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Open Forum
India-EU Closer To Trade Pact, By Dr. Krzysztof M. Zalewski, 26 April 2025 |
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Spotlight
New Delhi, 26 April
2025
India-EU Closer
To Trade Pact
By Dr. Krzysztof M.
Zalewski
(Boym Institute&
Centre for International Relations, Poland)
Negotiations on a
free trade agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India have been
ongoing for 18 years, with breaks. Despite the ongoing difficulties, for geo-economic
reasons its finalisation now seems more likely than ever before. It will probably
be the largest free trade area in the world next to RCEP.
Given the scale of
Indian economy, from Poland’s perspective this agreement creates both enormous
challenges and great opportunities. The impact of this trade agreement on the
economy depends on the negotiated detailed solutions and the ability of the
Polish administration to cooperate with business. The Polish debate on this FTA
should not be dominated by defensive interests.
“ The EU-India free
trade agreement would be the largest of its kind in the world (...). Timing and
determination count, and this partnership comes at the right time for both
sides. That is why we have agreed with Prime Minister Modi that we will strive
to achieve it this year”, said the President of the European Commission, Ursulu
van der Leyen in New Delhi during an unusual foreign visit of the entire
College of commissioners in February. She was echoed by Prime Minister Modi: We
have prepared a plan of cooperation in trade, technology, investment,
innovation, green growth, security, skills and mobility. We
have instructed our teams to conclude a mutual technology, investment,
innovation, green growth, security, skills and mobility.We have instructed our
teams to conclude a mutually beneficial bilateral free trade agreement by the
end of this year.”
Will the two major
economies – currently the world’s second and fifth largest – be connected by an
FTA? The history of the EU-India comprehensive trade agreement is not very
encouraging. It has often seemed that an agreement
was within reach, but in the end it didn’t happen.
Let us recall that
the work on the jointpolitical declaration
of 1993 and cooperation agreement of 1994 was accompanied by the idea of
deepening trade relations between New Delhi and the bloc countries. When in
2004 India and the EU became “strategic partners”, both sides expressed hopes
for the imminent conclusion of a free trade agreement. However, thenegotiations
started in 2007 were suspended in 2013. The reason was the difficult to
overcome differences in interest in sectors like automotive,
agriculture and food production or pharmaceutical industry.
There were fears of
too deep economic and social disruptions caused by the agreement. Reducing
tariffs of more than 100% on groups of goods suchas
dairy products, vegetables, fruits, sugar and confectionery products could
cause a collapse in production and a crisis in the industries. Boththe EU and India heavily subsidised their own
agricultural production, perceiving it as an inalienable component of food
security. In turn, different interests and rules regarding intellectual
property in the pharmaceutical market caused,
on the one hand, European fear of a flood of cheap Indian generic drugs, and on
the subcontinent - fear of a practice called ever-greening, i.e. maintaining drug
patents by European companies by introducing minimal changes to them.
After eight years, in
2021, a will was announced to return to negotiations, which startedin 2022. At that time, the interest in India
on the European side was mainly motivated by the intensifying competition with
China. New Delhi, on the other hand, had ambitions to take advantage of the de-risking policy promoted by EU institutions, i.e. reducing EU’s
dependence on imports from China. At the corporate level, this principle was
called"
China plus one ". In principle, large
international corporations should not base their extensive supply chains solely on the Middle Kingdom, having an alternative
place of production and sourcing of raw materials. India
seemed to be the ideal partner for this.
But for over two
years, there was a lack of political will to overcome obstacles old and new.
Although negotiating teams met, the scant information about the talks suggestedno breakthrough had been achieved. EC officials involved in the negotiations
complained that Indian delegations lacked information or authority to make
binding decisions.
This doesn’t mean
that trade has not flourished. Quite the opposite - over the past decade, trade
has almost doubled, both in goods and in services. As per EC, EU remains
India's largest trading partner, accounting for trade in goods worth €124
billion in 2023, or 12.2% of India's total trade, ahead of
the US (10.8%) and China (10.5%). India has a surplus in its relations with EU
every year. Exports to EU and the US each accounted for 17% of India's total
exports.
Although India is
only the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, accounting for just over 2% of
total EU goods trade in 2023, its position has been steadily growing over the
past two decades. Trade in goods has almost doubled in the decade since the FTA
negotiations were suspended, despite the pandemic crisis (2020-21). Trade in
services has grown even faster, almost doubling in 2020-23 from €30.4 billion
to €59.7 billion. Direct investment has been growing at a slightly slower pace,
rising by justover 30% in 2019-22 to €108 billion.
It is precisely
the rapidly growing trade in services and goods and the solid value of
investments that make both sides seem inclined to quickly conclude a trade and
investment agreement to maintain the existing trend. Trade and investment need
a stable legal basis, providing certainty of turnover.
More important factors that
speak in favor of quickly concluding an agreement that hadpreviously been impossible for decades.Firstly,
India-EU ties, especially in bilateral
relations with individual MemberStates, have
gained a strategic dimension not only in terms of declared plans and values, but in terms of interests. Brussels and New Delhi are currently united
by the desire to deepen cooperation in trade and technology, security and
defence issues, but also in the broad sense of global connectivity, i.e.
building multidimensional infrastructural, economic and business connections.
Secondly, bothEU and India are trying to acquire new
trading partners in the face of the
unpredictable policy of the US administration. The level of additional US
import tariffs announced on 2 April - 27% on Indian products and 20% on EU
goods - in both cases surprised business analysts. Since
the US remains the leading trading partner for boththe
European "
27" and India, such high
tariffs could cause economic disruption and crisis. Bilateral FTA may therefore
be a way to escape forward.
