Spotlight

New Delhi, 26 April 2025

India-EU Closer To Trade Pact

By Dr. Krzysztof M. Zalewski

(Boym Institute& Centre for International Relations, Poland) 

Negotiations on a free trade agreement (FTA) between the European Union and India have been ongoing for 18 years, with breaks. Despite the ongoing difficulties, for geo-economic reasons its finalisation now seems more likely than ever before. It will probably be the largest free trade area in the world next to RCEP. 

Given the scale of Indian economy, from Poland’s perspective this agreement creates both enormous challenges and great opportunities. The impact of this trade agreement on the economy depends on the negotiated detailed solutions and the ability of the Polish administration to cooperate with business. The Polish debate on this FTA should not be dominated by defensive interests. 

“ The EU-India free trade agreement would be the largest of its kind in the world (...). Timing and determination count, and this partnership comes at the right time for both sides. That is why we have agreed with Prime Minister Modi that we will strive to achieve it this year”, said the President of the European Commission, Ursulu van der Leyen in New Delhi during an unusual foreign visit of the entire College of commissioners in February. She was echoed by Prime Minister Modi: We have prepared a plan of cooperation in trade, technology, investment, innovation, green growth, security, skills and mobility. We have instructed our teams to conclude a mutual technology, investment, innovation, green growth, security, skills and mobility.We have instructed our teams to conclude a mutually beneficial bilateral free trade agreement by the end of this year.” 

Will the two major economies – currently the world’s second and fifth largest – be connected by an FTA? The history of the EU-India comprehensive trade agreement is not very encouraging. It has often seemed that an agreement was within reach, but in the end it didn’t happen. 

Let us recall that the work on the jointpolitical declaration of 1993 and cooperation agreement of 1994 was accompanied by the idea of deepening trade relations between New Delhi and the bloc countries. When in 2004 India and the EU became “strategic partners”, both sides expressed hopes for the imminent conclusion of a free trade agreement. However, thenegotiations started in 2007 were suspended in 2013. The reason was the difficult to overcome differences in interest in sectors like automotive, agriculture and food production or pharmaceutical industry. 

There were fears of too deep economic and social disruptions caused by the agreement. Reducing tariffs of more than 100% on groups of goods suchas dairy products, vegetables, fruits, sugar and confectionery products could cause a collapse in production and a crisis in the industries. Boththe EU and India heavily subsidised their own agricultural production, perceiving it as an inalienable component of food security. In turn, different interests and rules regarding intellectual property in the pharmaceutical market caused, on the one hand, European fear of a flood of cheap Indian generic drugs, and on the subcontinent - fear of a practice called ever-greening, i.e. maintaining drug patents by European companies by introducing minimal changes to them. 

After eight years, in 2021, a will was announced to return to negotiations, which startedin 2022. At that time, the interest in India on the European side was mainly motivated by the intensifying competition with China. New Delhi, on the other hand, had ambitions to take advantage of the de-risking policy promoted by EU institutions, i.e. reducing EU’s dependence on imports from China. At the corporate level, this principle was called" China plus one ". In principle, large international corporations should not base their extensive supply chains solely on the Middle Kingdom, having an alternative place of production and sourcing of raw materials. India seemed to be the ideal partner for this. 

But for over two years, there was a lack of political will to overcome obstacles old and new. Although negotiating teams met, the scant information about the talks suggestedno breakthrough had been achieved. EC officials involved in the negotiations complained that Indian delegations lacked information or authority to make binding decisions. 

This doesn’t mean that trade has not flourished. Quite the opposite - over the past decade, trade has almost doubled, both in goods and in services. As per EC, EU remains India's largest trading partner, accounting for trade in goods worth €124 billion in 2023, or 12.2% of India's total trade, ahead of the US (10.8%) and China (10.5%). India has a surplus in its relations with EU every year. Exports to EU and the US each accounted for 17% of India's total exports. 

Although India is only the EU’s ninth-largest trading partner, accounting for just over 2% of total EU goods trade in 2023, its position has been steadily growing over the past two decades. Trade in goods has almost doubled in the decade since the FTA negotiations were suspended, despite the pandemic crisis (2020-21). Trade in services has grown even faster, almost doubling in 2020-23 from €30.4 billion to €59.7 billion. Direct investment has been growing at a slightly slower pace, rising by justover 30% in 2019-22 to €108 billion. 

