|
|
| |
|
|
| |
Round the World
|
THE WAR IN IRAN: REGIONAL & GLOBAL CONDITIONS, By Krzysztof Płomiński, 25 April 2026 |
|
|
|
Spotlight
New Delhi, 25 April
2026
THE WAR IN
IRAN
REGIONAL
& GLOBAL CONDITIONS
By
Krzysztof Płomiński
(Expert,
Centre for Intl Relations, Poland)
An update on the
American-Israeli attack on Iran, launched on 28 February, and carried out
outside the rules of regional law, marks a new phase in the realities of the
broader Middle East, with implications for global events. For the ongoing
region, the war marks the beginning of the formation of a consciously vaguely outlined
order, incorporated into the American National Security Strategy and Israeli
aspirations. It also lays the foundations for the principle of the US imposing
rules of the game in international relations, with implementation elements and
without a political component, aimed at defending its losing position as a
global hegemon.
For Israel, this war
has long been mandatory until the process of excluding its hostile neighbours
is completed, leaving a friendly or destabilised member state, and approved by
a regional superpower willing to assume some responsibility for the region's
security from the US. In both cases, apart from specifically understood
interests, the influence on the tool in Washington and Tel Aviv was exerted by
decisions concerning the environment promoting the permissible
non-transposition into practical principles of the Old Testament records.
For the Islamic
Republic, the ongoing war is existential in nature and marks the culmination of
a conflict with the US and Israel that has been ongoing since the establishment
of the new regime in Iran in 1979. The roots, however, support each other, even
deeper – to the 1953 overthrow by the CIA and MI6 of the democratically
established Mossadeq administration – the author of the nationalisation of
Iranian government, the establishment of the Shah's oppressive rule, and the
scope of his overthrow through mass social rebellion.
The terminology of
"big and small Satan" prevailed in Tehran, an ideological source and one
resulting from its use, which comes from Iran's adversaries and reaction from
that state, its source of power. It's worth noting that Tehran's isolationists
have always opposed formal alliance arrangements, following the emergence of
complications with China and Russia. The deep-rooted distrust and suspicion
between Iranian theocracy and Gulf Arab monarchies, according to reports from
the US and West needs focus. Sunni Muslims, however, are a major and not always
satisfied minority (in Bahrain, they constitute the main one).
Over the course of a
decade, Iran has created a coherent constitutional system of "democratic
theocracy," in which the newly minted Revolutionary Guard Corps plays the
role of the central player. From the outset, Iran's establishment has been
characterised by persistent rivalry between various liberal and conservative
authorities and bodies. The latter's predominance at key moments was largely
determined by the lack of control Western states exerted over the liberals,
their softening of their hard line toward the Ayatollahs' rule, and the linking
of systemic liberalisation with improved relations with the West and
maintaining their dominant position.
This was one of the
reasons for the radicalisation of Tehran's course and the inclusion of its
advanced weapons programme, ballistic and cruise missile and drone attacks, as
well as the forerunners of the Atakh "resistance axis" in Syria,
Lebanon, and Yemen.
The Iranian programme
has caused great concern both globally and within its scope. It began under the
Shah's rule, was peaceful and subject to IAEA monitoring. The possibility of
delivery is internationally acceptable, contrived, and requires the 2015
restriction of freedoms, but three years later it was scrapped by President
Trump, and European signatories failed to defend it.
In June 2025, Iran's
programme, alongside missiles and influence, became the basis for justifying
Israeli-American airstrikes on Iranian installations during the negotiations.
These demands are at the top of the lists of demands made against Tehran. Even
then, it was clear that the goal was to overthrow or paralyze the succession in
creating a new Middle Eastern security architecture.
Iran's relations with
its Arab neighbours are historically regulated, fraught with mutual distrust
and civil distrust. The Arab Cold War analysis against Iran and the export of
an update, which justifies its expansion into the main application, focused on
all Gulf and neighboring countries. The aim of bilateral agreements was to
provide host countries with a security umbrella against Iranian security. How
leaky is it? In practice, it was used, and then as a protection against
international stability.
The outbreak of war
with Iran has erased the value of the Saudi-Iranian normalisation process,
which began in 2023 thanks to Chinese mediation. The agreement on the influence
of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies concerns minimal consequences for
them from the Gaza war and subsequent events, which contribute to Israel's
marginalisation of Iranian influence in the region. The attempt was made
despite the eventual rise in anti-American sentiment and solidarity with the
Palestinian withdrawal.