Third, even before
the new U.S. tariffs were announced, India’s economic growth, still the fastest among
theworld’smajor economies,
appeared to be slowing. It fell to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2024, well
below the RBI’s expectations of 6.8% annual growth. Direct investment data was
also disappointing, with Vietnam and Malaysia benefiting much more effectively
from the policy of relocating some production from China.
In turn, on the Old
Continent, most EU economies are stagnating, and the continent's largest
economy, Germany, is in its third year of recession. For both partners, an FTA would be a way to
stimulate economic growth.
Fourthly, why the current plan to speed up negotiations may
succeed is the clear change in attitudes among Indian elites towards
international trade and FTAs. Until now, New Delhi has been haunted by the
shadow of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's long-time post-war prime
minister, who, becauseof India’s unfavourable
modern experience in relations with the West, saw international trade as
a threat of colonisation.
After a period of
liberalization that began in 1991, tariffs have been rising again since at
least the middle of the last decade. The Modi government has sought liberal
economic reforms within the country since coming to power, but it has also
believed that a combination of higher tariffs and investment incentives should
attract manufacturing.
But New Delhi has
changed its attitude toward trade agreements
in recentyears,
recognizing their potential for growth and modernization and exposing Indian
companies to external competition. Concerns about domination by a rival from
across the northern border, China, prevented India from joining RCEP in 2020,
an agreement that liberalizes trade between the 10 nations of
Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and its five regional trading partners, South Korea,
Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand .
However, India has
sought trade agreements with smaller entities on a bilateral basis. In 2022, an
agreement was signed with the UAE and with Australia a few months later. Negotiations
on pact with UK were resumed. The pressure to quickly conclude an agreement
with EU is therefore part of a broader trend among the
Indian elite: after cades of skepticism, the Indian subcontinent is now
dominated by faith in its own strength and the ability of domestic
entrepreneurs tocope with external
competition.
The preparations for
this incomparably largeragreement also have a practical dimension. During Raisina Dialogue conference in New Delhi one could
sense a certain optimism among hosts and European guests regarding the
acceleration of talks and the
prioritisation of them by the leadership of the EC
and Indian government. Moreover, the ministers of the member states – with the
exception of Hungary – presented an exceptionally coherent position not only on the issue of relations with
India, but also on global challenges.
Teams on
both sides have been strengthened, and both sides at India's most important
geopolitical conference have publicly expressed hope that the talks will be
concluded bythe end of this year. The decision in 2022 to
negotiate on three separate platforms, namely a free trade agreement, an
investment protection agreement and an agreement on geographical indications
(GI) for food products ,has reduced
the risk that a blockade on anyone of them
will lead to the collapse of the whole.
This does not mean,
however, that the conclusion of the agreement is certain. It may be delayed or
permanently blocked by the relations of the EU with its external partners or by
internal factors in India and the Union.The biggest risk factor in trade issues
remains the unpredictable policy of US administration. Given the importance of
the economic partnership between both EU and US and US and India, it is
possible that the current hectic negotiations with Washington will drive
Brussels and New Delhi apart.
India has adopted a
different negotiation strategy than Europe. While EU is currently focused on
finding an internal compromise on tariffs on American goods, subsequent Indian
trade missions are focusing on creating conditions forsigning
a trade agreement withUS too. Before Modi's
visit to Washington in February, tariffs on American bourbon and motors were
reduced. During the visit, the Indian side declared its willingness to purchase
more American gas (LNG), crude oil and arms. There is hope in New Delhi that a
trade agreement on trade in goods with the US will be concluded by autumn 2025,
the goal being to achievetrade exchange of $500 billion in 2030, from $
210 billion lastyear (an average of 15% annually).
Indian negotiators
hope that while they will likely not be able to avoid an increase
in U.S. tariffs on products from the subcontinent, the tariffs will be lower
than those on goods from other parts of the world,
giving Indian products a comparative advantage in US market. However, the parallel talks with Washington could cast
a shadow over EU-India negotiations, especially since it may not be in U.S.
interest to conclude such an agreement between the two American trading
partners any time soon.---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
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A WAY OUT OF THE ARMS RACE, By Inder Jit, 15 May 2025 |
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REWIND
New Delhi, 15 May 2025
A
WAY OUT OF THE ARMS RACE
By
InderJit
(Released
on 21 April 1981)
India
continues to strive hard to somehow block American arms for Pakistan. New Delhi
has not only communicated its views on the subject to Washington, but also
sought to use the British Prime Minister's visit to India to mount pressure on
the US Administration. Mr's Gandhi raised the issue with Mrs Thatcher both
privately and publicly in her official talks and in Parliament's Central Hall
where a departure was made from established practice on the occasion of the
British Prime Minister's address to MPs to enable her also to speak. "The
spectre of cold war peeping in our doorway causes us grave apprehension",
said Mrs Gandhi and added: "We have already spoken to you about the
dangers of giving sophisticated arms to Pakistan." But New Delhi has again
drawn a blank. What is worse, Mrs Thatcher made out a powerful case for
Pakistan in New Delhi at her Press conference which will be remembered for her
superb performance. She answered questions candidly and forthrightly without
the slightest attempt to either hedge or side step or, like Mr Morarji Desai,
reply with counter questions!
We
in India have undoubtedly every reason to be gravely concerned over the
prospect of fresh supply of American arms to Pakistan. Our country has been
attacked thrice by Pakistan in the past three decades and more proving right
Krishna Menon's brilliant quip: No one has yet produced a gun which fires only
in one direction. Experience has also shown that military regimes are inclined
to be less restrained and more trigger happy; both the 1965 and 1971 wars were
launched by Pakistan while the country was ruled by Generals Ayub and Yahya
Khan. But then Pakistan, too, has a problem on its hands, as Mrs Thatcher
argued at her Press conference. The Soviet Union has "invaded" and
"occupied an independent and non-Aligned Afghanistan", posing a
threat to Pakistan. "I would be concerned if I had Soviet troops on my
border. I would be getting all the means to defend myself and my people."