It is precisely the rapidly growing trade in services and goods and the solid value of investments that make both sides seem inclined to quickly conclude a trade and investment agreement to maintain the existing trend. Trade and investment need a stable legal basis, providing certainty of turnover. 

More important factors that speak in favor of quickly concluding an agreement that hadpreviously been impossible for decades.Firstly, India-EU ties, especially in bilateral relations with individual MemberStates, have gained a strategic dimension not only in terms of declared plans and values, but in terms of interests. Brussels and New Delhi are currently united by the desire to deepen cooperation in trade and technology, security and defence issues, but also in the broad sense of global connectivity, i.e. building multidimensional infrastructural, economic and business connections. 

Secondly, bothEU and India are trying to acquire new trading partners in the face of the unpredictable policy of the US administration. The level of additional US import tariffs announced on 2 April - 27% on Indian products and 20% on EU goods - in both cases surprised business analysts. Since the US remains the leading trading partner for boththe European " 27" and India, such high tariffs could cause economic disruption and crisis. Bilateral FTA may therefore be a way to escape forward. 

Third, even before the new U.S. tariffs were announced, India’s economic growth, still the fastest among theworld’smajor economies, appeared to be slowing. It fell to 5.4% in the fourth quarter of 2024, well below the RBI’s expectations of 6.8% annual growth. Direct investment data was also disappointing, with Vietnam and Malaysia benefiting much more effectively from the policy of relocating some production from China. 

In turn, on the Old Continent, most EU economies are stagnating, and the continent's largest economy, Germany, is in its third year of recession. For both partners, an FTA would be a way to stimulate economic growth. 

Fourthly, why the current plan to speed up negotiations may succeed is the clear change in attitudes among Indian elites towards international trade and FTAs. Until now, New Delhi has been haunted by the shadow of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's long-time post-war prime minister, who, becauseof India’s unfavourable modern experience in relations with the West, saw international trade as a threat of colonisation. 

After a period of liberalization that began in 1991, tariffs have been rising again since at least the middle of the last decade. The Modi government has sought liberal economic reforms within the country since coming to power, but it has also believed that a combination of higher tariffs and investment incentives should attract manufacturing. 

But New Delhi has changed its attitude toward trade agreements in recentyears, recognizing their potential for growth and modernization and exposing Indian companies to external competition. Concerns about domination by a rival from across the northern border, China, prevented India from joining RCEP in 2020, an agreement that liberalizes trade between the 10 nations of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and its five regional trading partners, South Korea, Japan, China, Australia and New Zealand . 

However, India has sought trade agreements with smaller entities on a bilateral basis. In 2022, an agreement was signed with the UAE and with Australia a few months later. Negotiations on pact with UK were resumed. The pressure to quickly conclude an agreement with EU is therefore part of a broader trend among the Indian elite: after cades of skepticism, the Indian subcontinent is now dominated by faith in its own strength and the ability of domestic entrepreneurs tocope with external competition. 

The preparations for this incomparably largeragreement also have a practical dimension. During Raisina Dialogue conference in New Delhi one could sense a certain optimism among hosts and European guests regarding the acceleration of talks and the prioritisation of them by the leadership of the EC and Indian government. Moreover, the ministers of the member states – with the exception of Hungary – presented an exceptionally coherent position not only on the issue of relations with India, but also on global challenges. 

Teams on both sides have been strengthened, and both sides at India's most important geopolitical conference have publicly expressed hope that the talks will be concluded bythe end of this year. The decision in 2022 to negotiate on three separate platforms, namely a free trade agreement, an investment protection agreement and an agreement on geographical indications (GI) for food products ,has reduced the risk that a blockade on anyone of them will lead to the collapse of the whole. 

This does not mean, however, that the conclusion of the agreement is certain. It may be delayed or permanently blocked by the relations of the EU with its external partners or by internal factors in India and the Union.The biggest risk factor in trade issues remains the unpredictable policy of US administration. Given the importance of the economic partnership between both EU and US and US and India, it is possible that the current hectic negotiations with Washington will drive Brussels and New Delhi apart. 

India has adopted a different negotiation strategy than Europe. While EU is currently focused on finding an internal compromise on tariffs on American goods, subsequent Indian trade missions are focusing on creating conditions forsigning a trade agreement withUS too. Before Modi's visit to Washington in February, tariffs on American bourbon and motors were reduced. During the visit, the Indian side declared its willingness to purchase more American gas (LNG), crude oil and arms. There is hope in New Delhi that a trade agreement on trade in goods with the US will be concluded by autumn 2025, the goal being to achievetrade exchange of $500 billion in 2030, from $ 210 billion lastyear (an average of 15% annually). 