In the first two
months of the ongoing war, the Iranians ensured they were well prepared,
surprisingly capable of retaliation and precise strikes. They transformed the
Strait of Hormuz into an effective tool, approving it of Israel, US bases, and
neighboring infrastructure. They caused a partial paralysis of passenger and
tourist traffic. They also—and perhaps most importantly—challenged the
decades-long positioning of the Arab Gulf states as a safe and secure haven of
security and development amidst cyber chaos.
The Gulf monarchies,
though far from presenting their typical positions, under attack by the attack
on Iran understand that its consequences cannot be directly revealed. This
meant the death of regionalisation. Administrative condemnation of attacks on
their territories and spectrum rights is a conflict that has led to
restrictions on missile and drone programmes,
Iran has always been
a viral organism, posing a threat to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and other
GCC states. Often, like Iraq, it is played by the US in regional politics. It
is also questionable whether these countries are true targets of the war.
The US has once again
been drawn into an armed conflict in the Middle East by Israel without a clear
plan, despite initial dramatic financial and domestic consequences and
deterioration of its legal position straits. Also at stake is regional balance
of power and new security architecture of the region. Yet, unrelated to the
existing crises, from Libya and Sudan, through Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and
Yemen, to Iran and Afghanistan, which are beyond resolution. Several states are
on the verge of collapse.
The Arab Gulf
countries had to be an American security umbrella, with weakened partnerships.
There are no alternative solutions that do not involve a security system with
Pakistan or Turkey. The US will insist on a regional security pact with Israel
and an extension of Abraham Accords process. Therefore, the agenda will once
again focus on Saudi-Israeli normalisation and a unified package of Saudi-US
agreements, the scope of the security area, arms control, technology control,
investment, and cooperation. However, all GCC countries will have to be
controlled, and their spending will be controlled or regulated by the US.
Preliminary data for
the 30-day economic war indicate that Saudi Arabia's revenues will decline by
5-6% in 2026, and the UAE by 8-10%. A general solution is far from being
achieved, but the problems are mounting. An extension of the war with Iran,
which should be considered the most severe, threatens a breakdown in governance
and recession, and spreads threats and destabilising factors far beyond the
region, affecting countries with extensive development and organisational
development in Asia and Africa.
There will also be a
worsening of existing consequences of situation in the Middle East, including
migration and threats, and situation in Lebanon and Palestinian affairs.
Practical action is necessary after the situation has been de-escalated and diversification
of energy supply sources is necessary in the event of a deepening crisis. The
ongoing crisis requires careful monitoring. Government agencies need to prepare
an analysis of the Gulf War. ---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
|
|
|
Lee Jae-Myung Visits India: TURNS SLOGAN TO SUPPLY CHAIN”, By Prof. D.K. Giri, 24 April 2026 |
|
|
|
Round The World
New
Delhi, 24 April 2026
Lee Jae-Myung
Visits India
Turns Slogan to Supply Chain”
By Prof. D.K. Giri
(Prof of Practice,
NIIS Group of Institutions)
When
South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung landed in New Delhi on April 19, 2026, it
wasn’t just another photo-op at Rashtrapati Bhavan. It was the third time he
and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in 12 months, but the first time as the
head of state on Indian soil. The timing is significant.
This
is the first South Korean state visit to India in eight years, and the quickest
by any Seoul President after taking office. That urgency tells us one thing:
the India-Korea “Special Strategic Partnership,” announced in 2015, is finally
getting a deadline. The Middle East is burning, the Strait of Hormuz is
effectively closed, and both democracies have decided they can’t afford to keep
their ties stuck in the CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement)-2010
– era.
In
geopolitics both democracies face one chokepoint problem. President Lee was
blunt on X before boarding the plane: “Amidst ongoing supply chain instability
and a global economic crisis stemming from the aftermath of the Middle East
conflict, the Republic of Korea and India are emerging as increasingly vital
strategic partners.”
The
inference of the above statement is that Iran lost its Supreme Leader to
U.S.-Israeli strikes on Feb 28, Tehran is fractured, and Korean tankers can’t
get through Hormuz. Korea imports 70 per cent of its crude through that strait.
India, meanwhile, needs to de-risk Chinese inputs and find trusted partners for
critical tech. Both need each other’s geography.
So
the summit wasn’t about culture. It was about chokepoints. National Security
Adviser Wi Sung-lac said it plainly: the leaders would “maintain close
coordination on energy supply chains amid rapidly shifting global dynamics”. One
expects India to leverage its Iranian Chabahar port and East African routes,
while Korea brings maritime insurance, LNG ship tech, and its Hyundai/Hanwha
shipyards.
In
economic terms Shipbuilding, Chips, and the ‘Make in India’ approach converged
during this visit. The MEA brief for the talks reads like an industrial policy
wishlist: “shipbuilding, trade, investments, AI, semiconductors, critical and
emerging technologies”. Four of those are where Korea is top-3 globally and
India is most hungry.
