India News and Features Alliance (INFA) - An Unprofessional Policy: ARMY DEPLOYMENT, CIVIL CONTROL, by B.K. Mathur, 21 May 2007

The Army deployment in Jammu and Kashmir for tackling prolonged militancy has raised several issues concerning the country’s armed forces. Two most controversial of them are their deployment for civil duties and, if deployed, under what control and command. This depends upon the type of assignment. Deployment in aid of civil authority has necessarily to be under civil control, but the Jammu and Kashmir assignment is entirely different, where the Army is fighting for years a war-like situation against foreign militants, professionally trained for military operations in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. For such a deployment, the Army needs to be given full control and command, without which it becomes difficult for it to achieve its assigned task.

Presently a controversy is going on in J&K between the ruling coalition partners, the Congress and the PDP over the army deployment in the State. The latter party is persisting with its demand to withdraw the Army or reduce its presence in some crucial areas in pursuance of its “healing touch” policy, a policy which the armed forces personnel do not understand by virtue of their basic training. They are trained to “kill” to achieve their target. They have to be reckless with complete control and command. The State’s Chief Minister is against withdrawal or reduction of the Army at this stage in view of the existing situation in which the infiltration has increased during the last two months. But, at the same time, he continues to talk about human rights and advises the Army to observe restrain in handling the militancy, an entirely unprofessional policy.

Military intelligence and the GoC-in-C of the Northern Army Command have informed the Government with facts and figures that the infiltration of trained militants from across the border has increased during the last two months, April and May, as compared to figures of the corresponding period last year, despite the confidence-building measures (CBMs) for peace between the two neighbours. The infiltration has taken place by cutting the barbed wire fencing at several points along the Line of Control (LoC) and attempts to sneak in with the mortar and even artillery support from behind in the Pak-held area, have been foiled by the Army units. At times exchange of fire has taken place for hours together.

Those who have been repeatedly demanding the Army withdrawal to the barracks or its re-deployment seem to have missed the well-planned strategy of the militants; a diabolical gameplan. They are sneaking into the Indian territory but not striking. Instead of increase in violent incidents there is decrease which gives one the impression that the militancy is now under control and that the Governments at the Centre and in the State would be forced under political pressure to withdraw or reduce the Army deployment. It is evident that the gameplan of the militants and their supporters in Islamabad is to regroup the militants and prepare them for their operational readiness for a massive strike as was planned prior to the Kargil operation in 1999.

The first principle of a military operation is to take the enemy by surprise to ensure success. This was their strategy prior to operation when they quietly prepared for a long time as proved by the construction by them of multi-purpose bunkers and ammunition stores not only in Skardu but also close to the LoC. The reaction of the Army based in J&K should obviously be to prepare itself for such an eventuality and be ruthless in handling the militants trying to regroup themselves with the help of local elements. For such a readiness to counter a possible attack, the Army needs to be given compete authority without any political interference or any talk of “healing touch” or “human rights”, notwithstanding the fact that the unified command in the State is headed by the Chief Minister.

The greatest tragedy of nearly too decades of militancy is that the Pak-trained militants have been harboured by a large number of local people across the State and allowed to live and act at will. Such people who harbour the nation’s enemy have not been tackled more because of political reasons rather than Army laxity. In fact, the Army has suffered tremendously all these years of losing large-number of its personnel at the hands of the “hidden militants” living in safe buildings, virtually out-of-bounds for military action. Such militants are not only just harboured but also allowed to carry, and even store, arms and ammunition to kill the men of the security while on the move to tackle the bigger operations by the enemy. The personnel are killed undefended, with their hands tried to their back.

This at once reminds one of the Indian Peace Keeping Force’s (IPKF) mission of the Army against the LTTE in north-eastern parts of Sri Lanka in mid-1980s. This writer visited the area twice and saw with great surprise the Indian soldiers fighting the LTTE offensive with their hands virtually tied to their back. They were asked to keep peace in the region, help the Lankan Government without undertaking any operation intended to kill the enemy or to occupy any land. In the process, the Army lost a large number of its men, without fighting any regular operation. Unfortunately, on their return from the assignment some pro-LTTE element in India equated the IPKF mission with the Mylai operation in Vietnam.

Sri Lanka has again tried last week to get around New Delhi for military assistance to tackle the continuing problem with the LTTE. The Tigers, as the LTTE activists are called, have armed themselves adequately in the last two decades to fight the Lankan forces to get freedom for the Tamilian-dominated north-eastern region of the Island nation. As in 1983-84, Colombo has asked New Delhi for military assistance to fight the Tigers, who have now become much stronger than during the 1980s. They have also acquired air power, which could be a danger to India also. If India fails to help them, the Lankans have indicated they would take military equipment from China and Pakistan. Both Beijing and Islamabad have been trying for long to establish their bases in the Indian Ocean and surely both will jump at the opportunity of military relationship with Colombo.

It would be strategically wise for New Delhi somehow to stop China and Pakistan getting militarily close to Sri Lanka. National Security Adviser M.K. Narayanan is right in quickly offering to Colombo “whatever its requirement”, with a rider that New Delhi’s assistance would be confined to “defensive capabilities”. Importantly, if the Army personnel are to be deployed in Sri Lanka even for training or equipment maintenance purposes, they need be sent with clear directions and authority to take on-the-spot decisions required according to situation. In fact, such clear professional directions and authority need to be given to the forces deployed with a defined assignment, like the tackling of militancy in Jammu and Kashmir. How they achieve the assigned target is their business---INFA