Indian negotiators hope that while they will likely not be able to avoid an increase in U.S. tariffs on products from the subcontinent, the tariffs will be lower than those on goods from other parts of the world, giving Indian products a comparative advantage in US market. However, the parallel talks with Washington could cast a shadow over EU-India negotiations, especially since it may not be in U.S. interest to conclude such an agreement between the two American trading partners any time soon.---INFA 

(Copyright, India News & Feature Alliance)

REWIND

New Delhi, 15 May 2025

A WAY OUT OF THE ARMS RACE

By InderJit

(Released on 21 April 1981) 

India continues to strive hard to somehow block American arms for Pakistan. New Delhi has not only communicated its views on the subject to Washington, but also sought to use the British Prime Minister's visit to India to mount pressure on the US Administration. Mr's Gandhi raised the issue with Mrs Thatcher both privately and publicly in her official talks and in Parliament's Central Hall where a departure was made from established practice on the occasion of the British Prime Minister's address to MPs to enable her also to speak. "The spectre of cold war peeping in our doorway causes us grave apprehension", said Mrs Gandhi and added: "We have already spoken to you about the dangers of giving sophisticated arms to Pakistan." But New Delhi has again drawn a blank. What is worse, Mrs Thatcher made out a powerful case for Pakistan in New Delhi at her Press conference which will be remembered for her superb performance. She answered questions candidly and forthrightly without the slightest attempt to either hedge or side step or, like Mr Morarji Desai, reply with counter questions!

We in India have undoubtedly every reason to be gravely concerned over the prospect of fresh supply of American arms to Pakistan. Our country has been attacked thrice by Pakistan in the past three decades and more proving right Krishna Menon's brilliant quip: No one has yet produced a gun which fires only in one direction. Experience has also shown that military regimes are inclined to be less restrained and more trigger happy; both the 1965 and 1971 wars were launched by Pakistan while the country was ruled by Generals Ayub and Yahya Khan. But then Pakistan, too, has a problem on its hands, as Mrs Thatcher argued at her Press conference. The Soviet Union has "invaded" and "occupied an independent and non-Aligned Afghanistan", posing a threat to Pakistan. "I would be concerned if I had Soviet troops on my border. I would be getting all the means to defend myself and my people." India, she added, had increased its defence capability "enormously" and was in a position to defend itself. "You cannot deny the same right to another sovereign nation."

A question which needs to be asked is: Can something be done to avert an arms race in the sub-continent? Two possible answers are available. Ideally, the best would be to get the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan. All the countries, including Pakistan, have now veered round to India's view that this can be achieved only through a political solution and not militarily. Yet, enough has not been done for a political solution. The recent non-aligned meet in New Delhi took welcome initiative in setting up a four-nation committee to help resolve the Iran-Iraq conflict. The committee has since been vigorously following up its mandate and shuttling between world capitals. Yet the meet did not consider it necessary to either send a mission to Moscow on the Afghan issue or to set up a committee to help find a political solution. Even today, many feel that India, which has a vital security stake in getting the Soviets back to the Oxus, could help itself, the sub-continent and peace generally by taking a clear initiative regionally.

Opinion is divided on whether any such initiative would yield results. The Soviet Union seems to have little intention of pulling out of Afghanistan. But this need not cause us despair in rest our search for some way to avert an arms race between India and Pakistan. A second solution lies in taking Gen Zia at his word and accepting a unilateral offer he made to Mr Swaran Singh in April last year an offer which he repeated to me in an interview in reply to the question: "Do you think some kind of a permanent arrangement needs to be made to ensure against the build-up of a dangerous war psychosis between our two countries?" He said: "Well, the whole thing starts from a lack of trust. We must not forget that India and Pakistan have fought three wars. I only hope we have both realised the futility of wars... Wars do not solve political problems. In this year of the Lord 1981, might should not be right... We must create more confidence in the minds of not only the people but also at the Government level."