In
Shipbuilding, this was “at the top of India’s industrial agenda”. India has
7,500 km of coastline but only 1 per cent of global shipbuilding. Korea has 30
per cent. With Hormuz risky, India wants LNG carriers and warships built
locally. Korea wants orders to keep its yards running as Chinese competition
bites. These concerns resulted in an MOU signed on Monday. Now, let us watch
for a Hyundai Heavy Industries JV in Gujarat or Odisha.
In
semiconductors and AI, Samsung and SK Hynix need a China+1 fab base. India
needs their IP to make its $10-billion Semicon India mission real. Lee’s team
signalled that AI and chips were core deliverables. For India, this is the
bridge from “assembly” to “design.” For Korea, it’s market access to 1.4
billion digital consumers.
In
trade, bilateral trade hit $25.1 billion in 2024 and was $21.5 billion for
Jan–Oct 2025. That’s stagnant. CEPA needs an upgrade. Business forums in Delhi
saw both sides push for “new opportunities”. We can expect services, digital
trade, and defence exports to enter CEPA 2.0 talks.
The
defence angle was quiet, but real. No BrahMos-style headlines, but Wi Sung-lac
listed “defence” as a strategic sector for “a new chapter”. Korea is now a
top-10 arms exporter. India wants K9 Vajra artillery tech, ship engines, and
submarine collaboration. Korea wants India’s Russian legacy market and
Indo-Pacific naval access.
But
the subtext here is, both countries are hedging. Trump’s America is
unpredictable, China is assertive, and the Middle East is volatile. A
Seoul-Delhi defence industrial corridor — from Vizag to Busan — gives both the
strategic autonomy. Various bilateral mechanisms already exist for “defence
industrial cooperation”. This visit funds them.
On
the people track, CEOs, students, and the ‘Kimchi-Curry’ soft power are on top
priority. Lee didn’t just meet Modi. He laid a wreath at Gandhi’s memorial,
attended a business conclave, and met the Korean diaspora. First Lady Kim Hea
Kyung was alongside. President Murmu hosted the state dinner.
Why
it matters! India-Korea ties have always been elite-driven — Hyundai, LG,
Samsung. But the next phase needs SMEs, students, and startups. Korea’s
population is aging; India’s is young. Education visas, joint R&D in AI,
and cultural familiarity will decide if this is transactional or
transformational. Lee calling the summit a “turning point” only makes sense if
25-year-olds in Pune and Pohang start building together.
The
Vietnam link shows Lee’s ‘Global South’ play and India’s role in it. Lee flew
straight to Hanoi after Delhi. That’s not accidental. Wi called this trip part
of Lee’s “global South strategy” to “diversify supply chains and markets”.
India is the anchor of that strategy. If Korea can plug into India’s
manufacturing and Vietnam’s critical minerals, it creates a non-China supply
web for chips, batteries, and ships.
For
Delhi, that’s a win. It positions India not just as Korea’s market, but as
Korea’s gateway to the Global South and ASEAN. The India-Korea-Vietnam triangle
mirrors the Quad’s economic logic, minus the military baggage.
What
this visit actually changes? There could be three takeaways for Indo-Korean ties.
Takeaway 1: From Trade to Trust. For 15 years, India-Korea was about Hyundai
cars and CEPA tariffs. After Hormuz and the Middle East war, it’s about energy
security and war-proofing supply chains. That’s a strategic shift. You don’t
share shipbuilding IP unless you trust the partner for 30 years.
Takeaway
2: From Bilateral to Networked. Lee’s India visit was leg-1 of an India-Vietnam
tour focused on “critical minerals” and “energy supply chains”. India isn’t the
destination; it’s the hub. We can expect Seoul to route more of its
Indo-Pacific policy through Delhi.
Takeaway
3: From Intent to Investment. The test of this visit is the MOU signing
ceremony and the business forum. If Hyundai Heavy, Samsung, and SK announce
India capex by July, Lee’s “turning point” claim holds. If not, we’re back to
2018 communiqués.
In
conclusion, the ‘special’ in strategic should be noted. “Special Strategic
Partnership” has been diplomatic boilerplate since 2015. Lee Jae-Myung’s three-day
visit in April 2026 finally put machinery behind the metaphor. Hormuz forced
the issue; economics will sustain it.
