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Open Forum
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India & Australia:DIFFICULT PARTNERS,by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, 22 January 2008 |
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ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 22 January 2008
India & Australia
DIFFICULT PARTNERS
By Dr. Chintamani
Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
An international conference organized by the Indian Association for the Study of Australia (IASA) in
Kolkata last week aimed at improving mutual understanding and forging closer
ties between India and Australia. Given the recent blood-letting between the
Indian and Australian cricket teams in the ongoing series being played Down
Under and the new Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s decision not to supply
uranium to India because it was not a signatory to the NPT, overturning his
predecessor’s John Howard’s policy.
Such conferences in the past, like the one in Pune, are
blessed by the respective Governments, if not directly sponsored and supported
by the Governmental agencies. This new initiative to improve bilateral ties was
first launched post the Cold War as the Cold War dynamics put India and Australia on opposing sides of the
international political divide.
India championed the cause of Non-Alignment
and incessantly safeguarded this status even after forging closer security ties
with the former Soviet Union from the early
1970s. Australia joined the
American-led alliance system erected against the Soviet Union.
Hence, Australia maintained
considerable tactical distance from India
with a perception that New Delhi and Moscow were strategic
allies for all practical purposes.
The vast Indian Ocean served as a buffer rather than a water
connection between India and
Australia.
Canberra not only maintained cordial and
cooperative ties with New Delhi’s main
adversaries, Pakistan since the
early Cold War days and with China
from the days of the Sino-US détente but it also became a crusader against India’s nuclear
programme.
The end of the Cold War, the decline of Pakistan’s strategic relevance and the success
of India’s economic reforms
ignited an interest in Canberra to re-examine
its ties with New Delhi.
This resulted in several Australian initiatives to build a range of positive
structures of bilateral cooperation.
However, India’s
decision to go nuclear and Australia’s
ongoing crusade against proliferation have posed a considerable barrier since
the late 1990s. Even as trade and economic cooperation continued to grow, but
the political differences particularly on the nuclear issues prevented the two
countries from forging a kind of relationship that can be characterized as
strategic partnership.
Several developments since the early years of the 21st
Century induced Canberra to renew contacts with New Delhi with an aim to
boost mutual cooperation as well as improve images. First was the path breaking
visit of the US President
Bill Clinton to India.
This visit was successful in giving a new direction to US relations with India. From that
time onwards, Indo-US relations have shown an ascending line. The victory of a
Republican President, George Bush, the terrorist attacks on the US and the impressive
growth in India’s economic performance further improved Indo-US ties to a point
where the two countries are marching ahead to cement a new strategic
partnership.
Second, India
engaged all the major powers, such as France,
Britain, Germany, Russia Japan and even China in a
series of dialogues and unprecedented economic initiatives and soon came to be
regarded by all these powers as a fast emerging global player.
Third, India
was fast accepted as a new important player in the politics and economics of
the Asia Pacific region. India’s
elevation to the status of a Full Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, membership in the
ASEAN Regional Forum, its membership in the East Asia Summit initiative to
expand regional cooperation and several other developments also cast its
influence on Canberra’s
assessment of the emerging Indian profile.
Australia could not have ignored all these
developments. It would risk its own national interests by not doing enough to
boost ties with India.
The Quadrilateral Initiative to establish closer cooperation among the US, India,
Japan and Australia was
the outcome of all these fast moving developments.
However, one of the key areas that can over-heat
Indo-Australian differences is the nuclear issue. To start with Australia is a
member of almost all the international non-proliferation regimes, such as the
NPT, CTBT, Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, Proliferation Security Initiative and
several others. But India
for long has been the target of all these regimes.
Two, Australia
has been found to be quite critical of India’s nuclear programme since the
Pokharan nuclear test in 1974. To the extent of Canberra
leading the anti-New Delhi
sentiments relating to nuclear issues around the world. Three, successive Australian
Governments led by the Conservatives and the Labour Party have failed to
understand and appreciate the Indian compulsions to go nuclear. Last but not
least, New Delhi has never engaged Canberra in a nuclear
dialogue in a sustained manner to build confidence or remove suspicions.
Additionally, the Indo-US nuclear deal has a direct impact
on the Australian position on nuclear cooperation with India. Recall,
the Conservative Government last year gave more than decipherable hints
indicating the possibility of uranium trade with India. The Labour Party, on the
other hand, has taken a hard line stand on this issue. After winning the national
elections in the recent past, Canberra has made
it clear that it would not sell uranium to India.
The opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal in India is perhaps responsible to an extent in
making it difficult for New Delhi
to shop for nuclear fuel or even technology for its energy programme. If India is not able to make up its mind and
develop a bipartisan understanding, other countries, such as Australia cannot be blamed for the lack of
consensus on selling uranium to India.
Analyzed in a different perspective, if Australia’s non-proliferation lobby continues to
oppose uranium trade with India
after the deal with the United
States is successfully concluded, it would
certainly serve as a major road-block in bilateral relationship. As the nuclear
deal has all the potential to cement the emerging strategic ties with the US, a uranium deal with Australia will most likely lead to a durable
strategic partnership with Canberra.
Moreover, the differences over the uranium issue would have
negative impact on India.
Canberra is happily selling uranium to China, a country that is certainly a member of
the NPT, unlike India,
but is in no way stopping vertical proliferation. The Australian
double-standard will derail the current trend in the fast improving relations
between the two nations.
Thus, Indo-Australian relationship will most likely be a
difficult partnership until the nuclear differences are settled. ---- INFA
(Copyright India News & Feature
Alliance)
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PM’s China Visit:SYMBOLISM OVER SUBSTANCE,by Seema Sridhar, 16 January 2008 |
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ROUND THE WORLD
New Delhi, 16 January 2008
PM’s China Visit
SYMBOLISM OVER SUBSTANCE
By Seema Sridhar
School of International Studies, JNU
The Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh just concluded his
first State visit to India’s
largest and most awe-inspiring neighbour, the People’s Republic of China. The two
sides have signed 11 wide-ranging agreements, decided to triple the trade
target within the next four years and deepen their defence engagement. The
current visit, just weeks after India
and China
held their first-ever joint military exercise in December 2007, a landmark
confidence building measure augers well for bilateral ties.
China’s significance to India because of its location, it’s imposing
geographical size, magnitude of its armed forces that have recently been
modernized and now most importantly its economic supremacy brought about by its
rather unusual blend of capitalism and communism renders this visit of prime
importance to India’s
foreign policy.
The historical ties between the countries, cradling the
world’s ancient civilizations have been characterized by mutual mistrust and
cynicism in the past. Efforts to build bridges have always been marred by this
mutual suspicion rising especially from the border disputes between the two.
The results that have emerged out of such State visits in the past have been if
anything, cosmetic in nature.
What is it that makes this State visit different? What are
the most important issues that are being addressed? And what are the possible
outcomes of these?
India and China are two of the fastest
growing economies and have been competing with each other for foreign
investment. The two are the most populous nations of the world and have to face
the common challenges of developing economies which are in transition. They are
also facing the common threat of terrorism and insurgency within their
respective national boundaries. These commonalities need to be found and
furthered in the midst of systemic differences between these two essentially
diverse nations.
One issue where the interests of New
Delhi and Beijing
have converged is climate change. At the UN Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate
Change Conference in Bangkok in May 2007, China made a
submission that developed countries should formally recognize they were
responsible for 95 per cent of the green house gas emissions from the
pre-industrial era to 1950, and for 77 per cent from 1950 to 2000.
This contention was strongly backed by India and Brazil and the three of them
rejected that all the countries had to bear the responsibility of combating
climate change equally. Instead, they pushed for increased focus on the rich,
developed countries whose per capita green house emissions were far steeper
than those of the developing world. Thus, the dragon and the elephant found
their common strengthened voice against imposition of emission curbs and their
own view of combating the global threat of climate change, reflecting a larger
stand for the developing world.
Speaking of areas that have immense potential for
cooperation, trade is one such area which is under-exploited. In 2003, the two
Governments had established a Joint Study Group to examine the potential for
economic engagement. The most significant decision taken during this round of
talks was to set an ambitious two-way trade target of $60 billion by 2010 ---
reflecting their confidence to make business the primary vehicle to lead the
rapidly growing relations.
Economic ties between these two economic growth propellers
in Asia, has not reached it full potential
despite bilateral trade crossing $30 billion in 2007. The previous target of
$40 billion by 2010 is expected to be reached this year itself. However, the high
non-tariff barriers are acting as one of the major impediments towards this
end. The tilt in the trade balance in Beijing’s
favour is a source of discomfort to New
Delhi.