He then recalled his offer to Mr Swaran Singh: "I said to him. Tell us, whether Pakistan should have a force for its own security or not. Should India have a force for its security or not? And if you come to the conclusion that there is justification for Pakistan to have an armed force for its own security, then ask your (military) experts to tell us what should be the strength of our forces considering the defence requirements of a country like Pakistan and its geographic borders. I would accept their assessment and not debate it. In the process, you may probably ask our reaction. If you were to say all right, Pakistan should have this much and India that much. I said have as much as you like, I am not concerned. But I would be very much concerned when 18 divisions face Pakistan. We have then to think twice as to what all this exercise is about. But I made this offer. Unfortunately, we had no reaction at first. The reaction that came much later was 'No'. India said this is not a fair proposition. Because, Pakistan should have what Pakistan thinks necessary and India should have what India thinks necessary.

"Then I said, if that be the case, why should India get allergic to Pakistan's stress on its legitimate defence requirements. Here again, I proposed that if you want to know what we have and what we do not have, please come and ask me. I will tell you exactly what we have. And what you have I will not challenge. India is a big country. Pakistan realises this... We very humbly suggest to you and through you to the people of India that it is about time that both countries decided what was good for them. As for Pakistan, I can say there is no doubt in my mind that the good of both the countries lies in peaceful relationship, in mutual understanding, confidence, and respect. Pakistan is a small country. India is a bigger country, Pakistan today does not consider itself in competition with India. We can't. We are 80 million people. India is 650 million people. India is a bigger partner in this. It has a clear role to play and we grant it that much. But I think there is need for a better understanding and more confidence. I am sure sooner or later these will come."

I then said: "These are excellent thoughts, Mr President, I recall having a chat with SardarSwaran Singh on his return. He and many others in the country felt that any discussion in regard to the defence forces of the two countries would have to be preceded by some political understanding. Is that what he said to you?" Gen Zia replied, "No, he did not say so. We were discussing bilateral relations and came to the question of defence forces. This is what I offered unilaterally, as an idea. However, I agree that everything must emerge from a political understanding which willabout better military understanding and more confidence in each other. (Almost a year to the day, I wrote: "Notwithstanding their difference of perception, New Delhi has sought to end Islamabad's misgivings about India and, in the bargain, conceded Pakistan's concern for its security from across the Afghan border. Islamabad has been reassured by Mr Swaran Singh that India presents no security problem to Pakistan and that Pakistan should regard its eastern border with India as "a frontier of peace.")

Gen Zia also made some other remarks in the course of the interview which assume urgency and importance on two other grounds. First, in the context of the continuing talk of Pakistan's determined effort to go in for the nuclear bomb and Mrs Gandhi's forthright declaration in Parliament that India would respond appropriately in case Pakistan decided to go in for nuclear arms. (Some leading commentators are already advocating the view that India should exercise its nuclear option before Pakistan does so.) Second, in the overall context of the continuing cold war between the two countries and the fresh arms race, Gen Zia emphatically denied that Pakistan had any intention of either making a nuclear bomb or of detonating a nuclear device for peaceful purposes. Pakistan, he said, wanted nuclear technology to fill the gap of its energy requirement. Its programme was "peaceful and modest." Gen Zia also said that he regarded the Simla Agreement as a no-war pact and emphasised: "We should stop living in the past... (and) start a new chapter."

From here to where? Gen Zia has spoken and, as I said earlier, we should take him at his word. Full advantage should be taken of Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao's visit to Islamabad next month to begin a meaningful dialogue to avert an arms race and end the cold war, which is already causing both India and Pakistan enormous damage. Some Soviet commentators have reportedly suggested that the American arms for Pakistan are designed to prod Islamabad to fulfil "its old territorial ambitions in regard to Kashmir." But this is essentially an attempt on the part of Moscow to fish in the sub-continent's troubled waters. Pakistan may or may not accept the line of actual control in Jammu and Kashmir as an international frontier under the Simla Agreement. However, its willingness to go by India's assessment of its security requirements reflects a departure from its old policy and an inclination to accept a peaceful final settlement of the Kashmir issue.