For
India, Korea is the rare partner that brings capital, technology, and no border
dispute. For Korea, India is the rare democracy with scale, youth, and a navy
that can sail from Hormuz to Malacca. The two leaders have now met thrice. The
next meeting should be at a shipyard opening, not a summit. That’s when we’ll
know the Korean kimchi (a foundational staple in Korean cuisine) has really met
the Indian curry.---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
|
|
|
Lee Jae-Myung Visits India: TURNS SLOGAN TO SUPPLY CHAIN”, By Prof. D.K. Giri, 24 April 2026 |
|
|
|
Round The World
New
Delhi, 24 April 2026
Lee Jae-Myung
Visits India
Turns Slogan to Supply Chain”
By Prof. D.K. Giri
(Prof of Practice,
NIIS Group of Institutions)
When
South Korean President Lee Jae-Myung landed in New Delhi on April 19, 2026, it
wasn’t just another photo-op at Rashtrapati Bhavan. It was the third time he
and Prime Minister Narendra Modi met in 12 months, but the first time as the
head of state on Indian soil. The timing is significant.
This
is the first South Korean state visit to India in eight years, and the quickest
by any Seoul President after taking office. That urgency tells us one thing:
the India-Korea “Special Strategic Partnership,” announced in 2015, is finally
getting a deadline. The Middle East is burning, the Strait of Hormuz is
effectively closed, and both democracies have decided they can’t afford to keep
their ties stuck in the CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement)-2010
– era.
In
geopolitics both democracies face one chokepoint problem. President Lee was
blunt on X before boarding the plane: “Amidst ongoing supply chain instability
and a global economic crisis stemming from the aftermath of the Middle East
conflict, the Republic of Korea and India are emerging as increasingly vital
strategic partners.”
The
inference of the above statement is that Iran lost its Supreme Leader to
U.S.-Israeli strikes on Feb 28, Tehran is fractured, and Korean tankers can’t
get through Hormuz. Korea imports 70 per cent of its crude through that strait.
India, meanwhile, needs to de-risk Chinese inputs and find trusted partners for
critical tech. Both need each other’s geography.
So
the summit wasn’t about culture. It was about chokepoints. National Security
Adviser Wi Sung-lac said it plainly: the leaders would “maintain close
coordination on energy supply chains amid rapidly shifting global dynamics”. One
expects India to leverage its Iranian Chabahar port and East African routes,
while Korea brings maritime insurance, LNG ship tech, and its Hyundai/Hanwha
shipyards.
In
economic terms Shipbuilding, Chips, and the ‘Make in India’ approach converged
during this visit. The MEA brief for the talks reads like an industrial policy
wishlist: “shipbuilding, trade, investments, AI, semiconductors, critical and
emerging technologies”. Four of those are where Korea is top-3 globally and
India is most hungry.
In
Shipbuilding, this was “at the top of India’s industrial agenda”. India has
7,500 km of coastline but only 1 per cent of global shipbuilding. Korea has 30
per cent. With Hormuz risky, India wants LNG carriers and warships built
locally. Korea wants orders to keep its yards running as Chinese competition
bites. These concerns resulted in an MOU signed on Monday. Now, let us watch
for a Hyundai Heavy Industries JV in Gujarat or Odisha.
In
semiconductors and AI, Samsung and SK Hynix need a China+1 fab base. India
needs their IP to make its $10-billion Semicon India mission real. Lee’s team
signalled that AI and chips were core deliverables. For India, this is the
bridge from “assembly” to “design.” For Korea, it’s market access to 1.4
billion digital consumers.
In
trade, bilateral trade hit $25.1 billion in 2024 and was $21.5 billion for
Jan–Oct 2025. That’s stagnant. CEPA needs an upgrade. Business forums in Delhi
saw both sides push for “new opportunities”. We can expect services, digital
trade, and defence exports to enter CEPA 2.0 talks.
The
defence angle was quiet, but real. No BrahMos-style headlines, but Wi Sung-lac
listed “defence” as a strategic sector for “a new chapter”. Korea is now a
top-10 arms exporter. India wants K9 Vajra artillery tech, ship engines, and
submarine collaboration. Korea wants India’s Russian legacy market and
Indo-Pacific naval access.
But
the subtext here is, both countries are hedging. Trump’s America is
unpredictable, China is assertive, and the Middle East is volatile. A
Seoul-Delhi defence industrial corridor — from Vizag to Busan — gives both the
strategic autonomy. Various bilateral mechanisms already exist for “defence
industrial cooperation”. This visit funds them.
On
the people track, CEOs, students, and the ‘Kimchi-Curry’ soft power are on top
priority. Lee didn’t just meet Modi. He laid a wreath at Gandhi’s memorial,
attended a business conclave, and met the Korean diaspora. First Lady Kim Hea
Kyung was alongside. President Murmu hosted the state dinner.