The Indian exports in finished goods fall short of
expectations as compared to the raw materials and these need to be reversed in New Delhi’s interests. The
barriers to direct investments imposed in India
and the undeclared restrictions imposed on the import of cotton by China have been
key concerns. The revision of import duty on cotton in India would
give respite to the Indian farmers growing cotton. Any progress in this arena
would boost economic ties and set the tone for a distant vision of economic
cooperation replacing competition and needs to be furthered by the Joint Study
Groups.
India’s growing ties with the United States is not seen favourably by Beijing even though New Delhi
has made it clear that it is not part of any ‘contain China’
strategy. The Chinese position on India's civil nuclear cooperation
is also expected to be part of the discussions. New Delhi
is hopeful that Beijing’s
perceptions of the same would be more positive after this round of talks.
Officials in New Delhi have
stated that India has not
explicitly sought the support of China in the 45-nation Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) during the talks. Beijing has
always been wary of New Delhi’s traditional
support to the Tibetans and there are other issues of strategic alignments in
the region such as China’s
long standing support to Pakistan,
the Chinese influence in Myanmar,
which add fuel to the atmosphere of Sino-Indian distrust.
The most contentious historical dispute between the two is over
the boundary line that stretches across the Himalayan ranges. According to New Delhi, China
is illegally occupying 43,180 sq km of Jammu and Kashmir,
including 5,180 sq km illegally ceded to Beijing
by Islamabad
under the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement in 1963.
China’s contention is that India possesses
some 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory, mostly in Arunachal Pradesh. Since
1988, when the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, visited China, a new phase
of rapprochement began, which continues to this day, without any substantive
conclusion over the border dispute.
During the 1990’s, India
and China
held a series of talks to create the conditions for a fair boundary settlement.
The 1993 and 1996 agreements to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line
of Actual Control (LoAC) were results of this phase. After ten meetings of a
Sino-Indian Joint Working Group (SIJWG) and five of an expert group to resolve
where the LoAC lies, scant progress has been made.
The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, and his Chinese
counterpart, Wen Jiabao, have decided not to let their five-decade border
dispute cloud the growth in their relationship and have now set a deadline for
"arriving at an agreed framework of settlement" to the problem.
With the Chinese recognition of Sikkim as a part of India by
opening the Nathu La pass to trade and the Indian recognition of Tibet as an
autonomous part of China, a certain degree of understanding was reached on two
of the many difficult border issues between the two neighbours, no matter if they
are not resolved completely.
During the Chinese President Hu's visit in November 2006 the
two countries laid down a ten-pronged strategy to improve the quality of the
bilateral ties. The Indian side underplayed the reports of Chinese incursions
in Arunachal Pradesh during the discussions. The official position is that
other mechanisms were in place to discuss any such issue.
Decades of negotiations over disputed glaciers has only
resulted in a commitment to resolve the dispute through dialogue. The way both
sides perceive activities on either side of the border are very different and
unilateral in approach, which is why not much was expected on the boundary
dispute front, during the talks.
True, emphasis upon economic relations is necessary for
mutual co-operation and growth, but relations would be mired in mutual
skepticism until the border issue is resolved. Since security relations are
pre-dominant in the Sino-Indian relationship, no substantive result is expected
in the near future as far as this sphere is concerned. This visit is therefore
symbolic of a willingness to co-exist and to explore possibilities to
co-operate with each other, placed in the larger regional and global context.
----INFA
(Copyright India News & Feature
Alliance)
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PM’s Passage to China:EXPECTATIONS & IMPORTANCE,Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, 9 January 2008 |
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ROUND
THE WORLD
New Delhi, 9 January 2008
PM’s Passage to China
EXPECTATIONS & IMPORTANCE
By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh began his first official
visit to China
yesterday (January 13). He will be on the Chinese soil for three days to cement
further existing ties between the two countries. How significant is this visit?
And what will be the outcome?
Whenever a summit between Indian and Chinese leaders take
place, speculations and expectations go up in the air about some breakthrough
in the resolution of the territorial disputes between the two countries.
Similar is the case, as the Prime Minister begins his talks with his Chinese
counterparts.
Ever since China
invaded India
in October 1962, occupied several thousand square kilometers of Indian land and
unilaterally declared ceasefire, the relationship between the two Asian giants
have never been quite normal. In the post-Cold War strategic scenario, the two
countries agreed to maintain peace and tranquility along the border,
established joint working groups and expert groups to mutually discuss the
territorial dispute and come up with some formula to resolve the issue.