Time is here for a bold response to Gen Zia's offer and to test his sincerity. It is not enough that we keep talking of the East-West detente. New Delhi and Islamabad need to turn their thoughts to lowering tensions within the sub-continent itself. India should accept Pakistan's need to strengthen its defences as a frontline state in terms of Gen Zia's offer. Simultaneously, it should also seek an agreement in regard to nuclear development and leave no scope for mutual distrust. Indeed, Mrs Gandhi and Gen Zia should meet to gain understanding of each other's viewpoint and explore the areas of cooperation. Mrs Gandhi conveyed to Gen Zia in February last India's respect for the integrity, sovereignty and independence of Pakistan. Gen Zia has reciprocated by sending a warm message through Mrs Thatcher. India and Pakistan already regard the Simla Agreement as a "no-war pact." They should now consider ending the arms race which will only make them more dependent on the Super Powers. The two countries need to go beyond the Agreement towards a possible treaty of peace and friendship.----INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

REWIND

New Delhi, 8 May 2025

INDIA’S TIMELY WARNING TO PAKISTAN

By Inder Jit

(Released on 30 January 1990) 

Pakistan and its rulers urgently need to pause and ponder. They should not allow the developments in Jammu and Kashmir to encourage them to undertake any reckless adventure across the border, overtly or covertly. Prima facie, the temptation may be great to view the grave happenings as an opportunity to avenge the creation of Bangladesh. The circumstances may even appear to be in their favour. However, things are not always what they outwardly seem. India has no doubt its problems as a vigorous democracy. The nation may appear divided and plagued with political intrigue. But it has always stood together as one united people in the face of external threat or attack. Nothing reflects this more than the extraordinary step taken by the all-party Consultative Committee of Parliament attached to the Ministry of External Affairs at its first meeting on Friday last. The Committee unanimously adopted a resolution to declare: “Jammu Kashmir is an integral part of India. Any interference from any quarter whatsoever will not be tolerated.” 

India is prepared to face any threat from across the border, directly or indirectly. New Delhi has been fully alive to the fast developing situation. The Prime Minister, Mr V.P. Singh and his colleagues have been in close touch. The Army, commanded by Gen V.N. Sharma, who hails from Jammu, is keeping its powder dry. Equally alert are the Air and Naval Chiefs, Air Chief Marshal Mehra and Admiral Nadkarni. Simultaneously, action is under way on the political plane. Talks have been held at the highest level with Dr Farooq Abdullah. Undoubtedly, Dr Abdullah must take most of the blame for mindlessly reducing the State to its present dangerous situation. Nevertheless, it is a great pity that he should have run away from the call of duty at a crucial time, placing self, party and politics before the country. Sheikh Abdullah, his father, was eulogised as the Lion of Kashmir. Dr Abdullah is being denounced as a “scared lamb”. Nevertheless, he is still the State’s only leader who could possibly mobilize the silent majority and help end the tyranny of the terrorist minority. 

Ms Benazir Bhutto overplayed her hand last week both in terms of her statement on Kashmir and the brief with which Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yakub Khan, was sent to New Delhi. True, she is eager to project herself as a tough Prime Minister vis-a-vis India and win popularity in her tussle for supreme power in Islamabad. (Pakistan, according to experts, has today four centres of power in the following order: the US, the Army, the President and the Prime Minister.) The President, Mr Ishaq Khan, enjoys under the country’s Constitution power to appoint or dismiss the Prime Minister. This special power is due to lapse on March 20, leading to a controversy: Can Ms Bhutto continue as the Prime Minister after March 20 as an appointee of Mr Ishaq Khan? What if Mr Ishaq Khan dismisses her on March 19 and asks her to seek a fresh vote of confidence? Nevertheless, Ms Bhutto should have shown greater circumspection. She should not have wiped off in one stroke the great goodwill she had built for herself in India. Indeed, the Sahibzada’s visit could have easily waited since Mr Abdul Sattar had already visited India as her special envoy. 

The Sahibzada, a suave diplomat, took the Foreign Minister, Mr. I.K. Gujral, totally by surprise by the tone and content of his talk. His language was “offensive and hostile” even as he prefaced his remarks with the words:“There was a high-level meeting in Islamabad before I came. I have been treated to say...” But Mr. Gujral, also suave to a fault, gave the Sahibzada a good deal more than he got by late in the evening. He told the Sahibzada that a high-level meeting had been held on the message brought by the Sahibzada and that he too, had been “directed to tell” him clearly: “India will not tolerate any interference from Pakistan in its internal affairs...”Not much later, Mr Gujral briefed the Arab Ambassadors and so also the heads of missions of all the EEC countries of his talks with the Sahibzada. The Foreign Secretary, Mr S.K. Singh was rushed off to Moscow and the other Secretary in the MEA, Mr Muchkund Dubey, to the neighbouring countries and elsewhere. India’s views have already been made known to Washington. 

