Round
The World
New Delhi, 6 March 2007
Politics Of Iranian Plan
Nuclear
Proliferation at Crossroads
By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
The six-party meet to negotiate the nuclear issues in the Korean
Peninsula recently succeeded in at
least persuading North Korea
to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in return for extensive assistance, including generation of nuclear energy.
If the bargaining finally succeeds, North Korea
may be the second nation to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme after South Africa.
This limited success
of non-proliferation initiative in the Far East is in stark contrast to failure
of the UN Security Council to bring Iran
in West Asia to accept its demand for ceasing
its nuclear enrichment activities. Iran
has so far been defying pressures
from the United States,
European Union and the UN Security Council to give up uranium enrichment and is
unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future.
International linkages in proliferation politics are not a
new development. But this time around the Iranian nuclear question is rather
complicated. The North Korean success
in withstanding the international pressure
on its proliferation activities, despite domestic economic and social
backwardness, surely would have
emboldened Iranian leadership to play its nuclear card hard.
Now the question arises as to whether Pyongyang’s acceptance of non-proliferation
principles would deflate Iranian ambition to acquire a full cycle nuclear programme
that would some day enable it to build nuclear bombs if so desired. There is no
doubt that Tehran does not see North Korea as a role model of nuclear policy,
but it is probable that Pyongyang’s decision to embrace non-proliferation would
put moral pressure on Tehran and
give inspiration to the major powers to seek a similar solution in Iran as
well.
In the case of North Korea,
the United States, Japan and South
Korea were almost united and Russia and China had
differing perceptions and approaches to the nuclear question. In the case of Iran too, Russia and China differ with the US and EU member-countries. The
tactics and strategies adopted by an international group of nations for
promoting nonproliferation in the Korean
Peninsula may be
ultimately useful with certain modifications to resolve the West Asian nuclear
issue.
However, Iranian nuclear programme has a deep linkage with
the issues and politics of the
Muslim world and the Israeli factor in the Middle East.
First of all, the US
image in the Muslim world has been going from bad to worse with every passing day. The destruction of Iraq and the inability of the coalition forces
to restore order four years after the invasion; continuation of NATO occupying
forces in Afghanistan;
unpleasant incidents like Abu Ghraib, Danish Cartoon of Prophet Mohammed and Guantanamo Bay; and the continuing struggle of the
Palestinians for a homeland have generated intense anti-American sentiments in
the Muslim world. Iran’s
defiance of the West has definitely received quiet endorsements in the streets
of the Muslim world and any strong military measure against Iran could inflame the Muslim dislike of the US in the nook
and corner of the globe.
Secondly, the record of US
invasion of Iraq in the name
of destroying weapons of mass
destruction will hunt any US
decision to take military action against suspected Iranian nuclear programme.
After failing to establish the claim of presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, can the Bush Administration
provide credible evidence of Iranian drive for a nuclear weapon capability?
Both the Democrats in the US Congress
and the American people would demand clear and credible evidence of any Iranian
nuclear weapon programme before they support a strong US action against Tehran.
Thirdly, the Bush Administration cannot take any unilateral
action in Iran.
It did not do so during the first Gulf War, which was fought with an
international coalition force. It refrained from doing so even in the second
Gulf War (invasion of Iraq)
and in the absence of UN support went ahead and formed a willing coalition of
forces. Any plan to intervene in Iran would necessarily require a coalition of some sort and it is
doubtful if the Bush Administration will be capable enough to raise a credible
coalition of willing partners.
Fourthly, the US
troops are over-extended in Iraq.
The US Congress, dominated by the
Democratic Party, is showing unwillingness
even for modest troop reinforcement. The NATO forces are deeply involved in Afghanistan and
have so far failed to prevent the re-emergence of the Taliban forces. In fact,
the US
and NATO forces appear to be concerned at the moment about an expected Spring
Offensive by the Taliban forces. Pakistan is already under heavy pressure to perform more, although President Musharraf
seems to have developed a war fatigue. Can the US and NATO members agree on
opening the third –Iran-- in the Muslim World, while things are not happening
according to expectations in the two fronts: Iraq and Afghanistan.
Fifthly, the US
position in Iraq in 2003
frightened Libya to give up
its nuclear weapon ambition and mend fences with the West, but this time the US difficulties in Iraq
have emboldened Iran
not to budge from its nuclear stance. Significantly, the sectarian violence in Iraq has come to a situation where Washington has little option but to engage Iran in the
process to find a solution.
Iran has not stopped its support to
militant groups battling American interests in the Middle East, the Iranian
regime has not cared to respect US concerns over human rights situation in
their country; Iran has not
changed its stance on the Palestinian issue
and, above all, Tehran
has refused to stop uranium enrichment. But the Bush Administration has already
signaled that it would make Iran
and even Syria
parties to a multilateral initiative to address
the Iraqi crisis.
If Iran
becomes a crucial actor in the efforts to resolve the Iraqi crisis, can it
remain a serious target of American non-proliferation offensive? The general
impression is that no country wants
the emergence of a nuclear Iran.
But then similar was the case in the Korean
Peninsula. None wanted to
see a North Korean bomb, yet Pyongyang
went ahead and detonated one. Will Iran become a nuclear weapon power
by default? It may not happen now, but if Iran manages to have a full nuclear
cycle at home, it can become a nuclear weapon power in due course.---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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