Several rounds of negotiations have taken place, but no
solution of this emotive issue has come about. In the meantime, reports of
border tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have periodically raised
concerns particularly in the border
states of the North-east, especially Arunachal
Pradesh including Tawang, which the Chinese continue to claim as their
territory. Also, Beijing has still not
officially recognized Sikkim
as a part of India.
However, the Ministry of External Affairs has already warned
against high expectations from Manmohan Singh’s three days sojourn in China. Notwithstanding,
that the Prime Minister discussed the vexed border issue with his counterpart
Wen Jiabao over dinner last night prior to the delegation-level talks today. (More
later)
The significance of Singh’s trip to China or lack of it is reflected in the fact
that this is going to be the first official prime ministerial trip to Beijing in more than four
years! He has visited the United States,
Russia, and Japan to
strengthen the strategic partnerships with all these three major powers. China
comes the last.
Moreover, leaders from very many countries have made their
annual pilgrimages to the People’s Republic of China
where capitalism is thriving under Communist rule, but the father of the Indian
economic reforms chose Beijing
as his last destination among the major global powers.
True, the Prime Minister hosted the Chinese President, Hu
Jintao, in 2005 and may have inter-acted with him and other Chinese leaders in
various international forums, but there have been very few summit meetings between
Indian and Chinese leaders under the UPA Government that came to power in
mid-2004.
There is no doubt that Sino-Indian relations in the economic
field are on the upswing. There are predictions that China
at the current rate of growth of trade with India
may even surpass the United States
and become the largest trading partner of India in the near future. This can
actually serve as great rhetoric, but the reality is it can hardly replace the
strategic significance of the Indian economic ties with the US.
Besides, it is very difficult to beat China in
statistical representation of its economic successes. It is emerging as a big
challenge to the US
dominance in Asian trade even with American allies, such as Japan and South Korea. But as far as India is concerned, China will be co-existing with
considerable uneasiness for a considerable time in the future.
India’s increasingly intense engagement
with China
is a positive development for both the countries as well as for peace and
stability in the Asian continent. The territorial disputes between the two
countries have not been allowed to pose an insurmountable road-block in the
economic and socio-cultural exchanges between the two countries. Both the
countries have also developed adequate deterrence to refrain from military
exchanges.
All these are good news. But the economic geography and the
geo-politics of Asia will make China
and India
competitors in the short term and rivals in the long term. And this explains
the uneasy co-existence of these two Asian giants. India’s
geographical and demographical size, comparable civilization and historical
depth along with its rapid economic progress and military modernization have
made China sit up and look
at India as its major
emerging challenge in Asia.
There was a time when Beijing
was not prepared to sit and discuss with New Delhi
security issues, including the nuclear issues, on the ground that India was not a
major power actor in international politics. Today, when the whole world looks
at India as a rising power, China has
altered its opinion and engagement policy. What are the Chinese concerns and
approaches?
Firstly, Beijing has been
apprehensively watching the unprecedented improvement in Indo-US relations in
the security and defense sectors and appears to be more concerned about the
Indo-US nuclear deal that may truly elevate New Delhi’s
strategic partnership with Washington
to new heights. If this materializes, China’s
misplaced fear of encirclement by the US
and its allies/partners would look more real to Beijing.
Secondly, China
appears to be envious of India’s
rising defense and security relationships with Japan, the Indo-Chinese countries
and the South-East Asian nations. As India
enters into more and more agreements with these countries on naval cooperation,
arms transfer, military exercises and intelligence sharing which China has not been able to do so at a similar
scale, Beijing’s
apprehensions are further compounded.
It is a fact that East and South-East Asian countries
consider China
as a potential threat and tremendous challenge to their security. The same
countries have little to fear from democratic India. Whatever little
apprehensions were there in late 1980s and early 1990s regarding the Indian
military, particularly naval, modernization and expansions have disappeared
with New Delhi’s
close inter-actions with these countries.
Thirdly, India’s
naval exercises with Japan
and the United States in the
Pacific and with Australia, Singapore, Japan
and the US in the Indian Ocean, coupled with proposals for closer ties
among Asian democracies have generated a sense of isolation among the Chinese
leaders.
Somehow the Chinese now feel the need to be in the centre of
activities and attractions in whatever sub-regional or regional groupings that
are being formed in Asia. Any forum where India is in and China is out creates doubts and
suspicion in the Chinese minds.