Pakistan’s Army Chief, Gen Aslam Beg, is suspected to be playing a major role in Islamabad’s latest hawkish, nay belligerent outlook. Informed sources tell me that he is no longer the same Gen Beg who once said that the Army should stay out of politics. Of late, he has not hesitated to make political statements. He has even appeared to be playing for higher stakes. On December 12, he stated in Islamabad that the words of friendship from Delhi had not been matched by deeds and blamed India for “backing out” of the Siachen accord. Not only that. At a Press briefing at the Army Control headquarters at Sargodha, he reportedly described the country’s biggest-ever war exercise, “Zarb-e-Momin”, as a demonstration of the people’s military will and said this was designed to match and support the political will! Significantly, he also announced a major shift in Pakistan’s strategic doctrine from defence to “offensive-defence” and asserted: “War must be fought on the enemy soil!” He also clarified: “The main purpose of the exercise was to test the Army’s capacity to launch a large-scale offensive.” 

Ms Bhutto needs to be wary of Gen Beg, no less than Gen Zia was cautious of his own Generals. Zia was advised more than once to take advantage of India’s internal difficulties and divisions. But as a political General he drew wise lessons from the bitter experiences of Gen Ayub Khan and Gen Yahya Khan. The two were encouraged by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in their time to launch wars against India. Both the Generals came to grief and Bhutto calculatedly leap-frogged to power, first partially and thereafter fully. Gen Zia, therefore, was clear all along that any attack on India would amount to committing harakiri. It would be the surest and quickest way to bring his regime to an end. In fact, it is no secret that most Pakistanis desiring salvation from Zia’s rule repeatedly hoped (and prayed) that he would be stupid enough to attack India. Ms Bhutto should remember this. Any attack on India, encouraged by the misplaced euphoria over “Zarb-e-Momin” and the recent happenings within India, could put an end not only to Benazir’s Government but even to the country’s welcome return to democracy. 

There is no denying the fact that the Kashmir issue continues to be on the UN agenda. It also figures prominently in the Simla Agreement. But there is no question of India ever agreeing to a plebiscite in Kashmir, as demanded afresh by Ms Bhutto, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan and some others. Time was some 40 years ago when India was willing. Nehru then agreed to let the people decide their future again through a plebiscite under the UN auspices. However, the UN resolution which provided for self-determination and had the support of both countries could not be implemented. Why? Because of Pakistan, not India. How? Pakistan, took the astonishing and absurd stand that Part B of the resolution should be implemented before Part A, ignoring the basic scheme of things and the background. Part A provided for the withdrawal of Pakistani troops to clear the decks for the plebiscite. Part B provided for the withdrawal by India of the bulk of its forces from the State in stages. India could not, in fairness, be expected to take a chance again with the future of Kashmir and leave it to Pakistan’s mercy.

Clearly, the clock cannot be put back. India could not be expected to wait indefinitely. Sheikh Abdullah, who stood for the state’s accession to India, received overwhelming popular mandate through elections time and again. In sharp contrast, the Plebiscite Front in the State came to be wound up voluntarily by its founders. More importantly, India is in no position to risk a plebiscite today --not even if the chance of the plebiscite going against it is less than one per cent. As I candidly told a Pakistani friend at a dinner in honour of Sahibzada Yakub Khan last week: “Do you realise what would happen if the plebiscite was to go against us? India could then become Hindu on the rebound on the basis of your two-nation theory. What would then happen to India’s 100 million Muslims and their future?” The Pakistani interrupted: “I did not know your secularism is so fragile.” I continued: “That is not the question. You friends asked for partition, not we. You cannot escape responsibility for what happened then and what may happen tomorrow. Let us not demand something without going into its grave implications. Neither you nor we can afford another upheaval. It would destroy us both.” 

