all nationalities.

The demand for Andhra State was conceded when its leader Sri Ramulu died fasting  in 1953. To avoid a similar experience, Chandershakhar Rao demand was conceded when his condition due to fasting became critical.

Undoubtedly, both times the Union Government set a wrong precedent by acting under pressure after losing opportunities for a consensual settlement with all concerned. In 1953 the State Reorganization Commission while accepting the demand for Vishalandhra also recommended a separate Telengana, and allowed them ten years to experiment with separate identities after which they could merge if two-third majority of both State legislators supported the decision.

The Congress, ruling at the Centre, rejected the proposal and has since been experimenting with various alternatives. A gentlemen’s formula between Congress leaders of both regions in 1956 provided for safeguards for development of Telengana to be monitored by the Regional Planning and Development Committees answerable to the MLAs’.

Accordingly, the Deputy Chief Minister would be from the Telengana region and quotas were fixed for Government jobs. But these safeguards were not implemented. In 1973 the Regional Committees were made non-answerable to MLAs.

Further, the Congress adopted the tactics of coopting Telengana leaders and manipulating caste politics. In 1978 the TRS merged with the Congress after its leader Chenna Reddy was made Andhra’s Chief Minister. When Narasimha Rao became the Prime Minister it satisfied Telengana pride.

Meanwhile, the Telugu Desam Party forged an alliance of the Naidu and Kapu castes against the landowning Reddys and Kammas and opposed Reddy’s leadership of for a separate Telangana. To combat this, Chandershakher Rao, who belongs to Valama caste, formed an alliance of Dalits and OBCs, under the TRS in 2003 after resigning as the Andhra Assembly’s Deputy Speaker.

As more than 70% of Telengana population belongs to the schedule castes, schedule tribes and OBC, it became a formidable alliance. Moreover, its leaders argued that Andhra got a large allocation of Central funds thanks to Telengana’s population composition and not the rest of the State. As the Finance Commission’s devolution of funds was based on 25% for population and 75% for backwardness. Thus, Telengana, if made a separate State, would be financial viable.

Further, the experiments to tackle the Telengana problem showed that they were on ad hoc basis and short-term palliatives. Plainly, instead of quick-fix solutions under duress, the problems should be anticipated and action taken in a normal atmosphere.

I had an opportunity of visiting Telengana and meeting its leaders and common people in various parts of the region in 1998. I also discussed various proposals with the champions of an united Andhra. I tried to evolve an agreement between the leaders of the two groups on all contentious issues, including the relative level of development, share in Government services, basis of allocation of funds and the future of Hyderabad with its unique cultural identity and centre of modern technology.

Broadly, I mooted the idea of a sub-State for Telengana. The idea of sub-States was first mooted by the Planning Commission’s first Deputy Chairman Prof D R Gadgil. Whereby, each region in every State would have a sub-Legislature with political authority to legislate on subjects allocated to the region and to administer the departments dealing with these subjects, including recruitment to these departments.

Consequently, the economic, political and cultural urges of each region would be satisfied. Pertinently, the Srikrishna report’s “most workable” option provides for Regional Councils but without political powers and sans being elected.

In 1998 as the then Governor Krishna Kant’s guest, he told me that he would propose to the Chief Minister to appoint me with some authority to pursue my ideas. As Kant moved to New Delhi as India’s Vice President he could not follow up his proposal.

True, my formula may appear a case of too little too late for Telengana. However, interests of Raylseema and the coastal region could be accommodated in Hyderabad which has been built by not only Andhraites’ but outsiders also. Furthermore, with its 41% Muslim population entitles Hyderabad to a special status as a part of Telengana and its Capital by giving it an elected authority over civic problems, cultural matters and growing technology. 

The most relevant lesson of the Telengana experience is that regional and sub-regional sentiments could easily be satisfied if tackled at the right time. The fear that submission to these would weaken national unity is misplaced. Similar fear was expressed when linguistic States were formed.

In fact that strengthened national unity. If for instance, formation of the Punjabi Suba was not delayed for 10 years after the whole country was reorganized on linguistic basis, troubles in the State later could have bee avoided. Also, Punjab’s Hindus damaged their own interest by disowning their mother tongue and opposing the Punjabi Suba. When it was formed, some Hindi speaking Hindus in Chandigrah, and parts of Harayana and Himachal declared their mother tongue to be Hindi and were responsible for the exclusion of these areas from the new Punjab State which reduced its Hindu majority to a minority.

Now the urges of Gorkhaland, in West Bengal, Vidharba in Maharashtra, Saurashtra in Gujarat, Poorvanchal, Budhelkhand, Harit Pradesh in UP, Mithula Pradesh in Bihar and some tribes in North-Eeast are instances which need to be satisfied, either through separate Statehood or status of sub-States.

J&K is a most diverse State of the country. There are special reasons, on account of which it should not be divided. Instead, its three main regions deserve to be given regional autonomy which would ensure its emotional and political unity and satisfy regional aspirations as was agreed by Pandit Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah as part of the Delhi Agreement in 1952.  -----INFA

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