DEFENCE
NOTES
New Delhi, 2 June 2008
Firing On The LOC
PAK ARMY STILL CALLS SHOTS
By Col (Dr.) P. K. Vasudeva
(Prof International
Relations, ICFAI Business School)
When
the Kargil operation of the Pakistani military was launched in 1999, India and Pakistan were well on their way to
ushering in a new phase of bilateral relations. At the time, the then Prime
Minister Vajpayee’s Lahore
“bus diplomacy” was on the point of bearing fruit and the peace process would
have followed soon in the interest of both the countries.
It
was at that precise juncture that Kargil occurred. As everyone knows, Kargil
was a Pakistani military operation, with which Pakistani politicians had
precious little to do. It was conceived and conducted by the then ambitious and
power-hungry Pakistani Army Chief, General Pervez Musharraf, and as revealed later
the then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif himself was kept in the dark
about it. This fact came to light only after the enemy was evicted from Kargil’s
occupied posts.
However,
the damage was done. Undoubtedly, Kargil put a long spoke in the wheel of
“normalisation” of India-Pakistan relations.
So whoever engineered the military operation wanted — at that moment at
least — to upset the Vajpayee-Nawaz Sharif applecart. Which, in fact, it did.
The
Indian military could not have engineered Kargil, because it strictly abides by
the stipulations of the Constitution. Thus, it could not have struck out on its
own with the object of creating problems for the country’s Prime Minister and
his policy.
The
same cannot be said of the Pakistani military for reasons which are well-known
the world over. Therefore, it stands to good reason to suggest that the top
Pakistani military leadership did not like what was happening between New Delhi and Islamabad
on the diplomatic front, which led it to engineer Kargil.
It
is of course another matter that not long after Kargil, Nawaz Sharif himself
had to go. He fell victim to the military establishment which replaced him with
General Pervez Musharraf. Unfortunately, history is repeating itself. Presently
too, the new Gilani-led Government is not stable and it is doubtful if the
present coalition will survive. Already fissures have come to light.
Today,
as far as public perception is concerned, President Musharraf is no longer in
the ‘hot seat’ as it were, the politicians having “taken over”. Within the
military itself, there has been some change. There is a new Army Chief.
But
have things really changed in Pakistan
today, as regards the politician-military divide? Seen differently, can one
argue that the assassination of Benazir Bhutto has effectively moved the
Pakistani military establishment to the second position? Have the recent
elections, giving the civilian Pakistani society, led by its politicians, the
power once again to call the shots?
Questions
which have no easy answers. As it stands, the Gilani-led coalition Government
has started showing cracks once again as Nawaz Sharif is threatening to withdraw
his Party’s support of it. Primarily because the PPP Chief Asif Zardari is not
ready to reinstate the ‘forcibly’ retired judges. Zardari seems to have joined
hand with President Musharraf which holds dangerous signals --- of the Army
coming back to power.
Significantly,
the recent firing on the Line of Control (LoC) clearly suggests that nothing
has changed in Pakistan
as far as the power structure is concerned. The military continues to wield
absolute power but is currently hiding behind the fig-leaf of the poll results
which have, on the face of it, shifted the balance of power to the politicians.
The LoC firing cannot help the process of normalisation of
relations between the two countries, just as Kargil did not in its day. The
inference is that the Pakistani military is once again at work, telling the
politicians that they really amount to nothing in the power structure of Pakistan’s
society.
Moreover, by keeping the military pot boiling is Islamabad’s way of impressing on New
Delhi that Pakistan
is a force to reckon with. Further, whenever India
test fires its Agni long range missiles Pakistan retaliates by test firing
its Haft missiles. Islamabad’s
signal is loud and clear: We also mean business.
More
important is the extent of the hold, if any, which General Musharraf has on the
Armed Forces, through his loyal lieutenants who still enjoy enormous clout in
the military. The simple question is: Did Musharraf have any role to play in
organising the LoC firing and sending infiltrators across the LoC to cause
disturbance in Jaipur blasts and elsewhere in the country? The answer is yes.
Clearly,
the Indian Armed Forces cannot lower its guard on its side of the LoC. It has
to remain vigilant not only to ward off any untoward situation but also protect
its positions on the LoC because the Pakistani military is capable of pulling
of surprises as it did a la Kargil in 1999.
The
Samba incident and subsequent firing is a live example of the type of
adventurism the Pakistani Army is competent of launching. History is replete
with such skirmishes before Islamabad
launches actual operations.
The
news of Musharraf leaving the country due to political pressure is a welcome
sign but one has to wait and watch and keep our fingers crossed. ---- INFA
(Copyright India News & Feature Alliance)
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