Why
it matters! India-Korea ties have always been elite-driven — Hyundai, LG,
Samsung. But the next phase needs SMEs, students, and startups. Korea’s
population is aging; India’s is young. Education visas, joint R&D in AI,
and cultural familiarity will decide if this is transactional or
transformational. Lee calling the summit a “turning point” only makes sense if
25-year-olds in Pune and Pohang start building together.
The
Vietnam link shows Lee’s ‘Global South’ play and India’s role in it. Lee flew
straight to Hanoi after Delhi. That’s not accidental. Wi called this trip part
of Lee’s “global South strategy” to “diversify supply chains and markets”.
India is the anchor of that strategy. If Korea can plug into India’s
manufacturing and Vietnam’s critical minerals, it creates a non-China supply
web for chips, batteries, and ships.
For
Delhi, that’s a win. It positions India not just as Korea’s market, but as
Korea’s gateway to the Global South and ASEAN. The India-Korea-Vietnam triangle
mirrors the Quad’s economic logic, minus the military baggage.
What
this visit actually changes? There could be three takeaways for Indo-Korean ties.
Takeaway 1: From Trade to Trust. For 15 years, India-Korea was about Hyundai
cars and CEPA tariffs. After Hormuz and the Middle East war, it’s about energy
security and war-proofing supply chains. That’s a strategic shift. You don’t
share shipbuilding IP unless you trust the partner for 30 years.
Takeaway
2: From Bilateral to Networked. Lee’s India visit was leg-1 of an India-Vietnam
tour focused on “critical minerals” and “energy supply chains”. India isn’t the
destination; it’s the hub. We can expect Seoul to route more of its
Indo-Pacific policy through Delhi.
Takeaway
3: From Intent to Investment. The test of this visit is the MOU signing
ceremony and the business forum. If Hyundai Heavy, Samsung, and SK announce
India capex by July, Lee’s “turning point” claim holds. If not, we’re back to
2018 communiqués.
In
conclusion, the ‘special’ in strategic should be noted. “Special Strategic
Partnership” has been diplomatic boilerplate since 2015. Lee Jae-Myung’s three-day
visit in April 2026 finally put machinery behind the metaphor. Hormuz forced
the issue; economics will sustain it.
For
India, Korea is the rare partner that brings capital, technology, and no border
dispute. For Korea, India is the rare democracy with scale, youth, and a navy
that can sail from Hormuz to Malacca. The two leaders have now met thrice. The
next meeting should be at a shipyard opening, not a summit. That’s when we’ll
know the Korean kimchi (a foundational staple in Korean cuisine) has really met
the Indian curry.---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
|
|
|
POLL BATTLE AND FEDERALISM, By Inder Jit, 23 April 2026 |
|
|
|
REWIND
New
Delhi, 23 April 2026
POLL
BATTLE AND FEDERALISM
By Inder Jit
(Released on 18 May
1982)
Poll
campaigning has formally come to an end and with it the tumult and shouting.
The voter has the next two days to make up his mind going to be easy. Most
voters have got into the spirit of the elections and attended more than one
meeting. Poll meetings have the not undoubtedly been great fun. They bring
welcome tamasha into their otherwise dull and listless lives -- like a
visiting fair or a performing circus. But they have also left him bewildered.
Every party has bombarded him with claims and counter claims. Confusion has
been worse confounded by the statisties hurled at him from all sides. However,
two things seem clear. One, the mini-general poll has carried one step further
the process of political education, (which began with Jawaharlal Nehru in 1952.
The people are better aware now of the issues at stake. Second, a question mark
has gone up over the Centre-State relations and, in fact, over the future of
India as a well-knit federation -- a Union of States.
Mrs
Gandhi has asked the voters in the course of her whirlwind poll campaign to
support the candidates of the ruling party at the Centre, namely those of the
Congress (I). This, she has argued, was necessary for harmonious Centre-State
relations, better administration and planning and faster development. She cited
the examples of West Bengal and Kerala and said that non-Congress (I)
Governments in the two States had taken to the path of confrontation, adversely
affecting their development. This has been challenged by the Opposition
leaders, who have contended that these States have, indeed, progressed faster
than, say, Bihar. In fact, the leaders of the five main Opposition parties have
denounced Mrs Gandhi's approach as an open assault on the concept of federal
harmony enshrined in the Constitution. They also see it as an attempt to
threaten and blackmail the State's and, in so many words, saying: Development of
your area depends upon the Centre's help and cooperation. So, vote Congress (I)
or else... Don't say later that you were not warned!