India, she added, had increased its defence capability "enormously"
and was in a position to defend itself. "You cannot deny the same right to
another sovereign nation."
A
question which needs to be asked is: Can something be done to avert an arms
race in the sub-continent? Two possible answers are available. Ideally, the
best would be to get the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan. All the
countries, including Pakistan, have now veered round to India's view that this
can be achieved only through a political solution and not militarily. Yet,
enough has not been done for a political solution. The recent non-aligned meet
in New Delhi took welcome initiative in setting up a four-nation committee to
help resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict. The committee has since been vigorously
following up its mandate and shuttling between world capitals. Yet the meet did
not consider it necessary to either send a mission to Moscow on the Afghan
issue or to set up a committee to help find a political solution. Even today,
many feel that India, which has a vital security stake in getting the Soviets
back to the Oxus, could help itself, the sub-continent and peace generally by
taking a clear initiative regionally.
Opinion
is divided on whether any such initiative would yield results. The Soviet Union
seems to have little intention of pulling out of Afghanistan. But this need not
cause us despair in rest our search for some way to avert an arms race between
India and Pakistan. A second solution lies in taking Gen Zia at his word and
accepting a unilateral offer he made to Mr Swaran Singh in April last year an
offer which he repeated to me in an interview in reply to the question:
"Do you think some kind of a permanent arrangement needs to be made to
ensure against the build-up of a dangerous war psychosis between our two
countries?" He said: "Well, the whole thing starts from a lack of
trust. We must not forget that India and Pakistan have fought three wars. I
only hope we have both realised the futility of wars... Wars do not solve
political problems. In this year of the Lord 1981, might should not be right...
We must create more confidence in the minds of not only the people but also at
the Government level."
He
then recalled his offer to Mr Swaran Singh: "I said to him. Tell us,
whether Pakistan should have a force for its own security or not. Should India
have a force for its security or not? And if you come to the conclusion that
there is justification for Pakistan to have an armed force for its own
security, then ask your (military) experts to tell us what should be the
strength of our forces considering the defence requirements of a country like
Pakistan and its geographic borders. I would accept their assessment and not
debate it. In the process, you may probably ask our reaction. If you were to
say all right, Pakistan should have this much and India that much. I said have
as much as you like, I am not concerned. But I would be very much concerned
when 18 divisions face Pakistan. We have then to think twice as to what all
this exercise is about. But I made this offer. Unfortunately, we had no
reaction at first. The reaction that came much later was 'No'. India said this
is not a fair proposition. Because, Pakistan should have what Pakistan thinks
necessary and India should have what India thinks necessary.
"Then
I said, if that be the case, why should India get allergic to Pakistan's stress
on its legitimate defence requirements. Here again, I proposed that if you want
to know what we have and what we do not have, please come and ask me. I will
tell you exactly what we have. And what you have I will not challenge. India is
a big country. Pakistan realises this... We very humbly suggest to you and through
you to the people of India that it is about time that both countries decided
what was good for them. As for Pakistan, I can say there is no doubt in my mind
that the good of both the countries lies in peaceful relationship, in mutual
understanding, confidence, and respect. Pakistan is a small country. India is a
bigger country, Pakistan today does not consider itself in competition with
India. We can't. We are 80 million people. India is 650 million people. India
is a bigger partner in this. It has a clear role to play and we grant it that
much. But I think there is need for a better understanding and more confidence.
I am sure sooner or later these will come."
I
then said: "These are excellent thoughts, Mr President, I recall having a
chat with SardarSwaran Singh on his return. He and many others in the country
felt that any discussion in regard to the defence forces of the two countries
would have to be preceded by some political understanding. Is that what he said
to you?" Gen Zia replied, "No, he did not say so. We were discussing
bilateral relations and came to the question of defence forces. This is what I
offered unilaterally, as an idea. However, I agree that everything must emerge
from a political understanding which willabout better military understanding
and more confidence in each other. (Almost a year to the day, I wrote:
"Notwithstanding their difference of perception, New Delhi has sought to end
Islamabad's misgivings about India and, in the bargain, conceded Pakistan's
concern for its security from across the Afghan border. Islamabad has been
reassured by Mr Swaran Singh that India presents no security problem to
Pakistan and that Pakistan should regard its eastern border with India as
"a frontier of peace.")
Gen
Zia also made some other remarks in the course of the interview which assume
urgency and importance on two other grounds. First, in the context of the
continuing talk of Pakistan's determined effort to go in for the nuclear bomb
and Mrs Gandhi's forthright declaration in Parliament that India would respond
appropriately in case Pakistan decided to go in for nuclear arms. (Some leading
commentators are already advocating the view that India should exercise its
nuclear option before Pakistan does so.) Second, in the overall context of the
continuing cold war between the two countries and the fresh arms race, Gen Zia
emphatically denied that Pakistan had any intention of either making a nuclear
bomb or of detonating a nuclear device for peaceful purposes. Pakistan, he
said, wanted nuclear technology to fill the gap of its energy requirement. Its
programme was "peaceful and modest." Gen Zia also said that he
regarded the Simla Agreement as a no-war pact and emphasised: "We should
stop living in the past... (and) start a new chapter."
From
here to where? Gen Zia has spoken and, as I said earlier, we should take him at
his word. Full advantage should be taken of Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to
Islamabad next month to begin a meaningful dialogue to avert an arms race and
end the cold war, which is already causing both India and Pakistan enormous
damage. Some Soviet commentators have reportedly suggested that the American
arms for Pakistan are designed to prod Islamabad to fulfil "its old
territorial ambitions in regard to Kashmir." But this is essentially an
attempt on the part of Moscow to fish in the sub-continent's troubled waters.