Beijing has, of course, not kept quiet. It
tries its best to keep India
out of several initiatives and conflict management efforts in Asia.
Firstly, India should have
been ideally a member of the multi-lateral mechanism to address the nuclear
question of the Korean
Peninsula.
The Group of Six should have been the Group of Seven by
including India.
Since North Korea has been a
long standing arms supplier to Pakistan
and has illegal Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) linkages with Pakistan, New Delhi
should have been part of the diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
It is China that could be
held responsible for India’s
exclusion.
Secondly, China
is currently on its way to creating road blocks for the successful evolution of
the East Asian Summit forum where India is an original member. While
New Delhi wants this forum to be an inclusive one, Beijing supports the idea of
making it a two-stage process, the first being the ASEAN. And the second, where
China is a member but India
is not.
Thirdly, China
has not endorsed the Indian proposal for establishing an Asian Economic
Community to include all the countries located in a region spanning from the Himalayas to the Pacific. Beijing
would not like New Delhi
to steal the show by making such grand initiatives and becoming the core of
such a community.
Thus, the nature of China-India relationship in the years to
come has begun to unfold. It would be characterized by competition and
subsequently rivalry for the Asian leadership. Nonetheless, it is imperative
for New Delhi to engage Beijing in all aspects and dimensions of its
foreign policy. The goal should be to immunize this competitive spirit from
escalating into a conflict. Manmohan Singh’s trip to China would certainly be a step
further in this direction. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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PM’s Passage to China:EXPECTATIONS & IMPORTANCE,by Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra, 9 January 2008 |
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ROUND
THE WORLD
New Delhi, 9 January 2008
PM’s Passage to China
EXPECTATIONS & IMPORTANCE
By Dr. Chintamani Mahapatra
School of International Studies, JNU
The Prime Minister Manmohan Singh began his first official
visit to China
yesterday (January 13). He will be on the Chinese soil for three days to cement
further existing ties between the two countries. How significant is this visit? And what will be the outcome?
Whenever a summit between Indian and Chinese leaders take
place, speculations and expectations go up in the air about some breakthrough
in the resolution of the territorial disputes between the two countries.
Similar is the case, as the Prime Minister begins his talks with his Chinese
counterparts.
Ever since China
invaded India
in October 1962, occupied several thousand square kilometers of Indian land and
unilaterally declared ceasefire, the relationship between the two Asian giants
have never been quite normal. In the post-Cold War strategic scenario, the two
countries agreed to maintain peace and tranquility along the border,
established joint working groups and expert groups to mutually discuss the
territorial dispute and come up with some formula to resolve the issue.
Several rounds of negotiations have taken place, but no
solution of this emotive issue has come about. In the meantime, reports of
border tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have periodically raised
concerns particularly in the border
states of the North-east, especially Arunachal
Pradesh including Tawang, which the Chinese continue to claim as their
territory. Also, Beijing has still not
officially recognized Sikkim
as a part of India.
However, the Ministry of External Affairs has already warned
against high expectations from Manmohan Singh’s three days sojourn in China. Notwithstanding,
that the Prime Minister discussed the vexed border issue with his counterpart
Wen Jiabao over dinner last night prior to the delegation-level talks today. (More
later)
The significance of Singh’s trip to China or lack of it is reflected in the fact
that this is going to be the first official prime ministerial trip to Beijing in more than four
years! He has visited the United States,
Russia, and Japan to
strengthen the strategic partnerships with all these three major powers. China comes the
last.
Moreover, leaders from very many countries have made their
annual pilgrimages to the People’s Republic of China
where capitalism is thriving under Communist rule, but the father of the Indian
economic reforms chose Beijing
as his last destination among the major global powers.
True, the Prime Minister hosted the Chinese President, Hu
Jintao, in 2005 and may have inter-acted with him and other Chinese leaders in
various international forums, but there have been very few summit meetings
between Indian and Chinese leaders under the UPA Government that came to power
in mid-2004.
There is no doubt that Sino-Indian relations in the economic
field are on the upswing. There are predictions that China
at the current rate of growth of trade with India
may even surpass the United States
and become the largest trading partner of India in the near future. This can
actually serve as great rhetoric, but the reality is it can hardly replace the
strategic significance of the Indian economic ties with the US.