The
issue has been succinctly posed by Mr Jagjiwan Ram whose unrivalled experience
and success as a Union Minister qualifies him to speak with authority. Writing
in INFA's Election Series last week, Mr Jagjivan Ram stated: "Federalism
by the very definition implies a harmonious union of States on the basis of
equality, each functioning within the prescribed framework to project an
integrated image of a unified Centre. The States should be allowed an unhindered
realm of activity to discharge their constitutional obligations to the people….
In fact, the parallel functioning of the governments of different parties
affords people an opportunity to judge the merits of the parties. Those who
invoke the fears of confrontation and chaos are doing a disservice to the very
system we have adopted." He also said: "The concept of a one-party
rule at the Centre as well as in the States would reduce the latter to the
position of vassal states and impede growth. In the ultimate analysis, it would
recoil on the Centre and weaken the very fabric of federalism."
Not
many remember that the issue came up in a big way early in 1978 when the Chief
Minister of Punjab, Mr. Prakash Singh Badal argued strongly in favour of a
Centre-States dialogue especially fiscal relations. In the course of some
plainspeaking at a meeting of the National Development Council, Mr Badal said:
"The federal structure has been eroded, though without a constitutional amendment...
Growing dependence on the Centre has seriously sapped the initiative and
enterprise of the states... No major headway can be made in economic
development till the initiative is restored to the States and financial and
economic powers are radically decentralised. Most Chief Ministers present at
the subsequently endorsed Mr Badal's stand. At least two Chief Ministers then told
me: “Our States have been reduced to the position of glorified municipalities –
and we Chief Ministers to that of mendicants.” Mr. Badal, for his part, did not
stop at that. He even convened a meeting of some dozen Chief Ministers to
demand a recasting of the financial relations.
Many
in New Delhi then threw up their hands in horror. None in the Janata Government
expected Mr Badal, an ally, to play Brutus. Many are equally critical today of
the renewed cry for greater autonomy. Politics apart, there is much in what Mr
Badal boldly said then and what has been stated thereafter by Mr Jyoti Basu and
Dr Ashok Mitra, Sheikh Abdullah and other Chief Ministers. The fact is that the
autonomy of the States has been progressively emasculated over the past three
decades by various surreptitious means and by what is described by some as the
"extra-constitutional device" of the Planning Commission. The
Commission, which was created by a resolution of the Union Government and,
curiously, has no statutory basis was conceived as an autonomous body of
experts functioning impartially in the best national interest. Nehru became its
Chairman to give status to the Commission -- and to provide a link with the Government.
But the Commission has been reduced today virtually to a Government department
with the Planning Minister as its head.
What
has come to pass was foreseen by the Estimates Committee of the Second Lok
Sabha way back in April 1958. In its twenty-first report on the Planning
Commission, the Estimates Committee, headed by Mr Balvantray Mehta, suggested a
review of the "entire procedure now adopted in regard to planning."
In coming to this conclusion, the Committee conceded that planning involved
allocation of scarce resources and consequent fixation of priorities. It also acknowledged
that planning involved "special difficulties" in a federal
constitution especially when the financial resources of the States were
inelastic and they were required to depend upon the Centre for financing a very
large proportion of their development programmes. But it was eager to ensure
against a feeling in the States that the "Planning Commission was not just
an advisory body but that it was an additional authority to be reckoned with
which, though mot a part of the ordinary machinery of the Government of India, decided
every programme of work and whose decisions should be carried out by all."
The
Committee, which made several thought-provoking recommendations, also suggested
"that the utility to the State Governments and the Central ministries of
the role at present played by the Planning Commission in the annual and
periodical allotment of finances, should be reviewed in the light of experience
gained in the last two years. It should also be considered to what extent this
function should be performed by the Planning Commission and whether it should
not be left to the Government themselves leaving the Planning Commission to concentrate
on the evaluation of the current plan and formulation of the future
Plan..." Indeed, the Committee was so keen to get the Planning Commission
to be an independent, expert body that it questioned the advisability of the Prime
Minister and the Central Ministers retaining a formal connection with it. Individual
ministers, it said, could always be invited to attend meetings of the
Commission. Likewise, a representative of the Commission could be invited to
attend a meeting of the Cabinet.
Unfortunately,
Mr. Nehru was not happy with the recommendation and little was done in terms of
follow-up action. Worse, clever Finance Ministers at the Centre were thereafter
permitted to "distort the Constitution" in a manner which, according
to some experts, is principally responsible for pushing more and more states into
the red. Most States are, therefore, forced to seek Central subsidies and
overdrafts. On occasions, this has led to a head-on collision, as between the
Centre and West Bengal in recent months. The Constitution makers were conscious
of the fact that the states had not been given adequate revenues to meet their
expanding expenditure on agriculture, education, health, transport and water
supply etc. They, therefore, provided that certain revenues, such as income tax
and excise, should be divided between the Centre and the States. But some of
the revenues which were originally intended to accrue to the States over the
years have been grabbed by the Centre, thanks to successive Finance Ministers.