Pakistan may or may not accept the line of actual control in Jammu and Kashmir
as an international frontier under the Simla Agreement. However, its
willingness to go by India's assessment of its security requirements reflects a
departure from its old policy and an inclination to accept a peaceful final
settlement of the Kashmir issue.
Time
is here for a bold response to Gen Zia's offer and to test his sincerity. It is
not enough that we keep talking of the East-West detente. New Delhi and
Islamabad need to turn their thoughts to lowering tensions within the
sub-continent itself. India should accept Pakistan's need to strengthen its
defences as a frontline state in terms of Gen Zia's offer. Simultaneously, it
should also seek an agreement in regard to nuclear development and leave no
scope for mutual distrust. Indeed, Mrs Gandhi and Gen Zia should meet to gain
understanding of each other's viewpoint and explore the areas of cooperation.
Mrs Gandhi conveyed to Gen Zia in February last India's respect for the
integrity, sovereignty and independence of Pakistan. Gen Zia has reciprocated
by sending a warm message through Mrs Thatcher. India and Pakistan already
regard the Simla Agreement as a "no-war pact." They should now
consider ending the arms race which will only make them more dependent on the
Super Powers. The two countries need to go beyond the Agreement towards a
possible treaty of peace and friendship.----INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)
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INDIA’S TIMELY WARNING TO PAKISTAN, By Inder Jit, 8 May 2025 |
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REWIND
New Delhi, 8 May 2025
INDIA’S
TIMELY WARNING TO PAKISTAN
By Inder
Jit
(Released
on 30 January 1990)
Pakistan and its
rulers urgently need to pause and ponder. They should not allow the
developments in Jammu and Kashmir to encourage them to undertake any reckless adventure
across the border, overtly or covertly. Prima facie, the temptation may be
great to view the grave happenings as an opportunity to avenge the creation of
Bangladesh. The circumstances may even appear to be in their favour. However,
things are not always what they outwardly seem. India has no doubt its problems
as a vigorous democracy. The nation may appear divided and plagued with
political intrigue. But it has always stood together as one united people in
the face of external threat or attack. Nothing reflects this more than the extraordinary
step taken by the all-party Consultative Committee of Parliament attached to
the Ministry of External Affairs at its first meeting on Friday last. The
Committee unanimously adopted a resolution to declare: “Jammu Kashmir is an
integral part of India. Any interference from any quarter whatsoever will not
be tolerated.”
India is prepared to
face any threat from across the border, directly or indirectly. New Delhi has
been fully alive to the fast developing situation. The Prime Minister, Mr V.P.
Singh and his colleagues have been in close touch. The Army, commanded by Gen
V.N. Sharma, who hails from Jammu, is keeping its powder dry. Equally alert are
the Air and Naval Chiefs, Air Chief Marshal Mehra and Admiral Nadkarni.
Simultaneously, action is under way on the political plane. Talks have been
held at the highest level with Dr Farooq Abdullah. Undoubtedly, Dr Abdullah
must take most of the blame for mindlessly reducing the State to its present
dangerous situation. Nevertheless, it is a great pity that he should have run
away from the call of duty at a crucial time, placing self, party and politics
before the country. Sheikh Abdullah, his father, was eulogised as the Lion of
Kashmir. Dr Abdullah is being denounced as a “scared lamb”. Nevertheless, he is
still the State’s only leader who could possibly mobilize the silent majority
and help end the tyranny of the terrorist minority.
Ms Benazir Bhutto
overplayed her hand last week both in terms of her statement on Kashmir and the
brief with which Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, was sent to
New Delhi. True, she is eager to project herself as a tough Prime Minister
vis-a-vis India and win popularity in her tussle for supreme power in
Islamabad. (Pakistan, according to experts, has today four centres of power in
the following order: the US, the Army, the President and the Prime Minister.)
The President, Mr Ishaq Khan, enjoys under the country’s Constitution power to
appoint or dismiss the Prime Minister. This special power is due to lapse on
March 20, leading to a controversy: Can Ms Bhutto continue as the Prime
Minister after March 20 as an appointee of Mr Ishaq Khan? What if Mr Ishaq Khan
dismisses her on March 19 and asks her to seek a fresh vote of confidence?
Nevertheless, Ms Bhutto should have shown greater circumspection. She should
not have wiped off in one stroke the great goodwill she had built for herself
in India. Indeed, the Sahibzada’s visit could have easily waited since Mr Abdul
Sattar had already visited India as her special envoy.
The Sahibzada, a
suave diplomat, took the Foreign Minister, Mr. I.K. Gujral, totally by surprise
by the tone and content of his talk. His language was “offensive and hostile”
even as he prefaced his remarks with the words:“There was a high-level meeting
in Islamabad before I came. I have been treated to say...” But Mr. Gujral, also
suave to a fault, gave the Sahibzada a good deal more than he got by late in
the evening. He told the Sahibzada that a high-level meeting had been held on
the message brought by the Sahibzada and that he too, had been “directed to
tell” him clearly: “India will not tolerate any interference from Pakistan in
its internal affairs...”Not much later, Mr Gujral briefed the Arab Ambassadors
and so also the heads of missions of all the EEC countries of his talks with
the Sahibzada. The Foreign Secretary, Mr S.K. Singh was rushed off to Moscow
and the other Secretary in the MEA, Mr Muchkund Dubey, to the neighbouring
countries and elsewhere. India’s views have already been made known to
Washington.