Besides, it is very difficult to beat China in
statistical representation of its economic successes. It is emerging as a big
challenge to the US
dominance in Asian trade even with American allies, such as Japan and South Korea. But as far as India is concerned, China will be co-existing with
considerable uneasiness for a considerable time in the future.
India’s increasingly intense engagement
with China
is a positive development for both the countries as well as for peace and
stability in the Asian continent. The territorial disputes between the two
countries have not been allowed to pose an insurmountable road-block in the
economic and socio-cultural exchanges between the two countries. Both the
countries have also developed adequate deterrence to refrain from military
exchanges.
All these are good news. But the economic geography and the
geo-politics of Asia will make China
and India
competitors in the short term and rivals in the long term. And this explains
the uneasy co-existence of these two Asian giants. India’s
geographical and demographical size, comparable civilization and historical
depth along with its rapid economic progress and military modernization have
made China sit up and look
at India as its major
emerging challenge in Asia.
There was a time when Beijing
was not prepared to sit and discuss with New Delhi
security issues, including the nuclear issues, on the ground that India was not a
major power actor in international politics. Today, when the whole world looks
at India as a rising power, China has
altered its opinion and engagement policy. What are the Chinese concerns and
approaches?
Firstly, Beijing has been
apprehensively watching the unprecedented improvement in Indo-US relations in
the security and defense sectors and appears to be more concerned about the
Indo-US nuclear deal that may truly elevate New Delhi’s
strategic partnership with Washington
to new heights. If this materializes, China’s
misplaced fear of encirclement by the US
and its allies/partners would look more real to Beijing.
Secondly, China
appears to be envious of India’s
rising defense and security relationships with Japan, the Indo-Chinese countries
and the South-East Asian nations. As India
enters into more and more agreements with these countries on naval cooperation,
arms transfer, military exercises and intelligence sharing which China has not been able to do so at a similar
scale, Beijing’s
apprehensions are further compounded.
It is a fact that East and South-East Asian countries
consider China
as a potential threat and tremendous challenge to their security. The same
countries have little to fear from democratic India. Whatever little
apprehensions were there in late 1980s and early 1990s regarding the Indian
military, particularly naval, modernization and expansions have disappeared
with New Delhi’s
close inter-actions with these countries.
Thirdly, India’s
naval exercises with Japan
and the United States in the
Pacific and with Australia, Singapore, Japan
and the US in the Indian Ocean, coupled with proposals for closer ties
among Asian democracies have generated a sense of isolation among the Chinese
leaders.
Somehow the Chinese now feel the need to be in the centre of
activities and attractions in whatever sub-regional or regional groupings that
are being formed in Asia. Any forum where India is in and China is out creates doubts and
suspicion in the Chinese minds.
Beijing has, of course, not kept quiet. It
tries its best to keep India
out of several initiatives and conflict management efforts in Asia.
Firstly, India should have
been ideally a member of the multi-lateral mechanism to address the nuclear
question of the Korean
Peninsula.
The Group of Six should have been the Group of Seven by
including India.
Since North Korea has been a
long standing arms supplier to Pakistan
and has illegal Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) linkages with Pakistan, New Delhi
should have been part of the diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
It is China that could be
held responsible for India’s
exclusion.
Secondly, China
is currently on its way to creating road blocks for the successful evolution of
the East Asian Summit forum where India is an original member. While
New Delhi wants this forum to be an inclusive one, Beijing supports the idea of
making it a two-stage process, the first being the ASEAN. And the second, where
China is a member but India is not.
Thirdly, China
has not endorsed the Indian proposal for establishing an Asian Economic
Community to include all the countries located in a region spanning from the Himalayas to the Pacific. Beijing
would not like New Delhi
to steal the show by making such grand initiatives and becoming the core of
such a community.