In the bargain, the Constitution has been subverted in spirit.
Until
1959, for instance, income from companies was included in income-tax which was
divisible with the States. That year the terminology was cleverly changed by
the Centre and the income from companies entirely appropriated by describing it
differently as a corporation tax. In another instance, the Centre deprived the States
their share of the higher income-tax by levying a surcharge on income-tax for
the past 20 years and conveniently pocketing the additional return. Again, the
States agreed to surrender the sales tax on cloth, textiles, sugar and tobacco
to the Centre on the understanding that it would levy "additional excise
duty" and share the gains with the States. But the Centre subsequently
increased only the basic excise duties and appropriated the entire money giving
nothing to the States. Mr R. Venkatraman, a senior Congress-man and a former
member of the Planning Commission told the Lok Sabha on March 1, 1978: "I
was a Minister in a State for 10 years and I wanted to cry out. Now I have a
chance..." Ironically, however, he did little to set matters right as the
Union Finance Minister.
Centre-State
problems are not new. Nehru, too, faced them. But he was able to tackle them
through the informal channel of Congress Governments in the States. True, the
Constitution provides for a strong Centre. However, India's polity is federal,
not unitary. The Constitution is meant to be worked even in a multi-party
situation -- a point conceded by Mrs Gandhi in Cochin last week. New Delhi needs
to give serious thought to Centre-State relations and consider the
establishment of an Inter-State Council for ensuring harmonious Centre-State
functioning. Article 263 of the Constitution empowers the President to set up
such a Council "any time" public interest demands. The Council could
be charged, among other things, with the duty of "investigating and
discussing subjects in which some or all of the States, or the Union and one or
more States have a common interest." It could also be asked to make
"recommendations upon any such subject." All issues of national
importance could be taken up by this forum. In sum, the nation is not only much
more than a State. It is also much more than the Centre.--- INFA
(Copyright, India
News and Feature Alliance)
|
|
|
Early Summer Onset: FACE LESS RAIN & A HEAT WAVE, By Dhurjati Mukherjee, 22 April 2026 |
|
|
|
Open
Forum
New
Delhi, 22 April 2026
Early Summer Onset
FACE LESS RAIN & A
HEAT WAVE
By Dhurjati Mukherjee
India is likely to see below-average monsoon rains for the first time in
three years in 2026, the government stated recently, stoking concerns over farm
output and growth in Asia’s third largest economy as it battles inflation due
to the West Asian conflict. It is well-known that the monsoon is the lifeblood
of the country’s nearly $4 trillion economy, delivering almost 70% of the
rainfall needed to water farms and replenish aquifers and reservoirs.
As per Indian Meteorological Department (IMD) report, the monsoon is
expected to reach 92% of the long-period average (LPA) this year, stated M.
Ravichandran, Secretary of Earth Sciences. This happens to be the lowest in
nearly three decades though an updated outlook is expected in the last week of
May. “Currently weak El Nino-like conditions are transitioning to neutral
conditions, but after June it’s very likely that El Nino will develop”,
observed Mrutyunjay Mohapatra, IMD Director General.
In the past, 70% of El Nino years since 1980 corresponded with poor
summer monsoons in the country which led to reduced rainfall, for irrigation.
Experts are of the opinion that the ongoing West Asian crisis coupled with
prediction of lower rainfall may have an adverse impact on farm yields as well
as GDP growth.
Private weather forecaster Skymet had earlier
predicted below normal monsoon this year amid risk of El Nino, saying its
impact to develop increasingly during the second half (Aug-Sept) of the
four-month session that begins in June. If that happens, India’s farm sector,
already staring at the possibility of high input costs – fertiliser, diesel
etc. – due to the West Asian conflict, may face advanced challenges, given that
more than half of the country’s farm operations depend on monsoon rains.
India's rapidly expanding industrialisation
and urbanisation are already contributing to global warming which, in turn
means prolonged and intense heatwaves. Due to these two factors, there is a
change in Urban Land Cover Change (ULCC), which increased both Land Surface
Temperature (LST) and air temperatures and subsequently affected the surface
climate. Between 1901 and 2018, India's average annual temperature increased by
about 0.7 °C, and if the current pace of greenhouse gas
emissions continues, the global average temperature is anticipated to
increase by almost 5 °C by the end of the 21st century.
New temperature-breaking records have been
witnessed with 2016, 2020 and 2024 being the hottest years in the present
century. However, changing global climate and rapid anthropogenic activities
can increase and amplify heatwaves' intensity, frequency and duration, and
related events. Even Indian states which have not experienced heatwaves in the
past, such as Himachal Pradesh and Kerala, are now exhibiting a higher frequency
of extreme temperatures.