Pakistan’s Army
Chief, Gen Aslam Beg, is suspected to be playing a major role in Islamabad’s
latest hawkish, nay belligerent outlook. Informed sources tell me that he is no
longer the same Gen Beg who once said that the Army should stay out of
politics. Of late, he has not hesitated to make political statements. He has
even appeared to be playing for higher stakes. On December 12, he stated in
Islamabad that the words of friendship from Delhi had not been matched by deeds
and blamed India for “backing out” of the Siachen accord. Not only that. At a
Press briefing at the Army Control headquarters at Sargodha, he reportedly
described the country’s biggest-ever war exercise, “Zarb-e-Momin”, as a
demonstration of the people’s military will and said this was designed to match
and support the political will! Significantly, he also announced a major shift
in Pakistan’s strategic doctrine from defence to “offensive-defence” and
asserted: “War must be fought on the enemy soil!” He also clarified: “The main
purpose of the exercise was to test the Army’s capacity to launch a large-scale
offensive.”
Ms Bhutto needs to be
wary of Gen Beg, no less than Gen Zia was cautious of his own Generals. Zia was
advised more than once to take advantage of India’s internal difficulties and
divisions. But as a political General he drew wise lessons from the bitter
experiences of Gen Ayub Khan and Gen Yahya Khan. The two were encouraged by
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in their time to launch wars against India. Both the
Generals came to grief and Bhutto calculatedly leap-frogged to power, first
partially and thereafter fully. Gen Zia, therefore, was clear all along that
any attack on India would amount to committing harakiri. It would be the surest and quickest way to bring his
regime to an end. In fact, it is no secret that most Pakistanis desiring
salvation from Zia’s rule repeatedly hoped (and prayed) that he would be stupid
enough to attack India. Ms Bhutto should remember this. Any attack on India,
encouraged by the misplaced euphoria over “Zarb-e-Momin” and the recent
happenings within India, could put an end not only to Benazir’s Government but
even to the country’s welcome return to democracy.
There is no denying
the fact that the Kashmir issue continues to be on the UN agenda. It also
figures prominently in the Simla Agreement. But there is no question of India
ever agreeing to a plebiscite in Kashmir, as demanded afresh by Ms Bhutto,
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan and some others. Time was some 40 years ago when India
was willing. Nehru then agreed to let the people decide their future again
through a plebiscite under the UN auspices. However, the UN resolution which
provided for self-determination and had the support of both countries could not
be implemented. Why? Because of Pakistan, not India. How? Pakistan, took the
astonishing and absurd stand that Part B of the resolution should be
implemented before Part A, ignoring the basic scheme of things and the
background. Part A provided for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops to clear the
decks for the plebiscite. Part B provided for the withdrawal by India of the
bulk of its forces from the State in stages. India could not, in fairness, be
expected to take a chance again with the future of Kashmir and leave it to
Pakistan’s mercy.
Clearly, the clock
cannot be put back. India could not be expected to wait indefinitely. Sheikh
Abdullah, who stood for the state’s accession to India, received overwhelming
popular mandate through elections time and again. In sharp contrast, the
Plebiscite Front in the State came to be wound up voluntarily by its founders.
More importantly, India is in no position to risk a plebiscite today --not even
if the chance of the plebiscite going against it is less than one per cent. As
I candidly told a Pakistani friend at a dinner in honour of Sahibzada Yakub
Khan last week: “Do you realise what would happen if the plebiscite was to go
against us? India could then become Hindu on the rebound on the basis of your
two-nation theory. What would then happen to India’s 100 million Muslims and
their future?” The Pakistani interrupted: “I did not know your secularism is so
fragile.” I continued: “That is not the question. You friends asked for
partition, not we. You cannot escape responsibility for what happened then and
what may happen tomorrow. Let us not demand something without going into its
grave implications. Neither you nor we can afford another upheaval. It would
destroy us both.”
Islamabad would do
well not to be carried away by emotions and to desist from suicidal
recklessness. Facts must be faced squarely and pragmatically. India happens to
be bigger and stronger. As a senior Pakistani Ambassador once confided: “India
is an elephant. We can at best harass and wound it. Ultimately, the elephant
must triumph.” It would therefore be grave folly on the part of Islamabad to
ignore New Delhi’s timely (and friendly) warning. New Delhi is not unaware of
the emotions over Kashmir in Pakistan, especially amongst its rulers. But we
must not allow our feelings to run amuck. We must seek a realistic solution, of
which there is only one. We must build bridges between our two countries step
by step as provided for in the Simla Agreement. This must one day bring us
closer, as in the case of Canada and the United States. Once that happens, the
international border between our two countries must necessarily become soft. It
will then matter little whether Kashmir is on this side of the border or that.
We must learn to look beyond narrow nationalism, even as we retain our separate
national identities. The future lies in friendship, not conflict.---INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
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BEYOND A NO-WAR PACT, By Inder Jit, 1 May 2025 |
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REWIND
New
Delhi, 1 May 2025
BEYOND A
NO-WAR PACT
By Inder
Jit
(Released
on 19 January 1982)
Silent
prayers of most people in India and Pakistan anxious to see the two countries
bury the proverbial hatchet and strengthen friendly ties appear to have been
heard at long last. An absurd and incredible war of words on Pakistan's
proposal for a no-war pact between the two countries has ended! On December 27,
New Delhi eventually showed good sense and conveyed to Islamabad its
willingness to sign a no-war pact on the basis of certain principles. Islamabad
has since reacted positively to New Delhi's delayed response to its proposal.
The stage is now set for talks between the two Foreign Ministers Mr Agha Shahi
and Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao on January 30 and 31. Mr Agha Shahi is arriving a day
earlier at the suggestion of Pakistan's Ambassador, Mr Sattar. This will enable
him to witness Beating Retreat, a grand finale to the Republic Day
celebrations. Queen Elizabeth, who witnessed this ceremonial function many
years ago, is known to have stated that she had not seen the like of such a
magnificent spectacle anywhere any time.