Thus, the nature of China-India relationship in the years to
come has begun to unfold. It would be characterized by competition and
subsequently rivalry for the Asian leadership. Nonetheless, it is imperative
for New Delhi to engage Beijing in all aspects and dimensions of its
foreign policy. The goal should be to immunize this competitive spirit from
escalating into a conflict. Manmohan Singh’s trip to China would certainly be a step
further in this direction. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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Disastrous Gas Emissions:SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS NEEDED, |
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OPEN FORUM
New Delhi, 14 December 2006
Disastrous Gas Emissions
SUSTAINABLE SOLUTIONS NEEDED
By Dhurjati Mukherjee
reenhouse gas emissions by industrialized nations rose to the highest
levels in 2004 since the early 90s and governments must do more to fight global
warming, according to the UN climate change secretariat. Emissions by 40 nations, including bashers of caps
under the UN Kyoto Protocol and outsiders, led by the United States,
rose to 17.9 billion tonnes in 2004. There is a unanimous feeling that
industrialized nations will need to intensify efforts to implement strong
policies which reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The rise put overall emissions, mainly from burning fossils
fuels in power plants, factories and cars, just 3.3 per cent below 18.6 billion
tonnes in the Kyoto
benchmark year of 1990. This was the highest since soon after the collapse of
the Soviet Union in 1991, defying efforts at
cuts meant to avert disastrous changes such as more floods, erosion, heat waves
and higher sea levels. It may be mentioned here that 35 countries have agreed
to cut emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol by about five per cent below 1990 levels by 2008-12.
Meanwhile, a British government
report has reiterated that global warming will devastate the world economy.
Echoing this, British Prime Minister Tony Blair said unabated climate change
would eventually cost the world the equivalent of between five and 20 per cent
of global gross domestic product
each year. He called for bold and decisive actions to cut carbon emissions and stem the world of the temperature rise.
The report emphasised that global
warming can only be fought with the cooperation of major countries such as the
US and China and represents a huge contrast to the Bush Administration’s wait
and use global warming policies. According to Sir Nicholas Stern, government
economist and author of the report, acting now to cut greenhouse gas emissions would cost around one per cent of global GDP
each year.
The need for a low carbon economy
has been very aptly recommended through measures, including taxation,
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions
and carbon trading. Meanwhile, the British Foreign Minister, Margaret Beckett,
during her visit to India,
pointed out that moving to a low-carbon economy does not mean stopping economic
growth and/or condemning people to poverty.
It is a well-known fact that an
unstable climate affects the basic building blocks upon which individuals and
nations lay the foundations of their food, water and energy. Climate change
could lead to a fall in crop yield in the Sub-Continent by as much as 20-40 per
cent, dry areas experiencing massive
increases in rainfall and warmer and more humid conditions. This has already
been witnessed in many parts of India, leading
to malaria in new areas and the worsening of infection rates in those already
affected.
Scientists have now predicted,
Beckett informed, that one billion people in the South Asian Sub-Continent were
likely to suffer from the reduction in Himalayan melt-water and from changes in
the monsoon that would make it “more variable, less
predictable and more prone to extremes”. In this connection, she said that India had the
technological capacity to move towards three clean energy markets-- wind, solar
and bio-fuel plus fuel cells that were expected to grow four fold and reach $
167 million by 2015.
A way of life which embodies
exorbitance, waste and excess now
bears upon providing resource-base. And, with the demands of the industrialized
and also of Asian giants (Japan,
China and India) no
alternative concrete path has yet been crafted. Thus, these warnings to both
the developed and the emerging economies need to examined as the future appears
quite bleak if corrective measures are not taken now.
Another very significant report of the
WWF, Living Planet Report 2006, has
revealed that nature is being stripped by humans at an unprecedented rate and
will need two planets worth of natural resources every year on current trends
by 2050. It has clearly stated that the footprint from use of fossil fuel, whose heat-trapping emissions are widely blamed for rising temperatures,
was the fastest growing cause of strain. “Much will depend on the decisions
made by China, India and other
rapidly developing countries”, the WWF Director General, James Leape has observed.
However, the promiscuous life styles of countries such as the US, UK,
and Canada
need to be checked to save the planet from its degradation.
The alternative strategy for a
low-carbon economy has to be made mandatory not only to check greenhouse gas
emissions but to save the planet.
Already the population of many species, from fish to mammals has fallen by
about a third from 1970 to 2003. This is largely because of human threats such
as pollution, contamination by 40,000 or so chemicals, effects on climate
change, clearing of forests and over-fishing etc. It is not the salvaging of
the social and economic system that should be at the heart of the current
emergency but a reassurance that the
resource-base upon which systems depends will be conserved so that it may
provide a secure sufficiency for all humanity for an indefinite period.
Keeping in view these happenings the
world over, the warnings have to be taken seriously and a sustainable
development strategy evolved. As countries work to improve the well–being of
their people, they should keep in mind that there is need to match development
strategies with sustainable solutions. It is inevitable that any disconnect
will “limit the abilities of poor countries to develop and rich countries to
maintain their prosperity”. ---INFA
(Copyright,
India News and Feature Alliance)
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