In 2010, over 1300 heatwave-related deaths
were reported in Ahmedabad. At the same time, Karnataka is predicted to warm by
2.0 °C by 2030, making the region more vulnerable to severe heat extremes,
posing a higher risk to the vulnerable population. As per the National Disaster
Management Authority (NDMA), 24,223 fatalities were attributed to
heatwave-related deaths spanning from 1992 to 2015. In March 2022, intense
heatwaves caused temperatures to climb above 40 °C in numerous Indian
cities.
Meanwhile, the IMD chief stated recently
above-normal heatwave days are expected over Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana, UP,
Bihar, Jharkhand, Bengal Odisha Chhattisgarh Telangana etc. There have also
been around 45 human deaths due to extreme weather events across many states in
March. Meanwhile, the latest forecast from the Monsoon Mission Climate Forecast
System (MMCFS) suggested that El Nino Southern Oscillatory neutral conditions
are most likely to continue during April to June.
Heatwave like conditions this year arrived
earlier than expected, raising concerns among meteorologists, health experts,
and policymakers. Several regions across northern, central, and western India
have already begun experiencing unusually high temperatures weeks before the
traditional peak summer period. The early rise in temperatures triggered
warnings about possible prolonged heat waves, water shortages, and health
risks.
In fact, reports indicated that February 2026
was the 5th warmest on record since 1901. The uncomfortable part isn’t the
heat itself -- it’s what breaks under it: the wheat in your roti and the
grid powering your fan or AC. While in metros and big cities unbearable heat
may witness increased power needs, in villages lack of timely rain and
excessive heat may affect crop yields.
IMD’s summer 2026 prediction covers
maximum and minimum temperatures — meaning nights won’t cool down
either. High-risk heatwave zones such as Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana, Punjab,
Bihar, Odisha, and Andhra Pradesh may, like 2024, push peak power demand to a
then-record 250 GW. The geography is mapped; the trend is clear. What matters
now is what happens when the heat hits at scale. March is when India’s wheat
crop enters its final ripening stage and temperatures spiking above 35°C cause
heat damage lowering yields, eventually leading to higher atta, bread, and
biscuit prices by May this year.
Power planners project peak daytime demand at
275–285 GW this summer. Cooling load alone adds 50–55 GW. Despite 65 GW of
renewables added since 2024, a 10–12 GW supply gap persists during evening
peaks. Despite the gap, nuclear capacity is expanding — Kaiga alone will
add 1,400 MW by 2031. This heatwave economic impact India will face compounds
existing strain on the system.
Meanwhile, the latest update from the World
Meteorological Organization (WMO) on the possibility of an El Nino episode
later this year is obviously bad news for India’s monsoon. The update has
stated that the above average land surface temperatures during March-May period
may be due to climatic factors. This is already being felt in India which has
been facing some sort of heat wave conditions in many parts of the country. The
WMO predicted that day temperatures are likely to remain above normal by 5-7
degreeC over J&K and Himachal Pradesh by 4-6 degree C over plains of
northwest India. including Delhi NCR, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.
Rising global temperatures, reduced rainfall,
weak weather systems, and urban heating effects are all contributing to the
early surge in temperatures. With the hottest months still ahead, preparation
and awareness will be critical. Crop loss or lesser yields may be an area of
concern which needs to be seriously examined. Water availability remains a big
problem and if rainfall is not adequate, this may accentuate conditions in the
agricultural sector.
India needs to check pollution more seriously
as its flagship, National Clean Air Programme continues to be limited in its
scope as it covers only a fraction of polluted cities and over 60% of funds are
reportedly directed toward dust reduction. Structural impediments – vehicular
emissions, industrial output, coal dependence and agricultural burning – remain
inadequately addressed. Thus, it is necessary that pollution control must be
regionally coordinated and urban planning must integrate air quality
considerations to reduce heat conditions, at least in cities and urban areas.
Governments, communities, and individuals
must take proactive steps to protect health, manage water resources, and adapt
to increasingly extreme summer conditions. As climate patterns continue to
change, early heatwaves may become more common, making long-term climate
adaptation and sustainable urban planning increasingly important for India's
future. But unfortunately, in the urban sector or even in the rural areas,
green cover is steadily withering and this needs to be checked. India must draw
up an effective plan to counter extreme heat as well as manage situations where
rainfall is less.---INFA
(Copyright, India
News & Feature Alliance)
|
|
| | << Start < Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Next > End >>
| | Results 51 - 59 of 6547 |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
|