Pakistan
has so far played its cards adroitly. It has not only got Washington to give it
F-16s but projected itself as a country anxious to build bridges with India. In
distressing contrast, India has lost once again in terms of its image abroad.
It should have promptly welcomed the offer of a no-war pact and rejoiced over
the fact that Islamabad had, after all, seen light and accepted something which
New Delhi had first proposed in 1949. At the same time, it should have
expressed the hope that Islamabad was sincere and genuinely desired a no-war
pact. In doing so, it would have neatly put the ball back in Pakistan's court
in the first instance. True, New Delhi's stance helped internally. It made
people conscious of the new dangers and diverted their minds from problems at
home. But this line did not cut much ice abroad. Remember, the joint statement
issued at the end of Mr Rao's last visit to Islamabad included the following:
"Both sides agreed that each country had the sovereign right to acquire
arms for self defence."
Considerable
ground has been covered already in diplomatic exchange India has proposed
acceptance of seven principles for signing the no-war agreement. These are said
to be essential elements of the Simla Agreement and include what may be
described as the principles of peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's
territorial integrity and sovereignty, bilateralism and non-alignment. Pakistan
for its part, has called the proposals "constructive" and assured
India that it stands by the Simla Agreement. But it wants certain
clarifications in regard to the precise meaning and scope of some of these
principles in the context of their manifestly authoritative elaboration in the
Indian Press. India has, for instance, proposed that both countries should
revert to bilateralism for resolving all their differences and disputes -- as
provided for in the Simla Agreement. New Delhi, according to one
interpretation, believes that this bars Islamabad from raising Kashmir or any
other bilateral dispute at the UN or other world forums.
Islamabad,
I learn, does not accept India's interpretation. It concedes that the two
countries have resolved under the Simla Agreement "to settle their
differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations". But it
argues that this does not bar it from using a standard form to mention Kashmir
at the UN or any international forum on two counts. First, the Simla Agreement
provides for "a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir". Second, it
stipulates that in Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the
cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides "without
prejudice to the recognised position of either side". This recognised
position is said to be in regard to its stand on Kashmir at the UN, an item
which is still inscribed on the agenda of the world body. How can Pakistan, it
is asked, be prevented from stating at the UN that it desires "durable
peace" in the sub-continent and looks forward to "a final settlement
of Jammu and Kashmir" in accordance with the Simla Agreement?
A question
which is, therefore, certain to come up at the forthcoming talks is: what
exactly is bilateralism? Interestingly, the word does not occur in the Simla
Accord though, I am told, Krishna Menon in India and Bhutto in Pakistan had
their own thesis on the subject. In addition, one or two books are even said to
have been written on the subject. Clearly, this is one point which will need to
be clarified in the forthcoming talks so as to leave no scope for hard feelings
or bitterness in the future on either side. Pakistan may have its point in
regard to mentioning Kashmir in the course of saying its annual piece in the UN
General Assembly. But India, too, has its point. How far is Pakistan justified
in raising the Kashmir issue at other international forums as, for instance, at
the Islamic Summit? At one stage, General Zia not only mentioned Kashmir in the
course of his speech at the Islamic Summit but virtually asked for support of
the "Umma" -- the Islamic community -- in resolving the issue to
Islamabad's satisfaction.
India's
proposals made in an aide memoire do not specifically mention Kashmir or, for
that matter, the question of foreign bases, arms race or nuclear weapons. However,
Islamabad has also reacted to the interpretation given to the principle of
non-alignment and steps suggested by New Delhi to put "a brake on the arms
race," Strict adherence to non-alignment, it was stated in the Indian
Press, would commit the two countries against granting their territories for
establishing military bases by foreign powers. These reports further stated
that this implication of non-alignment was particularly important in the
context of reports that Pakistan was constructing a major port at Gwadur, 250
km west of Karachi, with the assistance of an Asian power. The Asian power was
said to have made its help available on the basis of some "secret"
understanding. India, therefore, wanted to be assured that a no-war pact between
the two countries would bar Pakistan from converting Gwadur from a commercial
port into a foreign naval base.
Pakistan,
it appears, would also like to pose the question: What precisely is
non-alignment? Does membership of the movement clash with a member's sovereign
rights? Islamabad is reportedly keen to ensure that the principles advocated by
India do not detract from the sovereignty of either country. Pakistan, it is
argued, has chosen of its own accord to give up its membership of CENTO and
join the non-aligned club. It has no desire or intention to forget the lessons
of the past and offer its territory for foreign military bases. But it wants to
go by the precise definition of non-alignment as given by the founders of the
movement and by the movement itself over the years in resolutions of the
Non-Aligned Conference -- and not by any arbitrary interpretation of any one
country. Simultaneously, as the smaller of the two countries vis-a-vis India,
it wants to be clear that nothing abridges its sovereign rights in regard to
the UN Charter, especially in the maintenanceof peace and security.
Now the
arms race. Pakistan appears to be coming ready to revive its earlier proposal
for an accord on force ratios. The proposal was initially mooted by Islamabad
in 1980 -- first to India's Foreign Secretary, Mr Ram Sathe, next to Mr Swaran
Singh when he called on Gen Zia and, thereafter in July, by Mr Shahi in his
controversial banquet speech in New Delhi. The proposal was renewed by Mr Shahi
during his meeting with Mr Rao in Islamabad in mid-1981. Mr Rao then reminded
Mr Shahi of the understanding reached during his visit to New Delhi, India had
then urged that the issue should be taken up only "at the appropriate
time" after a broad political understanding had been reached.
Significantly. Gen Zia also broached the subject during his talk with Mr Rao.