Islamabad would do well not to be carried away by emotions and to desist from suicidal recklessness. Facts must be faced squarely and pragmatically. India happens to be bigger and stronger. As a senior Pakistani Ambassador once confided: “India is an elephant. We can at best harass and wound it. Ultimately, the elephant must triumph.” It would therefore be grave folly on the part of Islamabad to ignore New Delhi’s timely (and friendly) warning. New Delhi is not unaware of the emotions over Kashmir in Pakistan, especially amongst its rulers. But we must not allow our feelings to run amuck. We must seek a realistic solution, of which there is only one. We must build bridges between our two countries step by step as provided for in the Simla Agreement. This must one day bring us closer, as in the case of Canada and the United States. Once that happens, the international border between our two countries must necessarily become soft. It will then matter little whether Kashmir is on this side of the border or that. We must learn to look beyond narrow nationalism, even as we retain our separate national identities. The future lies in friendship, not conflict.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

REWIND

New Delhi, 1 May 2025

BEYOND A NO-WAR PACT

By Inder Jit

(Released on 19 January 1982) 

Silent prayers of most people in India and Pakistan anxious to see the two countries bury the proverbial hatchet and strengthen friendly ties appear to have been heard at long last. An absurd and incredible war of words on Pakistan's proposal for a no-war pact between the two countries has ended! On December 27, New Delhi eventually showed good sense and conveyed to Islamabad its willingness to sign a no-war pact on the basis of certain principles. Islamabad has since reacted positively to New Delhi's delayed response to its proposal. The stage is now set for talks between the two Foreign Ministers Mr Agha Shahi and Mr P.V. Narasimha Rao on January 30 and 31. Mr Agha Shahi is arriving a day earlier at the suggestion of Pakistan's Ambassador, Mr Sattar. This will enable him to witness Beating Retreat, a grand finale to the Republic Day celebrations. Queen Elizabeth, who witnessed this ceremonial function many years ago, is known to have stated that she had not seen the like of such a magnificent spectacle anywhere any time.

Pakistan has so far played its cards adroitly. It has not only got Washington to give it F-16s but projected itself as a country anxious to build bridges with India. In distressing contrast, India has lost once again in terms of its image abroad. It should have promptly welcomed the offer of a no-war pact and rejoiced over the fact that Islamabad had, after all, seen light and accepted something which New Delhi had first proposed in 1949. At the same time, it should have expressed the hope that Islamabad was sincere and genuinely desired a no-war pact. In doing so, it would have neatly put the ball back in Pakistan's court in the first instance. True, New Delhi's stance helped internally. It made people conscious of the new dangers and diverted their minds from problems at home. But this line did not cut much ice abroad. Remember, the joint statement issued at the end of Mr Rao's last visit to Islamabad included the following: "Both sides agreed that each country had the sovereign right to acquire arms for self defence."

Considerable ground has been covered already in diplomatic exchange India has proposed acceptance of seven principles for signing the no-war agreement. These are said to be essential elements of the Simla Agreement and include what may be described as the principles of peaceful co-existence, respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, bilateralism and non-alignment. Pakistan for its part, has called the proposals "constructive" and assured India that it stands by the Simla Agreement. But it wants certain clarifications in regard to the precise meaning and scope of some of these principles in the context of their manifestly authoritative elaboration in the Indian Press. India has, for instance, proposed that both countries should revert to bilateralism for resolving all their differences and disputes -- as provided for in the Simla Agreement. New Delhi, according to one interpretation, believes that this bars Islamabad from raising Kashmir or any other bilateral dispute at the UN or other world forums. 

Islamabad, I learn, does not accept India's interpretation. It concedes that the two countries have resolved under the Simla Agreement "to settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations". But it argues that this does not bar it from using a standard form to mention Kashmir at the UN or any international forum on two counts. First, the Simla Agreement provides for "a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir". Second, it stipulates that in Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides "without prejudice to the recognised position of either side". This recognised position is said to be in regard to its stand on Kashmir at the UN, an item which is still inscribed on the agenda of the world body. How can Pakistan, it is asked, be prevented from stating at the UN that it desires "durable peace" in the sub-continent and looks forward to "a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir" in accordance with the Simla Agreement?

A question which is, therefore, certain to come up at the forthcoming talks is: what exactly is bilateralism? Interestingly, the word does not occur in the Simla Accord though, I am told, Krishna Menon in India and Bhutto in Pakistan had their own thesis on the subject. In addition, one or two books are even said to have been written on the subject. Clearly, this is one point which will need to be clarified in the forthcoming talks so as to leave no scope for hard feelings or bitterness in the future on either side. Pakistan may have its point in regard to mentioning Kashmir in the course of saying its annual piece in the UN General Assembly. But India, too, has its point. How far is Pakistan justified in raising the Kashmir issue at other international forums as, for instance, at the Islamic Summit? At one stage, General Zia not only mentioned Kashmir in the course of his speech at the Islamic Summit but virtually asked for support of the "Umma" -- the Islamic community -- in resolving the issue to Islamabad's satisfaction.

