Defence Notes

New Delhi, 15 January 2007  

By B.K. Mathur

The General spoke high of the force he commands, especially of his men historically known for their valour. That was an exercise to keep the morale of the force high.  But strategically an Army firepower even in a conventional war is dependent on its machines first and manpower later.  On this front, the Army is not fully-equipped for a modern warfare, given the progress made by developed countries which have been producing most sophisticated and state-of-the-art machines.  The Chief himself has publicly drawn the Government’s attention for early action in the procurement of equipment already agreed to or in the process of production indigenously to face India’s potential enemies, if they dare attack the country. The manpower of India’s armed forces is strong enough to defeat any force, however strong it may be. But again, it needs to be updated with sophisticated weaponry.

The Indian Army, as also the Navy and the Air Force, are slow in the procurement of the latest machinery, thanks to the policy planners and bureaucratic hassles. Take, for example, procurement of the 155 mm/52 calibre towed-gun for the artillery, which in the present-day warfare is a crucial arm. The process is slow. It is underway for the last several months and, it seems, it will continue for much more time, despite the fact that the final selection process will start only after the trials are completed. This immediately reminds one of the Bofors gun controversy and the slush money involved that caused the fall of a Government at the Centre.  For another example, the Army is yet to get the network-centric warfare concept for a digitized battlefield of the future, even though electronic surveillance devices and the like have been inducted, belatedly though.

These and other sophisticated devices are needed for the Army to operate in the prevailing Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) environment in the region. These capabilities are required to be regularly reviewed, keeping in view the fast research and development on this front in advanced countries which support India’s potential rivals.  In this context, former Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Ved Prakash’s vision for the Indian Army of the 21^st century comes to mind.  In his Army Day message as the Chief in 1999, Malik called for a great balanced, lean and mean Army.  What he meant was, as he explained later, that the army should be “optimally equipped and weaponised force with capability to operate effectively in a joint services environment in all likely nature of conflicts in our regional context….It should be a “technologically advanced Army….”

Let us hope that Malik’s vision of a balanced force, optimally-equipped and weaponised force is achieved at long last. But such a force requires constant, upgraded training to the troops.  This may not happen, if the present thinking at the policy and planning level continues, that of deployment of the Army in aid of civil power at the slightest provocation. There is no denying the fact, as Mulayam Singh had once told a Press Conference as the Defence Minister, that the armed forces personnel are the servants of the Government and they should be used whenever required.  But there is need to understand at the political level that training to the forces in these days of induction of sophisticated and expensive machines is more important than their deployment for civil duties.  This does not at all mean to suggest that they should not be used to help the administration in the event of serious national situation.

Not many may remember that the Rashtriya Rifles, which is now a part of the Army, tackling militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and some other similar in the country, was initially thought of by V.P. Singh as the Defence Minister and later as the Prime Minister, to exclusively handle law and order and to relieve the Army of its assignments in aid of civil power. This force or another force with military training may again be considered for the purpose.  But, unfortunately, the present Chief, Gen. J.J. Singh has his own view on the subject. Singh has reportedly worked out a new doctrine for combating “sub-conventional warfare,” meaning insurgency, terrorism or proxy war.  The Chief has his “ten commandments”, supplemented by another ten, outlined in the new doctrine.

The Chief in his doctrine provides a list of “dos and don’ts” for soldiers acting under the contentious Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act or providing aid to civil authorities for restoring law and order. He has been quoted as stating by the Times of India: “the doctrine for sub-conventional operations lays down the essence of our experience in handling low intensity conflict. These operations are not like conventional wars, with a clear battlefront and well-defined enemy.  Terrorists can come from anywhere”.  This forms part of the General’s pet theory of “an iron fist in a velvet glove”, intended to win the hearts and minds in Jammu and Kashmir and in the North-East.  Fine, General, but at what cost? What about training to the force for a war with sophistical weapons?

The Army cannot be made a civil force, to observe human rights. Their training is different and let it remain so.  Too much involvement of the men in OG (olive green) has already done a lot of harm to the Indian Army.  Their character has changed, corruption has entered the forces in a way, disciplinary standards have deteriorated considerably and, like in civilian departments and organizations, there is no respect for the seniors. The present state of the Army at once reminds one of the words inscribed in the Indian Military Academy’s Chatwood Hall: “The country comes first, each and every time, and the men you command come next. Your own comfort and well being come last, each and every time.”  These words have now become totally irrelevant.

Worse. The intake into the armed forces leaves much to be desired. Not many with the required OLQ (officers-like qualities) are willing to opt for military career. There are various reasons for this, requiring examination at length another time. In today’s context, one of the important causes is the loss of “izzat” which the Armymen used to command in public long time ago. It is not only a question of quality but also of quantity. This has resulted in the Army facing a severe shortage of middle-rung officers like senior Captains, Majors and Lt-Colonels, the “cutting edge officers who actually lead the troops in a battle. The shortage at present is to the tune of 11,300 officers in the crucial ranks of Lt-Colonels below.

The result? The serving middle-rung officers in the rank of Lt-Col and below face a  tremendous work-load on them, leading to great stress at work and mental disorders. It is especially so when the Army is deployed to combat insurgency or for jobs other than that for which they are actually trained.  Either they have to constantly remain in training and kept in operational readiness to meet an external threat or trained for a “sub-conventional” war following J.J. Singh’s “ten commandments”.  The General’s commandments and his “new doctrine” with its “dos and don’ts” is not going to help the force. Let the Army remain an army in its true sense.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)