But the latter pointed out that he and Mr Shahi had already agreed not to talk
about it yet. Candidly, New Delhi needs to respond boldly to such an offer and
to thereby test Islamabad's sincerity. Time was when Pakistan demanded parity.
Today, it talks of force ratios leading one to quip: If Washington and Moscow
can have SALT, why cannot New Delhi and Islamabad have MALT?
Talks on
mutual arms limitation or a no-war pact does not necessarily mean that durable
peace will be assured. India, as the Prime Minister has emphasised, will need
to keep its guard up and not take any chances. Experience shows that mere
condemnation of war or its renunciation is not enough. Prior to the Simla Agreement,
provisions of renouncing war were incorporated in one form or another in three
previous agreements: the Nehru-Noon Agreement of September 12, 1958 on border
disputes, the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of October 23, 1959, on border incidents,
and the Tashkent Declaration made jointly by Lal Bahadur Shastri and Gen Ayub
Khan on January 10, 1966. The Declaration stated in its first paragraph:
"The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both
sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India
and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their
obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their
disputes through peaceful means..."
In sum,
the Indo-Pakistan parleys pose a test in creativeness and innovativeness -- and
in forging understanding in regard to the words used. (Nehru said once that
much of the trouble in the world today arose because the same words meant
different things to different people.) Both sides need to shed mutual
suspicions and take the next step towards a no-war pact which, significantly,
is not regarded for the first time in Pakistan as a sell-out on Kashmir! Full
agreement need not necessarily be reached in one go. The Simla Accord, it may
be recalled, was drafted following an extensive exchange of views between the
two Governments. The special emissaries of the two sides met first at April-end
1972 in Muree and this exchange was continued at Simla. The important thing is to
have a meaningful dialogue for establishing enduring peace and not only build
mutual confidence but direct thoughts beyond a no-war pact. Our two peoples are
basically tired of confrontation and conflict. They yearn to live like brothers
and share in the greater glory of peace for the two countries.---INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)
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PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE, By Inder Jit, 24 April 2025 |
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REWIND
New Delhi, 24 April 2025
PRESIDENT,
JUDICIARY AND EXECUTIVE
By
Inder Jit
(Released
on 10 December 1985)
New
Delhi and, more especially, Parliament's Central Hall continue to buzz over the
Indian Express vs Jagmohan affair against the backdrop of the grim and timely
warning sounded by the Chief Justice of India, Mr P.N. Bhagwati, in regard to
the country's judicial system and two other developments. First, the debate in
Parliament on the Supreme Court judgment in the Indian Express case which is
increasingly viewed by impartial observers as a deplorable assault on the
country's highest Court. Second, the sharp frontal attack by Mr Ram Nath Goenka
on the Minister of State for Law, Mr H.R. Bhardwaj, in the Indian Express of
November 30 and the subsequent motions of breach of privilege moved by Prof
Madhu Dandavate and Mr K.P. Unnikrishnan in the Lok Sabha on December 2. Also
adding significant grist to the capital's usually well-informed gossip mills is
Giani Zail Singh's reported distress over the unfortunate happenings in
Parliament vis a vis the Supreme Court and the "courtesy call" by Mr
Justice Bhagwati, on the President not long after the latter returned from his
visit to Sikkim and Bihar.
The
Minister of State for Law and the Congress-I benches in Parliament were
manifestly elated on November 28 and 29 when the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha
concluded their debates on the Supreme Court judgment in the Indian Express
case on Opposition motions seeking the ouster of Mr Jagmohan from the office of
Governor of Jammu and Kashmir. The Supreme Court, the Opposition leaders had
argued, had passed severe strictures against Mr Jagmohan. It was, therefore,
only right and proper that he now resigned his high office. But Mr Bhardwaj and
prominent Congress-I members successfully used their massive majority to defeat
the motions after successfully side-tracking the main issue. They spotlighted
the judgment and sought to push both Mr Goenka and the then Minister of Works
and Housing, Mr Sikander Bakht, into the dock instead of dealing with the issue
before the two Houses: the Supreme Court's judgment on Mr Jagmohan's review
petition. But by Monday, December 2, Prof Dandavate had more than settled his
score with the Minister of State and the ruling party, thanks to Mr Goenka's
attack on Mr Bhardwaj and others.
Prof
Dandavate, Janata, and Mr. Unnikrishnan, Congress-S, urged the Speaker to refer
their respective motions to the Privileges Committee on the ground that Mr
Goenka, Chairman of the Indian Express Group and himself a member of the House
once, was guilty of breach of privilege. Said Prof Dandavate: "I am
raising a very important issue connected with the House on which the entire
House would agree. When the debate on Mr Jagmohan took place here, the Minister
made certain observations explaining the Government's position. On 30th,
Mr Ram Nath Goenka has written an article..." The Speaker interrupted:
"I am looking into it." But Prof Dandavate went on: "Sir, in
that article he has called our Minister as delinquent as far as that House is
concerned and juvenile here..." The Speaker again intervened: "I will
look into it." But Prof Dandavate pushed ahead as is his won't and said:
"If our Minister is called juvenile here and delinquent there, that House
will take care of the delinquency but you have to take care of his
juvenileness. Therefore, the matter should be referred to the Privileges
Committee... so that Mr Goenka's allegations may be cleared,"
Ironically
but eloquently, the Treasury benches stayed silent. Prof.Dandavate then
shrewdly moved ahead for his kill like an adept Parliamentarian and said:
"I am surprised that no member of the ruling party is disturbed by this
article". The speaker averred: "You ask them, sir, not me". Mr Unnikrishnan
was now on his feet seeking to raise another related issue: arrival of 55 MLAs
from Kerala in New Delhi in support of the demands of coconut farmers. The Speaker
ruled: "If there is anything, we can again discuss it." Prof.Dandavate
again asked: “What is the response of the Parliamentary Affairs Minister to my
privilege motion”. The speaker replied: "I do not know”. Mr KrupasindhuBhoi,
Congress-I, intervened: "Sir, Prof Dandavate and Mr Unnikrishnan are
bringing in again and again malignant hallucination to this House." Prof
Dandavate was once again on his feet and repeated his earlier question: “we
would like to know from the Parliamentary Affairs Minister as to what is his
response to this privilege motion?" But the Minister, Mr H.Κ.L. Bhagat,
refused to be moved -- and sat in stony silence.