India's proposals made in an aide memoire do not specifically mention Kashmir or, for that matter, the question of foreign bases, arms race or nuclear weapons. However, Islamabad has also reacted to the interpretation given to the principle of non-alignment and steps suggested by New Delhi to put "a brake on the arms race," Strict adherence to non-alignment, it was stated in the Indian Press, would commit the two countries against granting their territories for establishing military bases by foreign powers. These reports further stated that this implication of non-alignment was particularly important in the context of reports that Pakistan was constructing a major port at Gwadur, 250 km west of Karachi, with the assistance of an Asian power. The Asian power was said to have made its help available on the basis of some "secret" understanding. India, therefore, wanted to be assured that a no-war pact between the two countries would bar Pakistan from converting Gwadur from a commercial port into a foreign naval base.

Pakistan, it appears, would also like to pose the question: What precisely is non-alignment? Does membership of the movement clash with a member's sovereign rights? Islamabad is reportedly keen to ensure that the principles advocated by India do not detract from the sovereignty of either country. Pakistan, it is argued, has chosen of its own accord to give up its membership of CENTO and join the non-aligned club. It has no desire or intention to forget the lessons of the past and offer its territory for foreign military bases. But it wants to go by the precise definition of non-alignment as given by the founders of the movement and by the movement itself over the years in resolutions of the Non-Aligned Conference -- and not by any arbitrary interpretation of any one country. Simultaneously, as the smaller of the two countries vis-a-vis India, it wants to be clear that nothing abridges its sovereign rights in regard to the UN Charter, especially in the maintenanceof peace and security.

Now the arms race. Pakistan appears to be coming ready to revive its earlier proposal for an accord on force ratios. The proposal was initially mooted by Islamabad in 1980 -- first to India's Foreign Secretary, Mr Ram Sathe, next to Mr Swaran Singh when he called on Gen Zia and, thereafter in July, by Mr Shahi in his controversial banquet speech in New Delhi. The proposal was renewed by Mr Shahi during his meeting with Mr Rao in Islamabad in mid-1981. Mr Rao then reminded Mr Shahi of the understanding reached during his visit to New Delhi, India had then urged that the issue should be taken up only "at the appropriate time" after a broad political understanding had been reached. Significantly. Gen Zia also broached the subject during his talk with Mr Rao. But the latter pointed out that he and Mr Shahi had already agreed not to talk about it yet. Candidly, New Delhi needs to respond boldly to such an offer and to thereby test Islamabad's sincerity. Time was when Pakistan demanded parity. Today, it talks of force ratios leading one to quip: If Washington and Moscow can have SALT, why cannot New Delhi and Islamabad have MALT?

Talks on mutual arms limitation or a no-war pact does not necessarily mean that durable peace will be assured. India, as the Prime Minister has emphasised, will need to keep its guard up and not take any chances. Experience shows that mere condemnation of war or its renunciation is not enough. Prior to the Simla Agreement, provisions of renouncing war were incorporated in one form or another in three previous agreements: the Nehru-Noon Agreement of September 12, 1958 on border disputes, the Indo-Pakistan Agreement of October 23, 1959, on border incidents, and the Tashkent Declaration made jointly by Lal Bahadur Shastri and Gen Ayub Khan on January 10, 1966. The Declaration stated in its first paragraph: "The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agree that both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter. They reaffirm their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means..."

In sum, the Indo-Pakistan parleys pose a test in creativeness and innovativeness -- and in forging understanding in regard to the words used. (Nehru said once that much of the trouble in the world today arose because the same words meant different things to different people.) Both sides need to shed mutual suspicions and take the next step towards a no-war pact which, significantly, is not regarded for the first time in Pakistan as a sell-out on Kashmir! Full agreement need not necessarily be reached in one go. The Simla Accord, it may be recalled, was drafted following an extensive exchange of views between the two Governments. The special emissaries of the two sides met first at April-end 1972 in Muree and this exchange was continued at Simla. The important thing is to have a meaningful dialogue for establishing enduring peace and not only build mutual confidence but direct thoughts beyond a no-war pact. Our two peoples are basically tired of confrontation and conflict. They yearn to live like brothers and share in the greater glory of peace for the two countries.---INFA

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