Clearly,
the silence told its own story. Mr Bhagat and his colleagues chose to face
humiliating embarrassment and even be shown up as "spineless" rather
than walk into Prof Dandavate's trap. Nothing would have suited the Opposition
more than to get the issue referred to the Privileges Committee and have the
matter thrashed out again first in the Lok Sabha and then in the Committee,
wherein the ruling party would have found it difficult to side-track the main
issue and, what is more, to defend Mr Bhardwaj and his conduct in Parliament.
Interestingly, Mr George Ferandez sought in 1975 to get the Pondicherry Licence
scandal discussed by the House through an identical stratagem. He wrote a
brazenly defamatory article against the Lok Sabha in Pratipaksha, a
socialist Party paper, and even likened it to "a brothel House". Prof
Dandavate then brought forward a motion of breach of privilege. The Minister of
Parliamentary Affairs, Mr K. Raghurammiah, was provoked and seemed inclined to
support reference of the issue to the Privileges Committee. But he soon saw the
trap and pulled back.
Meanwhile,
the controversy has been sharpened by the bizarre happenings in the Supreme
Court Bar Association beginning with its meeting on November 28 called
specifically to discuss the issue arising out of the Supreme Court judgment. At
this meeting, Mr S.N. Kacker, who is the President of the Association, strongly
criticised Mr Bhardwaj for his attack on the Supreme Court judges and said:
"We cannot ignore what he has said... The Bar is capable of expelling Mr
Bhardwaj... We must be up against anyone who insults the judiciary."
However, he did not push ahead and agreed to adjourn it until Tuesday so that
the members could have the benefit of the transcript of Mr Bhardwaj's speeches
in Parliament. On Tuesday, supporters of Mr Bhardwaj from all over Delhi packed
the meeting and reportedly adopted a resolution even after Mr Kacker had
adjourned the meeting and left. They put the Attorney-General, Mr K. Parasaran,
in the chair and got him to put the resolution to vote. The resolution not only
condemned Mr Kacker but asked him to render "an unconditional and
unqualified apology" for his remarks against Mr Bhardwaj.
Developments
took a new turn when 120 members of the Supreme Court Bar Association met a day
later -- on Wednesday, under the presidentship of Mr Shanti Bhusan, former Law
Minister and adopted a resolution condemning Mr K. Parasaran, Attorney-General
of India, for having presided over Tuesday's meeting. The resolution read as
follows: "We the members of the Supreme Court Bar Association strongly
condemn the so-called meeting of the Bar held on the 3 December 1985 which the
Attorney-General is supposed to have chaired". The meeting expressed
complete faith in and solidarity with Mr Kacker, the duly-elected President of
the Association. In fact, the meeting further held that the conduct of Mr
Parasaran in presiding over the meeting was unbecoming and worthy of the office
of the Attorney General of India when Kackerhad adjourned the meeting and left.
According to one press report, over 100 advocates who participated in the
Wednesday meeting were seen daily practising in the Supreme Court, whereas
ninety per cent of the advocates present at Tuesday's meeting were not seen in
the Supreme Court daily.
Controversy
continues on two questions. First, whether the judgment would have been
different if the concessions stated to have been made by Mr .LN. Sinha, former
Attorney General and counsel for the Union of India, and Mr. M.C. Bhandare,
counsel for Delhi Municipal Corporation, had not been made. Second, whether Mr
Sinha and Bhandare should have been given a hearing before the Judges passed
adverse remarks against them. First, informed circles maintain that the final
conclusions reached in the judgment do not rest on the concessions. Said one
legal luminary: "Even if these concessions are discarded, the process of
reasoning leads to the same conclusion”. Second, the Supreme Court Bar
Association has taken the stand that Mr Sinha and Mr Bhandare should have been
given a hearing. However, some veterans feel that this was not necessary. At
any rate, there appears to be little question of the two counsels getting a hearing
now unless they make amends. Perhaps, the matter should best rest with the
dismissal of the review. If there is to be a hearing, it can only be had on the
filing of affidavits. This could lead to further complications.
More
of the debate on Parliament's assault on the Supreme Court is bound to be heard
in the days and weeks to come -- unless enlightened and immediateefforts are
made to sort out matters in the best national interest. Thought will also need
to be given to the question of reforming the system and eliminating delays in
the delivery of judgments. But a few things need to be done without delay. One
hopes Mr Justice Bhagwati, who met the President last week, has already taken
up the issue with the Prime Minister. Further, that he will, if necessary, take
an early opportunity to speak on the subject. (Not a few in New Delhi were
disappointed at the absence of any reference to the issue -- even between lines
-- in his address to the Lawyers' Forum in Calcutta on November 30.) Fortunately,
the President has evinced interest in the matter as he is duty-bound by the
oath of his office -- to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution. At a
function to honour Mr Justice Bhagwati, the President said: "The people
expect much from the Supreme Court." I might add the people also expect
much from the President and the Prime Minister. Perhaps, Mr Rajiv Gandhi might
consider the advisability of making a statement in Parliament to put an end to
the controversy.--- INFA
(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)
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